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This dissertation is a collection of three essays on personnel economics.
The rst essay studies bonus payments in a hierarchical rm. A well-documented
nding in the internal labor markets literature is that the size of bonus payments
increases as one moves up the corporate ladder. Two existing theories that can be
used to explain this nding cannot fully capture the empirical patterns of the size of
bonus payments. I develop a unied framework that can better match the empirical
ndings. Using a dynamic tournament model augmented with an asymmetric learn-
ing structure in which the current employer has an informational advantage over
its competitors regarding the worker's productivity, my model oers an economic
rationale for the employer's decision on the size of bonus payments by identifying
two counteracting mechanisms that determine bonuses. Specically, the size of bonus
payments increases with the level of eort the employer aims to induce, but decreases
with the size of the worker's career-concern incentives. I test the model's predictions
using data from the personnel records of a medium-sized rm in the nancial services
industry. The results provide direct evidence for the model's predictions.
The second essay investigates how salaries and bonus payments are related to
turnover. In contrast with the existing literature, this study treats bonus payments
as a distinct type of compensation, rather than aggregating them with salaries. The
rst part of the empirical analysis focuses on data coming from the personnel records
of a medium-sized U.S. rm. I nd that earning a bonus in the current period, as
well as the size of the bonus, is negatively related to the probability of turnover
after controlling for the size of salary or the growth rate of salary. These results
also indicate that the growth rate of salary is negatively related to turnover, while
results concerning the eect of the size of salaries are mixed. The second part of the
empirical analysis uses a sample drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). The results show that salary, both in terms of size and growth rate, has a
negative eect on the probabilities of quits and layos; whereas the negative eect
of bonus payments is more evident in layos than quits.
This third essay examines conditions under which employee referrals serve a
screening function. Unlike the existing theoretical work, the possibility of a con-
ict of interest arising between the rm and current employees during the referral
process is investigated. I consider two potential mechanisms that lead to a conict of
interest. First, I examine how the employee's social connections relate to his referral
decision. I show that the employee nds it optimal to refer applicants with whom
he has a strong social connection rather than applicants of high ability. Second, I
examine how the employee's promotion prospects aect his referral decisions. Specif-
ically, I posit that the current employee will have incentives to refer an applicant of
lower ability if he faces any possibility of competition for promotions between him-
self and the newly hired worker. In either of these situations, employee referrals may
not provide screening of more able workers. Finally, I show that the rm can make
use of referral bonuses, which are contingent on the referral's performance, to align
incentives of the employee with those of the rm.
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CHAPTER 1
BONUS PAYMENTS IN A CORPORATE HIERARCHY: THEORY
AND EVIDENCE
1.1 Introduction
Incentives to workers within a corporate hierarchy are provided in various forms;
explicit incentives come with the compensation package a job entails, whereas implicit
incentives are embedded in the job itself in the form of potential future benets. The
rm, which has the authority to direct resources in the most favorable way according
to its objectives, needs to provide the `best' mixture of incentives to elicit optimal
performance from its employees. Hence, it is very hard, if possible, to analyze one
form of incentives thoroughly without any reference to its relations to others. By
taking this perspective, the current paper scrutinizes how bonuses are aligned with
other forms of incentives in a hierarchical rm.
One empirically well-documented nding about bonuses is that the size of bonus
payments increases as one moves up the hierarchy (e.g., Lambert, Larcker, and
Weigelt, 1993; Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom, 1994a,b; Smeets and Warzynski, 2008).
However, the economic rationale behind this nding is not well understood. Hence,
this paper attempts to shed light on this issue by studying how bonus contracts are
determined in a hierarchical rm. In doing that, the model incorporates two sep-
arate strands in the literature that examine performance-pay contracts. The rst
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one focuses on the most evident function of performance-pay contracts, which is to
implement the ecient level of eort, and examines how the size of performance-pay
contracts is related to the level of eort the employer aims to induce. The second
one focuses on the career-concern incentives of workers that result from the market's
gradual learning about the worker's ability, and examines how the presence of career-
concern incentives aects compensation contracts. As will be shown, the theoretical
model that adapts these two incentive mechanisms for a corporate hierarchy better
explains the empirical patterns than either of the two can do on its own. Therefore,
this paper primarily attempts to reconcile the theory of bonus contracts with the
empirical ndings regarding the size of bonus payments in a corporate setting.
In the rst part of the paper, I develop a theoretical model in which incentive
eects of bonuses can be examined in conjunction with the worker's career-concern
incentives. In doing that, the paper develops a theoretical framework in which a
clear distinction is made between functions of salary and bonuses, and both explicit
incentives from bonuses and career-concern incentives are incorporated. Accord-
ingly, bonuses are used to implement the ecient level of eort, whereas the size
of salary is determined to ensure that wage oers made by competing rms do not
surpass the wage contract oered by the current employer. The worker's career-
concern incentives arise from the asymmetric learning structure between the current
employer and potential employers regarding the worker's productivity. The model
yields three predictions regarding how bonus payments are related to job levels and
career-concern incentives of the worker. These predictions are used to distinguish
the current model from two competing theories that can also be used to explain
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why bonuses increase with job level. The second part of the paper uses personnel
data from a medium-sized hierarchical rm to investigate the extent to which these
predictions are consistent with the data. The empirical analysis suggests that the
model proposed in the current paper better matches the data than the competing
explanations.
As the theoretical model will demonstrate, incentives provided to a worker who
is employed in a hierarchical rm are not limited to her compensation contract.
Consider a worker whose compensation contract includes a base salary and a bonus
contingent on her performance. The compensation contract provides the worker
with incentives to put forth eort. Besides the compensation contract, however, the
worker is also provided with implicit incentives due to the hierarchical structure of
the rm. The fact that the worker enjoys higher wages as she climbs up the job
ladder provides her with incentives to exert more eort. Moreover, the worker also
has incentives to improve wage oers made by potential employers since they in
turn determine her compensation contract at the current rm. Therefore, the bonus
contract should be examined within the incentive structure of the hierarchical rm
which, as the discussion demonstrates, is not limited to the compensation contract
alone.
Having argued that dierent forms of incentives provided to the worker should
be examined jointly, I develop a theoretical framework that incorporates dierent
incentives. Borrowing the terminology of Gibbons and Murphy (1992), who study
the career-concern incentives of CEOs, I assume that the worker's explicit incen-
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tives come from the bonus contract, as in their work. To incorporate the career-
concern incentives, an asymmetric learning structure between the current employer
and potential employers is employed (e.g., Zabojnik and Bernhardt, 2001; Ghosh
and Waldman, 2010). Hence, not only the bonus contract but also the fact that
the worker can earn higher wages by improving the current employer's perception
about her ability (thereby improving the market's perception through promotions)
provides the worker with the implicit incentives to exert eort. Note that implicit
incentives are not a part of the wage contract, but they result from the employer's
gradual learning about the worker's ability. Finally, as there are multiple periods
with hierarchical job levels in the model, it builds upon Rosen's (1986) multi-stage
elimination tournament model. This framework will help examine how bonuses are
related to other forms of incentives, and oers a rationale for why bonuses increase
with hierarchical level.
To model a corporate hierarchy in which the possibility of upward mobility gener-
ates career-concern incentives for workers, I employ the tournament approach where
prizes are endogenously determined via the competition in the labor market. Unlike
the early generation of tournament models in which the employer sets prizes to elicit
optimal eort from its employees (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), the approach used here
makes use of an asymmetric information structure between the current employer and
potential employers about the worker's ability level in order to generate competition
to raid more productive workers.1 In this setup, the current employer revises its
1See Waldman (2011) for a comparison of the two approaches to modeling promotion tourna-
ments.
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beliefs about a worker's ability after observing the worker's output, and it makes
a promotion decision which serves as a signal of the worker's ability to the market
(Waldman, 1984). Consequently, the promotion premium (and also any `punish-
ment' for being passed over for a promotion decision) is determined by the market
demand for the worker. Even though the current employer has an informational
advantage over its competitors regarding the worker's productivity, it does not have
direct control over prizes associated with promotions.2
Bonuses are incorporated into the model by imposing a wage contract which is
composed of a base salary and a bonus contingent on worker performance. The
worker earns a bonus each period if the level of her output meets a threshold output
level, which is determined in accordance with the production limits at the corre-
sponding job level. As promised, both explicit and implicit incentives are embedded
in the model. The worker is provided with explicit incentives through the com-
pensation package, which includes a base salary and a bonus based on individual
performance, and implicit incentives through promotions and wage oers made by
potential employers.
The model shows that the bonus contract used by the employer to implement
the ecient level of eort is determined by two counteracting mechanisms. First,
returns to ability at a given job level determine the ecient level of eort. Therefore,
2Starting with the seminal work of Gibbons and Katz (1992), there is a large body of empirical
literature that tests asymmetric learning in labor markets. Recent empirical work that nds sup-
porting evidence of asymmetric learning includes Kahn (2009), Pinkston (2009), and Hu and Taber
(2011). DeVaro and Waldman (2012) focus on the promotion-as-signal hypothesis and nd sup-
porting evidence for workers with bachelors and master degrees, and mixed evidence for high-school
graduates and PhDs.
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as returns to ability increase with job level, the employer oers higher bonuses to
workers assigned to higher job levels. This feature of the model is in line with
Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009) who show that the performance-pay increases
with the returns to eort. Second, the career-concern incentive of the worker reduces
the bonus contract. This follows from the feature of the optimal contract which is
to balance between explicit and implicit incentives provided to the worker (Gibbons
and Murphy, 1992). The size of the career-concern incentive depends on the worker's
job level and age, thus its eect on the bonus contract changes with job level and
age. Accordingly, the rst two predictions derived by assessing the eects of the
two mechanisms on the bonus contract compare the size of bonus payments across
job level and age, while the third one focuses on the relation between the bonus
contract and the career-concern incentives of the worker. The testable predictions
of the model are as follows: i) controlling for age, bonus payments increase with job
level; ii) holding job level constant, bonus payments increase with age; and iii) the
bonus payment in the current period is negatively related to the expected prize for
promotion.
The implication of the rst prediction is that bonuses paid to workers of the same
age group increase with job level. To illustrate the intuition behind this prediction,
compare two middle-aged workers at dierent job levels. Two counteracting mecha-
nisms aect the size of bonus payments for the middle-aged worker. First, as returns
to ability are greater at the higher job level, the ecient level of eort is also higher
at the same job level. Therefore, the employer oers a larger bonus contract to the
worker at the higher job level. Second, the worker at the higher job level has stronger
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career-concern incentives to put forth eort, thus she is oered lower bonuses. I show
that the rst eect dominates the second eect, so that the worker at the higher job
level is oered a larger bonus contract. For old workers, however, only the rst eect,
that is returns to ability increase with job level, drives the result. This is due to the
fact that old workers do not have incentives from career concerns since their career
prospects are limited.
The second prediction states that among workers at the same job level, older
ones are eligible for higher bonuses. The intuition behind this prediction is similar
to the argument made by Gibbons and Murphy (1992). Workers who are close to
retirement have weaker career-concern incentives since they have fewer opportunities
for promotions, and also fewer periods to collect future benets. Therefore, their
wage contracts must include higher bonuses to maintain incentives to induce the
ecient level of eort. Note that since workers in comparison are assumed to be at
the same job level in this prediction, returns to ability are the same for them. Hence,
the disparity in career-concern incentives remains as the only eect that implies
bonuses of dierent sizes.
The third prediction stems from the tradeo between explicit and implicit in-
centives provided to the worker. Note that a worker who is promoted to the next
job level experiences an increase in her expected compensation for the next period.
Therefore, the possibility of earning a promotion provides the worker with implicit
incentives to exert eort in the current period. As will be discussed in detail, the
optimal contract balances incentives provided through the bonus contract and in-
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centives provided through the possibility of promotions. Therefore, if the increase
in the expected compensation in the next period gets larger, the employer reduces
the bonus contract as a response. Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that the prize for
promotion (that is, the wage spread between the winner and the loser of a given
tournament) can be used to induce the ecient eort level. The logic of this pre-
diction is consistent with their argument, yet its focus is dierent. Accordingly, this
prediction maintains that the composition of incentives provided to the worker can
be changed without altering the ecient level of eort.
The second part of the paper tests the empirical predictions using personnel
data from a medium-sized hierarchical rm. The same data was rst analyzed by
Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a,b) in their inuential studies that gave a very
detailed examination of the internal organization and pay dynamics of the rm.3 The
original data are a 20-year unbalanced panel of all managerial employees in one rm;
however, I will use its last 7-year sub-period in which bonus data is available. This
data set is well-suited for the purposes of the current paper because in addition to
having information on salary, bonus and performance ratings, it also includes detailed
information on the rm's hierarchy that Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom constructed
using the raw data on job titles and typical movements across job titles.
As the theoretical model demonstrates, in equilibrium more able workers are as-
signed to higher job levels. This may bias the point estimates of job levels since
presumably more able workers earn higher bonuses. To address this potential bias, I
3Other studies that employ the same data set include Gibbs (1995), Kahn and Lange (2010),
and DeVaro and Waldman (2012).
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exploit the panel aspect of the data by employing a xed-eects specication. This
estimator will eliminate selection bias operating through a time-invariant worker-
specic heterogeneity term. To illustrate the eects of worker heterogeneity on pa-
rameter estimates, I report the ordinary least-squares regression results as a bench-
mark. As will be discussed in detail, the detailed information about workers' per-
formance ratings and job histories enables me to further check the robustness of the
results.
The empirical analysis provides supporting evidence of the model's prediction.
Specically, regression results show that the size of bonus payments increases with
job level even when one controls for the worker's age, and that the size of bonus
payments increases with the worker's age after controlling for job level. As for the
third prediction, the results indicate that an increase in the expected prize for a
promotion in the next period leads to a decrease in bonuses earned in the current
period. Therefore, they suggest a trade-o between the worker's explicit incentives
from bonuses and her implicit incentives that arise from the possibility of promotions.
Note that the empirical support for the predictions implies that the theoretical
model developed in this paper better matches the data than the competing theories
in the literature. In particular, the idea that returns to ability determine the size of
bonuses cannot explain why bonuses in a given job level increase with the worker's
age, while the idea of career-concern incentives cannot explain why bonuses increase
with job level after controlling for the worker's age. The third prediction, on the
other hand, combines the basic results of the baseline tournament model and the
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career-concerns model. Hence, it oers a novel prediction regarding the interplay
between bonus-based and promotion-based incentives.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work in
the literature. The theoretical model is presented in Section 3, which includes the
analysis of the model and a discussion of its testable implications. Section 4 describes
the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 5 begins with a preliminary analysis
of the rm's bonus policy, and then it discusses econometric specications to test the
predictions and the subsequent results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
1.2 Related Literature
Stemming from the seminal analysis of Lazear and Rosen (1981), the literature on the
tournament approach to internal-labor-market compensation has grown enormously.4
Among others, two important extensions to the benchmark tournament approach are
the main ingredients of the framework presented in this paper. The rst extension is
Rosen's (1986) multi-stage tournament model, and the second extension is the one
that incorporates market demand into the determination of prizes (Zabojnik and
Bernhardt, 2001; Ghosh and Waldman, 2010).
In their benchmark model, Lazear and Rosen (1981) consider a single rm that
establishes a tournament for two risk-neutral identical workers. Since workers' eort
4For a detailed discussion of the tournament literature and references to early works, see Gibbons
and Waldman (1999), Prendergast (1999), Waldman (2010), Lazear and Oyer (2010), and references
therein.
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choices are not observable by the rm, it employs a compensation scheme that is
based on workers' output levels. Accordingly, the rm commits to prizes for the
winner and the loser of the tournament, where the winner is the worker who produced
more than the other worker. By choosing the dierence between the two wages, i.e.,
the spread, the rm can implement the ecient level of eort.
Since I consider multiple levels, the approach used to model promotions in this
paper is closest in spirit to that of Rosen (1986) who extends the benchmark tourna-
ment model to multiple levels. Rosen's model has a single elimination tournament
with a single winner at the end of the tournament. In that setup, each round can be
interpreted as a competition for promotions. Assuming identical risk-neutral workers
exerting the same constant eort level from round to round, he shows that prizes for
promotions (i.e., the spread between the winner's and the loser's wages in a given
round) are constant, except in the last round where there is a discretely higher prize.
A number of important dierences between the two models needs to emphasized.
First, in Rosen's model there are not dierent jobs with dierent production tech-
nologies. Therefore, promotions do not lead to a change in tasks to be performed by
the winner of a given round or to dierent ecient eort levels. Second, he assumes
the rm can commit to future prizes associated with promotions. As discussed in
more detail below, my model has an asymmetric learning structure that leads to wage
increases upon promotions being endogenously determined via the labor market. Fi-
nally, Rosen's model does not have any type of performance pay, including bonuses,
which is the main focus of the current paper. Consequently, my model builds upon
Rosen's, and it extends his results in two ways. First, promotions serve both as a
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sorting mechanism, in which more able workers are assigned to jobs that have higher
returns to ability, and as an incentive mechanism, in which wage increases upon
promotions provide implicit incentives to the worker to exert more eort. Second,
consistent with the empirical evidence, the result that prizes for promotions increase
with job level is not conned to the very last level.
Having an asymmetric learning structure between the current employer and po-
tential employers has two roles in the model proposed in this paper. First, it in-
corporates labor market demand into the determination of prizes associated with
promotions. The current employer privately observes the output realization of the
worker, and makes a promotion decision. Potential employers that cannot observe
the worker's output use the promotion decision as a signal of the worker's ability,
and make wage oers consistent with the signal. As a result, workers who are pro-
moted receive higher wage oers that the current employer has to match to retain the
worker. Unlike the early tournaments models, the current employer cannot commit
to future prizes associated with promotions since they are determined via the labor
market demand for the worker.
In this regard, the model proposed in the current paper is similar to that of
Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001) and Ghosh and Waldman (2010), yet both papers
have dierent foci and major dierences as well. Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001)
use a model in which workers choose the level of human capital accumulation that
can aect their probability of winning a promotion to oer an explanation to the
rm-size wage eect and inter-industry wage dierentials. In Ghosh and Waldman
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(2010), on the other hand, promotions serve as incentives for worker eort and to
allocate workers to jobs according to their capabilities. Using this approach, they
attempt to shed light on the choice between standard promotion practices and up-or-
out contracts. However, the current model departs from them in an important way;
accordingly, the current model indicates that the employer can use bonus contracts
to implement the ecient level of eort, whereas the ecient level of eort (or, the
ecient level of human capital investment) may not be possible to induce in their
models.
The second role of the asymmetric learning structure is to provide career-concern
incentives to the worker.5 In this regard, the most relevant work is by Gibbons and
Murphy (1992) who examine how career concern incentives aect performance pay
contracts. To do so, they employ the idea of symmetric learning in which all labor
market participants, including potential employers, observe the output realization
of the worker and use that additional information to update their beliefs about
the worker's ability.6 They show that the optimal wage contract should optimize
implicit incentives, which arise from career concerns, and explicit incentives from the
compensation contract, by making one stronger when the other one is weaker. One
5The idea that the worker has implicit incentives was rst proposed by Fama (1980) and Holm-
strom (1999), and it is called career concerns in the literature. This strand of the literature maintains
that the worker has incentives to exert eort not just to maximize her contemporaneous benets
but also to aect the market's perception regarding her unobserved skills in order to improve her
future benets. Workers improve the market's perception by producing high output levels which are
publicly observable in their approach. In that sense, employing an asymmetric learning structure
yields results consistent with their argument since the output is privately observed by the current
employer, but promotion decisions are observed by all labor market participants.
6Andersson (2002) extends their model by examining the case in which potential employers that
do not observe wage contracts use incomes to estimate the worker's ability level, and shows that
the worker's eort is distorted upward and the distortion positively depends on turnover.
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empirical implication of this argument is that performance pay should increase with
age since workers close to retirement have weaker career concern incentives. Using
data on CEO compensation, they nd supporting evidence for this hypothesis.
My theoretical model contrasts with that put forward by Gibbons and Mur-
phy (1992) in three major ways. First, they assume symmetric learning about the
worker's ability, whereas I employ asymmetric learning as discussed above. Their
second crucial assumption is workers are risk-averse. Indeed, career concerns would
be entirely eliminated by optimal contracts if workers were assumed to be risk neu-
tral in their model. My model, on the contrary, shows that career concerns still
arise even with risk neutral workers, owing to the presence of the asymmetric learn-
ing mechanism. Third, they do not model promotions, thus there is a single job at
which the worker remains throughout her career.
Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009) study how the prevalence of performance-
pay contracts can aect wage inequality. Even though their main focus is not relevant
to the current paper, their theoretical model oers a potential explanation for why
bonuses increase with job level. Their model focuses on how rms choose between
performance-pay contracts and xed-wage contracts. Accordingly, at the time of
hiring rms have very limited information about the worker's ability, which may
result in a mismatch between the worker's capabilities and the employer's expecta-
tions. The use of performance-pay contracts can mitigate the loss in productivity
that results from this mismatch. The introduction of this type of contract is not
costless, though, since it requires monitoring workers' performance that eventually
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determines their payments. Hence, the employer chooses performance-pay contracts
over xed-wage contracts when the gain in productivity resulting from the use of the
former exceeds its cost.7 They derive testable implications from the model, and test
them using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
One implication of their model is that wages given a performance-pay job increase
with the returns to eort. Using the observation that returns to eort are higher
at higher job levels (Rosen, 1982), this argument can be extended to explain why
bonuses increase with job level. That is to say, bonuses increase with job level because
returns to eort increase with job level and pay tied to performance increases with
returns to eort.
There are thus two competing theories that can also explain why bonuses increase
with job level. First, the argument made by Gibbons and Murphy (1992) implies
that bonuses go up with job level because workers at higher job levels are older on
average, and therefore they must be compensated for lack of, or diminished, career-
concern incentives. However, as a distinguishing feature, the current model yields the
testable prediction that bonuses increase with job level even if age is held constant.
Second, as Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009) demonstrate in their model, as
returns to eort are greater at higher job levels the employer will oer bonuses of
larger size to workers at higher job levels. However, contrary to the implication of
their argument that all workers at the same job level are eligible for bonuses of the
same size since returns to eort are the same, the current model shows that workers
7This argument was originally proposed by Lazear (1986).
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at the same job level may be eligible for bonuses of dierent sizes due to disparities
in their career-concern incentives. More specically, it indicates that older workers
are eligible for higher bonuses than their counterparts at the same job level.
In related work, Boschmans (2008) examines the eect of promotions on
performance-pay contracts. In a three-period model, he focuses on a single rm
with two job levels. He shows that since workers assigned to the higher job level
have no further promotion opportunities, their wage contracts should be tied more
directly to performance. The intuition behind this result is in line with the current
model; old workers who have no promotion prospects are provided with incentives
for eort only through bonus payments. However, his model does not address the
issue of how the worker's career-concern incentives aect the size of bonus payments
at dierent job levels and at various stages of the worker's career. Nor does he ex-
amine the interplay between the worker's incentives from bonus payments and her
career-concern incentives. On the contrary, the current paper addresses both of these
issues and provides empirical evidence for the model's predictions.
1.3 Model
In this section I develop a theoretical model that focuses on the worker's incentives
in a corporate setting. I present the model in pieces. I rst present the basic setup
and the timing of the model. Next, I discuss the properties of the equilibrium I focus
on. Then, starting with the last period, I present the optimal wage contract for each
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period. I nish this section with a discussion of testable predictions derived from the
model. All derivations and proofs are provided in the Appendix.
1.3.1 Basic Setup and Timing
I consider a three-period model with free entry and identical rms that produce
output using labor as the only input. In each period labor supply is xed at one
unit for each worker whose career lasts three periods. Without loss of generality,
each worker is referred to as young in period 1, middle-aged in period 2, and old
in period 3. The worker's (innate) ability is denoted  and distributed according
to F(:) with support in [L; H ] ; H > L. None of the labor market participants
including the worker himself observes the true value of , while its distribution is
common knowledge. The asymmetric information structure of the model is built on
how rms gradually learn about a worker's ability. The current employer privately
observes the output realization of the worker at the end of each period, and uses
that information to revise its beliefs regarding the worker's ability. It then uses the
additional information when making a promotion decision. Potential employers, on
the other hand, use the promotion decision as a signal of ability.
Each rm consists of three jobs denoted job 1 to job 3, and the worker can
produce either high or low output in each job level. Let yj 2 fY jL ; Y jHg be the output
produced in job level j, j = 1; 2; 3, and , Y jH > Y
j
L . If worker i is assigned to job j in
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period t, the probability of producing the high level of output is given by
Pr(yijt = Y
j
H) = [eijti]; (1.1)
where eijt is the eort exerted by worker i assigned to job j in period t.
8 Note that
using the multiplicative specication means that eort and ability are complements.9
Rosen (1982) illustrates that decisions of those in higher job levels are more
vital to the organization since they have implications for the marginal productivity
of workers in lower job levels, and consequently that returns to ability are convex.
Therefore, poor performance of workers in higher positions reduces the rm's prots
more severely. To incorporate this, I assume that Y jL > Y
j+1
L for j = 1; 2. Further,
I assume that [Y j+1H   Y j+1L ] > [Y jH   Y jL ] for all j, so the impact of ability on the
expected output increases with job level.10
If a worker is employed by the same rm in a subsequent period, she becomes
more productive owing to her rm-specic human capital.11 Accordingly, the worker
produces skyj if she remains at her current employer, and produces hyj if she gets
a new job in the market, where s (h) represents the accumulation of rm-specic
(general) human capital, and k denotes the tenure at the current rm. I make the
8Since Pr(yijt = Y
j
H) 2 [0; 1], eijt is dened on the interval [0; 1=H ].
9The binary specication of output is not important for the results presented in the paper, and
it is adopted for analytical tractability.
10One can generalize the model by assuming Pr(yijt = Y
j
H) = cj [eijti]. In that case, this
assumption would be replaced by cj+1[Y
j+1
H   Y j+1L ] > cj [Y jH   Y jL ] and cj > 0 for all j. Note that
the order of cj 's could have an intuitive meaning; for example, assuming c3 > c2 > c1 > 0 would
imply that the impact of ability (or eort) on the probability of producing the high level of output
increases with job level. Note that the current model normalizes cj to 1 for all j.
11Note that this is true even if the worker changes her job level at the same rm. Therefore,
building up the rm-specic human capital is independent of job level.
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assumption that s3 > s2 > 1, so that the worker's output increases with tenure at
the rm, and that sk > h  1, so that the expression sk   h can be interpreted as
the rm-specicity of human capital.12 The worker could build up her rm-specic
human capital either through learning-by-doing or through on-the-job training (OJT)
provided by the rm. Since it is not the primary interest of the paper, the mechanism
to build rm-specic human capital is not modeled.
I assume that employers cannot oer long-term contracts, i.e., they cannot com-
mit to a specic wage prole or promotion decisions in subsequent periods. Also,
potential employers do not observe bonuses. In order to draw out the implications of
the interaction between the bonus contract and career-concern incentives that arise
from the hierarchical structure of the rm, I also assume that output is contractible
but not publicly observable.13 As a result, each period a single-period wage contract
that consists of a base salary  and a bonus payment , which is paid if the worker
produces the high output in that period, is oered to workers. Therefore, a wage
contract in period t takes the general form wjt(yjt) = jt + Bjt, where Bjt = jt if
yjt = Y
j
H , and zero otherwise. Note that given the binary output structure, this wage
contract is ecient since it yields the rst-best eort level.14
12Note that if h = 1, then none of the human capital the worker builds at the current rm is
transferable to another rm in the market. Also, this specication implies that the worker does not
accumulate general human capital over time. However, this assumption does not drive the results
of the paper, and is used as a simplication.
13In other words, the employer can credibly reveal output to the court, but output is not ob-
servable by rival rms. Mukherjee (2008) and Koch and Peyrache (2009) make use of the same
assumption to allow for output-contingent payments in the presence of career concerns.
14Note that the mechanism that allocates bonuses to workers does not allow any distortionary
actions that could be taken by employees since it is assumed that the rm directly observes the
output level produced by the worker, and decides if the worker merits the bonus, or not. Several au-
thors discuss how a supervisor, whose responsibility includes assessing the worker performance, may
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Assume that rms and workers are risk neutral, and that both of them have a
discount rate of zero. Let the worker have the following utility function:
U(w1; w2; w3; e1; e2; e3) =
3X
t=1
[wt   g(et)];
where wt is the wage paid in period t and g(et) is the disutility of exerting eort level
et. I assume that function g(:) is strictly increasing and convex (i.e., g
0 > 0; g00 > 0)
and g(0) = 0.
The structure of the game, similar to that in Ghosh and Waldman (2010), is as
follows. In period one, all workers are ex-ante identical and assigned to job level 1
given a parameter restriction imposed below. After being assigned to job level 1,
each worker chooses an eort level, which is privately known by the worker himself,
and output is realized. The output realization yi1, which is privately observed by
the current employer and the worker, conveys some information about the worker's
innate ability. Using that, the current employer updates its beliefs regarding the
worker's ability and makes a promotion decision at the beginning of the second
period. Potential employers, which do not have any information about the worker's
ability, use the promotion decision made by the current rm as a signal of ability
and make wage oers. Then, the current employer is allowed to make a counter-oer
after observing the wage oers made by the potential employers. Finally, the worker
chooses a rm for which to work in the second period after comparing the wage oers.
cause a misallocation of monetary rewards. For example, Milgrom and Roberts (1988), and Mil-
grom (1988) discuss how employees may indulge in inuence activities to improve their performance
reports; Prendergast and Topel (1996) suggest that supervisors may favor some workers purely for
exogenous reasons; Fairburn and Malcomson (2001) discuss conditions under which employees may
bribe the supervisor to earn the monetary reward contingent on the worker performance.
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I assume when the current employer and the market make wage contracts that induce
the same expected utility level, the worker remains with the current employer.15 The
same sequence of events is repeated in the last period, and the worker retires at the
end of period three.
1.3.2 Equilibrium
I focus on perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of the model in which beliefs are de-
rived from Bayes' rule given equilibrium strategies, and equilibrium strategies are
optimal for employers and workers in each period of the game given beliefs. Note
that assuming a binary output structure simplies the analysis since it lets me focus
on the role of promotions in providing incentives, in conjunction with bonus pay-
ments, rather than dealing with ineciency results. When promotions serve as a
signal of the worker's ability, there is an incentive to distort the promotion decision.
However, this result is not relevant in the model proposed here for the following
reason. That the output is a binary outcome indicates that workers who produced
the same output are observationally the same to the current employer. Therefore,
if promotion decisions are distorted, the equilibrium does not entail turnover within
the rm. Since the focus of the paper is on incentive eects of job hierarchies and
bonuses, I will consider parameterizations that allow job-to-job mobility within the
rm, so that I can discuss how bonuses are aligned with incentives coming from the
hierarchical structure of the rm. Note that this simplication, which is natural in
15This condition is equivalent to assuming an innitesimal moving cost borne by the worker.
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the current context, indicates that promotion decisions are ecient and they convey
all private information the current employer has about the worker's ability.16
It is also worthwhile to highlight the role of rm-specic human capital on the
equilibrium of the model. The fact that the worker becomes more productive over
time at her current rm relative to other rms in the market increases the value of
the worker to the current employer. However, the worker cannot benet from that in
terms of higher expected wages since her outside option, which is determined by her
productivity in a competing rm, is not aected from her build-up of rm specic hu-
man capital.17 Therefore, the current employer earns positive rents from middle-aged
and old workers. As a result, even though both the current employer and potential
employers have the same information about the worker's ability in equilibrium, the
current employer has incentives to retain the worker owing to the presence of the
rm-specic human capital. Therefore, there is no turnover in equilibrium; workers
are retained by their rst period employers throughout their careers.
Starting with the last period, I solve the game backward. Subscript i will be
omitted in the rest of this section.
16An implication of this result is that the equilibrium I focus on is not characterized by a winner's
curse result in which potential employers are willing to oer the worker a wage contract which is
consistent with the belief that the worker has the lowest productivity among workers with the same
labor market signal (i.e., the same age and job assignment.).
17The extent to which the worker benets from her rm-specic human capital in terms of higher
wages depends on the degree of transferability of her human capital (measured by h). Accordingly,
as the transferability of human capital increases (i.e., as h increases), the worker receives higher
wage oers from the competing rms.
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The Third Period
In the beginning of the third period, the current employer updates its beliefs re-
garding the worker's ability after observing her output in the second period. There-
fore, the expected probability of a worker producing the high level of output in
the last period if assigned to job j is given by pej(y1; y2) = ej
e
3(y1; y2), where
e3(y1; y2) = E[jy1; y2].18 The current employer's optimization problem which is
to nd the optimal contract for this period is given by
max
j3;j3
s3[p
e
j(y1; y2)[Y
j
H   Y jL ] + Y jL ]  pej(y1; y2)j3   j3
subject to
ejargmaxbej[eL;eH ]j3 + p
e
j(y1; y2; bej)j3   g(bej); (1.2)
j3 + p
e
j(y1; y2)j3   g(ej)  U3(y1; y2); (1.3)
where (1.2) is the incentive constraint, and (1.3) is the participation constraint.
Note that (1.3) implies that the optimal contract must give the worker at least her
reservation utility, which is determined by the potential employers' demand for the
same worker. Since the output realizations of the worker are private information
for the current employer, the worker's outside option depends on the signals that
potential employers receive regarding the worker's ability level. As promotions that
serve as a signal of ability are determined by the worker's output realizations, the
outside option can be represented as a function of the worker's output history (y1; y2).
18Note that I suppress the ej 's in the notation for p
e
j(:) for the sake of expositional clarity.
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One can show that the optimal wage contract and the eort level induced by the
contract satises19
j3 = s3[Y
j
H   Y jL ]; (1.4)
j3 = U3(y1; y2)  [pej(y1; y2; ej)s3[Y jH   Y jL ]  g(ej)]; (1.5)
g0(ej) = 
e
3(y1; y2)s3[Y
j
H   Y jL ]: (1.6)
As (1.4) indicates, the bonus payment in the last period is equal to the extra output
produced by the worker, thus it increases with job level.20 Since the worker's only
incentive to exert eort in the last period is provided by the bonus payment, as
indicated by (1.6), workers at higher job levels exert more eort in this period. An-
other implication of (1.6) is that the optimal eort level is increasing in the worker's
expected ability level. As will be shown, workers at higher job levels are of higher
ability in equilibrium, thus they exert more eort not only because their rewards
are greater but the marginal probability of earning them are also greater. Finally,
note that bonus contracts are the same for workers in the same job level, yet their
realized bonuses will dier since not all workers earn bonuses that they are eligible
for. Expected wages of workers at the same job level, on the other hand, dier if they
have dierent output histories. Output realizations determine promotions which, in
turn, are signals sent to the market. Therefore, the labor market has a more posi-
tive perception about the abilities of promoted workers than those of non-promoted
19As I explain in the Appendix, I employ the rst-order approach to solve for the optimal contract
(Rogerson, 1985).
20Bonuses take this simple form because the output has a binary structure and eort level is
a continuous variable. The employer sets the bonus payment equal to the additional output the
worker can produce, and lets the worker choose her eort level to equate the marginal cost of eort
to the expected marginal return.
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workers. As a result, promoted workers have higher reservation utilities since their
outside options are relatively better.
The Second Period
At the end of the rst period, the current employer privately observes what level of
output the worker produced and updates its beliefs regarding the worker's ability
to e2(y1) = E[jy1]. Using that additional information regarding workers' ability
level, it then makes a promotion decision for each worker. To do that, the current
employer solves for the optimal contract that will be oered to each middle-aged
worker depending on their rst period output realizations y1.
In solving for the optimal contract, the current employer maximizes its expected
prots from retaining the worker. Therefore, it takes expected prots both in the
second and third periods into account when choosing the optimal wage contract. Sim-
ilarly, the worker is concerned about her expected utility levels both in the second
and third periods when choosing what level of eort to put forth. Therefore, intro-
ducing some notation is necessary to formulate the problem properly. Let e3(y1; y2)
denote the expected prots of the current employer in the third period from retain-
ing a worker with output history (y1; y2), and U3(y1; y2) denote the same worker's
reservation utility in the third period. Finally, let pej(y1) = ej
e
2(y1) be the expected
probability of the worker producing the high level of output in job level j. Then, the
optimal contract for each job level can be found by solving the following optimization
25
problem:
max
j2;j2
s2[p
e
j(y1)[Y
j
H   Y jL ] + Y jL ]  pej(y1)j2   j2 + pej(y1)e3(y1; yH) + [1  pej(y1)]e3(y1; yL)
subject to
ejargmaxbej[eL;eH ]j2 + p
e
j(y1; bej)j2   g(bej) + pej(y1; bej)U3(y1; yH) + [1  pej(y1; bej)]U3(y1; yL);(1.7)
j2 + p
e
j(y1)j2   g(ej) + pej(y1)U3(y1; yH) + [1  pej(y1)]U3(y1; yL)  U2(y1); (1.8)
where (1.7) is the incentive constraint, and (1.8) is the participation constraint.
Using the rst-order conditions of this problem, one obtains
j2 = s2[Y
j
H   Y jL ] + [e3(y1; yH)  e3(y1; yL)] (1.9)
j2 = U2(y1)  [pej(y1)j2 + pej(y1)U3(y1; yH) + [1  pej(y1)]U3(y1; yL)  g(ej)] (1.10)
g0(ej) = 
e
2(y1)[j2 + [U3(y1; yH)  U3(y1; yL)]] (1.11)
Unlike old workers, middle-aged workers have both explicit and implicit incentives
to exert eort this period. As (1.11) indicates, the explicit incentives come from the
bonus payment, j2, which the worker earns if she produces high output this period.
In addition, the fact that the worker enjoys a higher utility level last period if she
produces high output this period, as indicated by the term [U3(y1; yH) U3(y1; yL)],
generates implicit incentives for the worker.
Note that the worker who produced the high level of output this period enjoys a
higher utility level in the last period, regardless of the current employer's promotion
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decision. If the worker is promoted to a higher job level after producing the high
level of output, potential employers updating their beliefs about the worker's ability
level make higher wage oers that could give the worker higher expected utility. This
part of the argument is simple. However, the same worker attains a higher expected
utility even if she is not given a promotion by her current employer. To illustrate
this, consider two middle-aged workers of whom only one produced the high level of
output. When neither of these two workers is promoted, potential employers have
no information to dierentiate between the two. As a result, they will oer the same
wage contract, i.e., the same base salary and bonus, to these workers. However,
both the current employer and workers observe what level of output is produced
by each worker, and update their beliefs accordingly. Thus, the current employer
believes that the successful worker is more likely to produce high output in the last
period. As a result, the expected utility from the wage contract oered by potential
employers will be higher for the successful worker even though the other worker is
made the same oer. Hence, as the reservation utility of the successful worker is
greater, she attains a higher utility level.
Rewriting (1.9) more explicitly makes it easier to interpret bonus payments and
relate them to career concerns.
j2 = s2[Y
j
H Y jL ]+s3[E[Y jy1; yH ] E[Y jy1; yL]] [U3(y1; yH) U3(y1; yL)] ; (1.12)
where  = [g(el;3)  g(em;3)] and l(m) is the worker's job level in period three if she
produced high (low) level of output in the second period, that is, if y2 = yH (y2 = yL).
The rst term in (1.12) is the additional output the worker can produce this period
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if the worker succeeds and the second term is the additional rents the employer can
extract next period given that the worker produced high output this period. The
third term in (1.12) reects the career concerns; it implies that the optimal bonus
contracts are adjusted to embody career-concern incentives by imposing a lower
bonus payment than there would be if there were no career concerns. The last term,
, reects the disutility of being in a higher job level in the last period. Since the
worker exerts higher eort at higher job levels, the worker incurs a higher disutility
of eort if she ends up working in a higher job level in the last period.
The First Period:
As all workers are ex-ante identical at the beginning of this period, the probability
of a worker producing the high level of output, pe1 = e1E[], is public information.
To decrease the number of cases to be considered, I assume that on average young
workers are more productive in job level 1.21 Therefore, they are assigned to job
level 1 at the beginning of their careers. As rms with symmetric information about
workers' abilities compete in the market for young workers, these workers are paid
their expected output in the current period plus the expected surplus they generate
in subsequent periods. Consequently, the employer earns zero prots from the hire,
i.e., the zero prot condition holds.
21That is, Y 1L + e

1E[Y
1
H   Y 1L ] > Y jL + ejE[Y jH   Y jL ] for j = 2; 3.
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The following problem characterizes the optimal wage contract for the rst period.
max
1;1
1 + p
e
11   g(e1) + pe1U2(yH) + [1  pe1]U2(yL)
subject to
e1argmaxbe1[eL;eH ]1 + p
e
1(be1)1   g(be1) + pe1(be1)U2(yH) + [1  pe1(be1)]U2(yL) (1.13)
pe1[Y
1
H   Y 1L ] + Y 1L   [1 + pe11] + pe1e2(yH) + [1  pe1]e2(yL)  0; (1.14)
where e2(y1) is the expected prots made by the current employer in the second
period if the worker produces y1 in the rst period, and U2(y1) is the same worker's
reservation utility in the second period. At this point, rms oer wage contracts that
maximize the worker's expected lifetime utility subject to the incentive compatibility
constraint (1.13), and zero-prot condition (1.14).
Note that the expected prots next period, e2(y1), implicitly includes the ex-
pected prots in the last period. Therefore, (1.14) ensures that the expected prots
from hiring a young worker generates non-negative prots to the rm. Since that
constraint is binding at the optimum, rms make zero expected prots from hiring
a young worker. Note that (1.13) ensures that the worker's optimal eort choice
maximizes her lifetime expected utility. Therefore, similar to middle-aged workers,
young workers also have incentives to produce the high level of output to enjoy higher
utility levels in subsequent periods.
The optimal wage contract for young workers is characterized by (1.15) through
(1.17).
1 = [Y
1
H   Y 1L ] + [e2(yH)  e2(yL)] (1.15)
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1 = Y
1
L + 
e
2(yL) (1.16)
g0(e1) = E[][1 + [U2(yH)  U2(yL)]] (1.17)
Similar to the second-period problem, (1.17) indicates that the worker has explicit
incentives from bonus payments and implicit incentives due to career concerns. The
optimal base salary and bonus payment in the rst period are easy to interpret: the
rm pays the worker the sum of the low level of output that can be produced this
period and the expected lowest prots made in the second period as a base salary.
The bonus payment, on the other hand, consists of the additional output when high
output is produced in the rst period plus the additional rent the worker can generate
in the second period.
1.3.3 Analysis and Testable Implications
In order to derive testable implications, my discussion focuses on parameterizations
for which in equilibrium there are strictly positive probabilities a worker remains
at her period-1 employer and earns a promotion in each period. Since the output
has a binary structure, these conditions indicate that the equilibrium entails realistic
results in which the worker is promoted to the next job level when she produces the
high level of output, and the current employer always has incentives to match the
outside wage oers to retain its employee. Also, parametric restrictions ensure that
the worker who produced the low level of output is not assigned to a lower job level,
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that is, she is not demoted.22
As indicated, it is ecient to assign all young workers to job 1. Since all employers
have exactly the same information about young workers' ability and there is free entry
to the market, the labor market for young workers mimics a perfectly competitive
market in the sense that employers make zero expected prots from hiring a young
worker. Consequently, all young workers, independent of their ability, earn higher
expected wages than their expected productivity.
Beginning with the second period, workers follow dierent career paths with
diverse earnings proles. Specically, young workers who produce the high level of
output earn the bonus they are eligible for, and they are promoted to job level 2
in the beginning of the second period. Young workers who produce the low level of
output, on the other hand, do not earn the bonus, and they remain at job level 1.
The following proposition formally states this result.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium behavior in the second period is as follows:
1. All middle-aged workers remain at their period-1 employers.
2. The middle-aged worker who produced YH in the rst period is promoted to job
level 2 at which she becomes eligible for the bonus equal to 22 = s2[Y
2
H  Y 2L ] +
[e3(yH ; yH)  e3(yH ; yL)], and attains the expected utility U2(yH).
3. The middle-aged worker who produced YL in the rst period is kept on job level
22Specic parametric restrictions that ensure these conditions are provided in the Appendix.
31
1. In that case, she becomes eligible for the bonus equal to 12 = s2[Y
1
H   Y 1L ] +
[e3(yL; yH)  e3(yL; yL)], and her expected utility is given by U2(yL).
Promotion decisions for old workers are similar to those for middle-aged workers.
Accordingly, middle-aged workers who produce the high level of output receive the
bonus, and they are promoted to the next job level in the last period, whereas their
counterparts who produce the low level of output do not receive the bonus and remain
at their current job level.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium behavior in the last period is as follows:
1. Regardless of promotion decisions, all old workers remain at their period-1
employers.
2. The old worker who produced YH at job level 2 in the second period is promoted
to job level 3 at which she becomes eligible for the bonus equal to 33 = s3[Y
3
H  
Y 3L ] and attains U2(yH ; yH).
3. The old worker who produced YL at job level 2 in the second period is kept on
the same job level. In that case, the worker becomes eligible for the bonus equal
to 23 = s3[Y
2
H   Y 2L ] and attains U2(yH ; yL) in the last period.
4. The old worker who produced YH at job level 1 in the second period is promoted
to job level 2 at which she becomes eligible for the bonus equal to 13 = s3[Y
2
H  
Y 2L ] and attains U2(yL; yH).
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5. The old worker who produced YL at job level 1 in the second period is kept on
the same job level. In that case, she becomes eligible for the bonus equal to
13 = s3[Y
1
H   Y 1L ] and attains U2(yL; yL).
As the discussion so far should have made clear, the main goal of the current model
is to examine how bonuses are aligned with other forms of incentives provided to the
worker. The employer's main intention in using bonus contracts is to implement the
ecient level of eort. In doing that, the employer takes the worker's career-concern
incentives into account as setting the optimal size of bonus payments. That is to
say, the size of bonus payments is determined in accordance with the total incentives
required to induce the ecient level of eort and the career-concern incentives of the
worker. As the employer needs to oer higher bonuses to implement a higher level
of eort, an increase in the ecient level of eort leads to an increase in the size
of bonus payments. On the other hand, the size of bonus payments is negatively
related to the size of the worker's career-concern incentives. That is, the employer
oers lower bonuses to workers whose career-concern incentives are stronger, and
vice versa.
Overall, the interaction between the two mechanisms, which are ecient levels
of eort and career-concern incentives, determine the size of bonus payments. As
both levels of ecient eort and career-concern incentives depend on the worker's
job level and age, comparison of bonus payments across job levels and age groups
provides the rst two testable predictions of the model.
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Corollary 1 Holding the worker's age constant, the size of bonus payments increases
with job level. That is, 22 > 12 and 33 > 23 > 13.
This prediction states that the size of bonus payments increases with job level both
for middle-aged and old workers. To see the intuition behind this, consider two
middle-aged workers at job levels 1 and 2. The ecient level of eort is higher at job
level 2 since returns to ability are greater at the same job level. Hence, other things
equal, the worker at job level 2 is oered a higher bonus contract than the worker at
job level 1. However, the career-concern incentives of the worker at job level 2 are
also higher.23 Therefore, incorporating the career-concern incentives reduces the size
of bonus payments of the worker at job level 2 relatively more. The juxtaposition
of these two opposite eects reveals that the former dominates the latter, thus the
worker at job level 2 is eligible to earn higher bonuses than the worker at job level 1
is. This follows from the fact that the worker's expected net surplus is convex with
respect to her expected ability. In other words, the worker at job level 2 is expected
produce a greater surplus both in the current period and the next period since her
expected ability is higher than the worker at job level 1.
Since this result holds despite the fact that the worker at job level 2 has stronger
career-concern incentives than the worker at job level 1, it may seem inconsistent
with the argument proposed by Gibbons and Murphy (1992). They show that the
optimal contract implies that the explicit incentives must be weaker for workers with
23As the model indicates, the reward for promotion increases with job level. Therefore, the worker
at job level 2 enjoys higher benets than the worker at job level 1 if she earns a promotion. This
disparity in rewards for promotion implies that the worker at job level 2 has higher career-concern
incentives than her counterpart at job level 1.
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stronger career-concern incentives. Yet, their argument assumes that the comparison
is made by holding the ecient level of eort the same across workers, which is not
the case in the current model. As higher job levels that entail greater returns to
ability are occupied by high-ability workers, the ecient level of eort increases with
job level. Therefore, the worker at the higher job level is oered larger bonuses even
though she also has stronger career-concern incentives.
Note that the mechanism driving the result diers for middle-aged and old work-
ers. That is, bonuses for middle-aged workers are adjusted to embody career concern
incentives, so higher bonuses reect the disparity both in career concern incentives
and returns to ability. Old workers, on the other hand, do not have career-concern
incentives since they retire at the end of the current period. Therefore, their bonus
payments, which are solely determined by the ecient level of eort, also increase
with job level.
The second prediction of the model, which is formally stated in Corollary 2,
illustrates how the size of bonus payments at a given job level changes with the
worker's age. Particularly, it indicates that among workers at the same job level
older ones are oered higher bonus contracts. The intuition for this result is similar
to that found in Gibbons and Murphy (1992): since the worker has weaker career-
concern incentives when she is closer to retirement, the employer needs to provide
her with stronger explicit incentives by oering higher bonuses.
Corollary 2 For a given job level j, the size of bonus payments increases with the
worker's age, that is, j3 > j2 for j = 1; 2.
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As should be clear from the discussion thus far, the worker is provided with explicit
incentives through bonuses and career-concern incentives through promotions. In
order to generate a testable prediction that addresses the relation between the two
forms of incentives, I conduct a comparative-statics analysis with respect to the
parameter h. Note that as h increases, the rm-specicity of human capital decreases,
that is, the worker can transfer more of her human capital built at the current rm to
competing rms in the market. In other words, the worker becomes more productive
at competing rms as h increases.
As discussed earlier, the period-1 employer earns zero expected rents from hir-
ing a young worker. Due to the presence of rm-specic human capital, however,
the period-1 employer earns positive rents from employment in subsequent periods.
The worker becomes more productive over time at her current rm by building up
rm-specic human capital. Yet, as wage contracts oered by potential employers
reect the worker's productivity at rival rms, they do not capture the increase in
the worker's productivity due to her rm-specic human capital. Consequently, the
current employer earns positive rents from its middle-aged and old employees. Note
that the size of economic rents the current employer earns from employment de-
pends on the degree of the rm-specicity of human capital. Specically, the current
employer earns higher rents if the rm-specicity of human capital is smaller.
An increase in the parameter h has two ramications. First, the worker's out-
side option increases since potential employers oer wage contracts that reect the
worker's productivity at competing rms. As outside wage oers increase more at
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higher job levels (due to the convexity result shown in the Appendix), the gain in the
expected utility from winning a promotion increases.24 In other words, the worker
is entitled to earn a higher reward for her good performance in the current period.
Hence, a decrease in the rm-specicity of human capital results in an increase in
the worker's career-concern incentives. Second, the current employer oers lower
bonus contracts. This follows since the bonus contract for the middle-aged worker
is adjusted to embody career-concern incentives. As the worker's career-concern
incentives increase, the employer oers lower bonuses since a part of the required in-
centives to induce the ecient level of eort is provided by the higher career-concern
incentives. The following corollary formally states this result.
Corollary 3 For a middle-aged worker, an increase in h (i.e., an increase in general
and decrease in the rm-specicity of human capital) leads to an increase in the gain
in the expected utility from winning a promotion and a decrease in the size of bonus
payments the worker earns in the current period. That is, an increase (decrease) in
[U3(y1; yH)  U3(y1; yL)] leads to a decrease (increase) in j2.
The result implies that the bonus payment, which gives the worker explicit incentives
to perform better, is negatively related to the implicit incentives provided through
the possibility of promotions. As discussed earlier, a worker who is promoted to
the next job level experiences a large increase in her expected utility for the next
24The gain in expected utility upon good performance (i.e., U3(y1; yH)   U3(y1; yL)) is dened
as the dierence between the expected utility of the old worker if she produces the high level of
output in the second period and her expected utility if she produces the low level of output in the
same period. In other words, it is the prize for a promotion (similar to the one dened by Lazear
and Rosen (1981)) expressed in expected utility terms.
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period. Therefore, the possibility of earning a promotion gives implicit incentives to
the worker to put forth more eort. Another crucial point in this exercise is that the
decrease in the rm-specicity of human capital does not change the ecient level
of eort since the total incentives provided to the worker remains the same. Yet,
it alters the composition of incentives oered to the worker by lowering the bonus
contract and increasing the prize for promotions.
Now let us turn to competing theories that also predict that bonuses increase
with job level. Using the idea of career concerns, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) show
that bonuses should increase with age since workers close to retirement have weaker
career concern incentives, and the optimal contract balances the explicit incentives
coming from bonuses and the implicit incentives arising from the worker's career
concerns. Applying this idea to internal labor markets, one can show that bonuses
increase with job level because workers at higher job levels are older on average,
thus they need to be provided higher bonuses to compensate for their diminished
career-concern incentives. The model presented in this paper, however, yields a
distinguishing prediction that bonuses increase with job level even if age is held
constant.
The second potential explanation makes use of the argument that performance
pay increases with job level because returns to eort are greater at higher job levels.
This result is derived from the employer's prot maximization problem; when returns
to eort are higher, the employer oers higher performance pay in order to implement
the ecient level of eort. Using this reasoning, Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent
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(2009) build a theoretical model in which performance pay increases with returns
to eort and examine how the prevalence of performance pay in high-paying jobs
contributes to earnings inequality.
Their argument implies that workers at the same job level should be eligible
for bonuses of the same size since returns to eort are the same. However, the
model I develop in the paper predicts that the age of the worker has a signicant
eect on bonuses since the employer takes the worker's career-concern incentives into
consideration when setting the bonus contract. In particular, among workers at the
same job level, younger ones have stronger career concern incentives. Therefore, the
employer uses lower bonuses to elicit the ecient level of eort from young workers.
The predictions that will be tested in the next section can be summarized as
follows: i) Controlling for the worker's age, the size of bonus payments increases
with job level; ii) controlling for job level, the size of bonus payments increases with
the worker's age; and iii) controlling for the worker's performance, the size of bonus
payments in the current period is negatively related to the size of promotion prizes.
Before turning to the empirical analysis of these testable predictions, let me
discuss how the theoretical results regarding the optimal wage contracts would be
aected if the standard tournament approach were used to model promotions. Recall
that in the standard tournament approach, the employer has the ability to commit to
promotion prizes. On the other hand, the approach employed in the present paper,
which is called the market-based tournament approach, implies that the employer
cannot commit to promotion prizes because they are determined by labor market
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demand. Now, assume the employer has the ability to commit to promotion prizes
in the current setup. In that case, the employer could implement ecient levels of
eort by choosing the same base salaries and bonus payments as those discussed
above. However, that equilibrium would not be unique since the rm could choose
any combination of base salaries and bonus payments that induce the same level of
expected utility.
Note that one of these equilibria is such that bonus payments are set to zero for
young and middle-aged workers. In that case, the worker's only incentives would
come from promotion prizes as in Lazear and Rosen (1981). The reasoning behind
this result is that since the employer can commit to promotion prizes, it is able to
provide workers with incentives for eort only through the possibility of promotions
instead of balancing between the incentives from bonus payments and promotions.
However, this result does not apply to old workers for whom only bonuses can provide
incentives for eort since they retire at the end of the current period. Overall, the
equilibrium obtained via the market-based approach is unique and it yields positive
bonus payments for each worker. Also note that the same equilibrium is one of many
equilibria when commitment is possible.
1.4 Data
The data used in the empirical analysis come from the personnel records during the
period 1969-1988 for all managerial employees of a medium-sized U.S. rm operating
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in the nancial-services industry. The data were rst analyzed in the canonical
studies of Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (hereafter called BGH) (1994a,b) on the
internal labor markets. I assume the following restrictions for my working sample.
First, since promotion dynamics for female workers may be dierent than they are
for male workers (e.g., Milgrom and Oster, 1987; Lazear and Rosen, 1990), and there
are few female workers in higher job levels, I restrict my analysis to male workers.25
Second, as the bonus data cover only the period 1981-1988, I use observations from
the earlier years only to construct lagged values of some variables. Third, since all
compensation data are in local currencies, I only look at workers employed at plants
in the U.S.
The data include salary, bonus and performance measure variables, as well as
demographics including age, race, gender and education. Among these, variables
of special interest are job levels, bonuses and performance ratings. Since the HR
department of this rm does not provide any information about job levels, BGH
(1994a) use movements between job titles to identify job levels.26 In their original
work, they identify 8 levels, where level 8 is the top level lled by the CEO. Since
the dynamics that determine the CEO's compensation is dierent and there are
fewer employees at higher levels due to the pyramidal structure of the rm, I drop
observations in level 8, and combine levels 6 and 7 with level 5.27
All compensation variables are reported annually, and measured in real terms in
25In order to check the robustness of the results, I used the full sample to test the predictions of
the model. Regression results were very similar to the results reported in the paper.
26Some studies in the job ladder literature use pay variables to identify job levels (Lazear, 1992).
27Gibbs (1995) uses the same breakout of job levels in his regressions.
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1988 dollars. Bonuses for a given year are paid in February of the following year,
and not all eligible employees earn bonuses (about 35.2 percent of all employee-
years of data includes positive bonuses). Note that in addition to employee-years
with positive bonuses, the data also include observations in which the worker is not
eligible for bonuses, and those in which the worker is eligible but does not earn
any bonuses. Subjective performance ratings are measured on a ve-point scale,
where 1 reects the best performance. One caveat about performance ratings is that
they are not available for all employee-years (69.8 percent of the sample includes
performance ratings), thus the sample size gets smaller when they are included in
the regressions. However, I will make use of performance ratings as a proxy for the
worker's performance in a given year.28
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1.1. The average worker is 40.5 years
old and has a tenure of 6.4 years at the rm. Looking at the statistics by job level,
one can see that the worker gets older, has longer tenure at the rm, receives better
performance ratings and earns higher bonuses as she moves up the hierarchy. As
there are fewer slots at the upper levels of the corporate hierarchy, the percentage of
promotions decreases with job level.
28Gibbs (1995) uses performance ratings in his analyses, and shows that they are correlated with
promotions and bonuses. Also, Kahn and Lange (2010) and DeVaro and Waldman (2012) use them
as a proxy for performance.
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1.5 Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis consists of three sections. In the rst section, I examine the
rm's policy on bonuses. In particular, I scrutinize which observable attributes of
workers are related to the rm's decision to oer bonus contracts, and how these
attributes are related to a worker's probability of earning bonuses. In the second
section, I test the predictions of the theoretical model concerning the eects of the
worker's age and job level on bonus payments. In the last section, I test the model's
prediction regarding the trade-o between incentives provided through bonus pay-
ments and incentives provided through promotions.
1.5.1 Firm's Policy on Bonuses
As should be clear from the discussion of the empirical predictions, the variable of
primary interest is the size of bonus payments. In other words, the theory built in this
paper focuses on bonuses which are actually paid to the worker rather than bonuses
which the worker is eligible to earn. Therefore, consistent with the model I use the
subsample of bonus recipients to test the empirical predictions. That is, the sample
that I use to test the predictions excludes observations (i.e., employee-years of data)
in which the worker was either not eligible to earn bonuses or she was eligible but
did not earn any bonuses. Unfortunately, we do not have any information on what
basis the rm decides to oer bonus contracts to its employees. However, to help
illuminate the rm's policy on bonuses I begin my empirical analysis by considering
44
the rm's decisions to oer bonus contracts and to reward bonuses, respectively.
Even though examining the rm's contract choice is beyond the scope of this
paper, I evaluate some conjectures borrowed from the related literature. Presumably,
the rm may use job characteristics to decide whether to oer a bonus contract to a
worker. For example, workers assigned to jobs with a better monitoring technology
(i.e, lower monitoring costs, lower measurement errors and so on) may be more likely
to be oered bonus contracts (Lazear, 1986). One implication of this reasoning
is that workers at higher job levels in which output is more sensitive to eort and
ability are more likely to get bonus contracts (Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent, 2009).
Alternatively, the rm may be inclined to oer bonus contracts to older workers whose
career-concern incentives are weaker (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992).
To investigate these possibilities, I estimate logit models predicting whether or
not a worker is eligible to earn a bonus in a given year. Results are reported in Table
1.2.29 The baseline specication reported in column (1) includes job level dummies
and age terms in addition to control variables for race, education and year. The
results indicate that workers at higher job levels are more likely to be oered bonus
contracts. These results also indicate that age has a statistically signicant positive
eect on the probability of being eligible to earn a bonus. Thus, consistent with
our conjecture, older workers are more likely to be oered bonus contracts. Column
(2) augments the baseline specication with a binary variable that indicates whether
performance ratings are available for a given employee-year of data. Interestingly, the
29Throughout the paper, statistical signicance at the 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, and
**, respectively. Also, age refers to the age of the average worker in the whole sample.
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Table 1.2: Determinants of the Probability of the Firm Oering a Bonus Contract
A.Pooled Logit B.Fixed-Eects Logit
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Level=2 0.251** 0.187** 0.189** -0.0228 0.0201 0.0853
[0.0449] [0.0476] [0.0481] [0.0679] [0.0689] [0.0737]
Level=3 0.584** 0.492** 0.486** 0.288** 0.357** 0.481**
[0.0443] [0.0467] [0.0474] [0.0953] [0.0970] [0.111]
Level=4 1.383** 1.298** 1.272** 1.637** 1.722** 1.933**
[0.0465] [0.0491] [0.0497] [0.148] [0.151] [0.176]
Level=5 1.254** 0.842** 0.869** 3.349** 3.392** 3.621**
[0.0748] [0.0864] [0.0871] [0.342] [0.352] [0.371]
Age 0.0968** 0.114** 0.0571** 1.018** 1.069** 0.991**
[0.0135] [0.0141] [0.0148] [0.0449] [0.0463] [0.0522]
Age2/100 -0.123** -0.143** -0.0924** -0.618** -0.646** -0.563**
[0.0158] [0.0164] [0.0170] [0.0472] [0.0484] [0.0522]
Rating available -1.630** -1.712** -0.487** -0.539**
[0.0424] [0.0422] [0.0367] [0.0374]
Tenure at level=2 0.560** 0.444**
[0.0419] [0.0484]
Tenure at level=3 0.566** 0.412**
[0.0472] [0.0612]
Tenure at level=4 0.576** 0.142
[0.0538] [0.0728]
Tenure at level5 0.753** 0.173*
[0.0462] [0.0806]
N(worker-yrs) 40,808 40,808 40,808 30,405 30,405 30,405
N(workers) 7,203 7,203 7,203 3,563 3,563 3,563
Log-likelihood -16943 -15850 -15680 -8106 -8015 -7959
Pseudo-R2 0.386 0.425 0.432 0.435 0.441 0.445
2-test H0: 
j = 0 1168 998.3 935.8 220.8 219.3 209.7
for all j
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2-test H0 : 1+ 2.124 0.529 60.16 2567 2549 1414
age  2=50 = 0
p-value 0.145 0.467 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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point estimate for this variable is negative and statistically signicant at the 1 percent
level. Therefore, the rm is less likely to oer bonus contracts when performance
ratings are available. One potential explanation for this nding is that the rm uses
both bonuses and performance ratings to provide workers with feedback about their
current performance. Thus, the rm substitutes performance ratings with bonuses
for some employee-years. However, since there is no information regarding why
performance ratings are not available for some observations, there is no way to test
this conjecture.
To analyze the eect of future promotions, I estimate the specication reported
in column (3) which includes binary variables indicating the worker's tenure at the
current job level. Since workers who remain at the same job level longer are less
likely to get promoted, tenure at the current job level may pick up the eect of
future promotions (Gibbs, 1995). The results suggest a monotonic relationship be-
tween tenure at the current job level and the probability of being eligible for bonuses.
Hence, workers who are less likely to get promoted are more likely to be oered bonus
contracts. The model developed in the paper oers a theoretical explanation for this
empirical pattern. As indicated in the discussion of the third prediction, the model
predicts that the employer oers wage contracts that balance the worker's incen-
tives provided through bonuses and her career-concern incentives provided through
promotions. That is, the employer increases the size of bonus payments when the
worker's career-concern incentives get lower. Even though it is not formally shown
in the paper, it is possible to generalize this argument to shed light on the rm's
contract choice. Since workers whose promotion prospects are limited have weaker
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career-concern incentives, the rm needs to provide them with additional incentives
for eort. As a result, the rm is more likely to oer bonus contracts to these workers
in order to elicit ecient levels of eort.
Finally, to examine if the ndings are robust to unobserved worker heterogeneity,
I re-estimate the same specications using the xed-eects logit model (see columns
(4) to (6)).30 The results are qualitatively the same as those in pooled logits, except
for tenure at current job levels. The monotonic relationship between the probability
of oering a bonus contract and the tenure at current job level does not hold for
tenure longer than 4 years. However, workers are more likely to get a bonus contract
in any year of their tenure than their rst year at the current job level.
The theoretical model developed in the previous section implies that the proba-
bility of earning a bonus increases with the worker's eort and ability. As I demon-
strated, the employer elicits the ecient level of eort which increases with job level.
Therefore, we expect that, other things equal, the probability of earning a bonus
increases with job level. As discussed before, I make use of performance ratings as
a proxy for performance. In addition, I use average salary increase and tenure at
the current job level as proxies for expected ability.31 The rationale for using these
variables to control for the worker's expected ability is as follows. BGH (1994a,b)
30I estimate the xed-eects logit models using the conditional maximum likelihood approach
(Chamberlain, 1984). Note that this estimator does not treat worker-specic xed eects as param-
eters to be estimated along with other parameters which are actually estimated. Also, estimation
of the xed-eects logit model relies on workers whose eligibility status changes over time (eligible
to non-eligible or vice versa). Therefore, workers whose eligibility status do not change during the
sampling period are not used in the estimation.
31Gibbs (1995) uses these variables in logit models predicting promotions and nds that they are
correlated with promotions.
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nd that workers who experience faster wage growth are more likely to be promoted,
thus they are also of higher expected ability. Gibbs (1995) argues that the rm uses
promotion decisions to sort workers, so that workers who remained longer at a given
job level are expected to be of lower ability. Note that both the average salary in-
crease and tenure at the current job level are expected to be positively related to the
worker's probability of earning a bonus.
To investigate the rm's decision to reward bonuses, I estimate logit models pre-
dicting whether or not the worker earns a bonus in a given year. Results are reported
in Table 1.3. The rst specication reported in column (1) includes dummy variables
for job levels and performance ratings in addition to control variables for age, race,
education and year. The results show that workers at higher job levels are more likely
to earn bonuses than workers at lower job levels. Point estimates for performance
ratings have the expected signs and they are statistically signicant at the one per-
cent level.32 Accordingly, the probability of earning a bonus increases monotonically
with performance. Indeed, the ndings regarding job levels and performance ratings
are consistent in all estimated specications reported in Table 1.3. Consistent with
our hypothesis, the average salary increase at the current job level has a statistically
signicant positive eect on the probability of earning a bonus (see column (2)).
The results also show that workers are more likely to earn a bonus in their second to
fourth years than their rst year at the current job level. However, the relationship
is not statistically signicant for tenure longer than ve years (see column (3)). The
32Note that the omitted category for performance ratings is 1, which reects the best performance
level. Therefore, we expect negative point estimates for performance rating dummies.
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Table 1.3: Determinants of the Probability of Earning a Bonus
A.Pooled Logit B.Fixed-Eects Logit
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Level=2 0.559** 0.558** 0.563** 0.942** 1.102** 0.756**
[0.0858] [0.0890] [0.0856] [0.128] [0.143] [0.131]
Level=3 1.200** 1.180** 1.205** 1.710** 1.949** 1.321**
[0.0809] [0.0843] [0.0808] [0.149] [0.167] [0.161]
Level=4 1.521** 1.514** 1.541** 1.918** 2.382** 1.265**
[0.0854] [0.0887] [0.0859] [0.190] [0.209] [0.218]
Level=5 1.812** 1.821** 1.811** 2.722** 3.390** 1.523**
[0.141] [0.147] [0.141] [0.315] [0.340] [0.372]
Rating=2 -0.670** -0.611** -0.682** -0.465** -0.422** -0.466**
[0.0459] [0.0482] [0.0463] [0.0581] [0.0596] [0.0584]
Rating=3 -1.806** -1.705** -1.818** -1.358** -1.298** -1.343**
[0.0762] [0.0796] [0.0770] [0.0977] [0.0992] [0.0986]
Rating=4 -2.453** -2.282** -2.447** -1.922** -1.833** -1.929**
[0.303] [0.304] [0.304] [0.390] [0.392] [0.390]
Av salary increase 2.586** 8.039**
at current level [0.539] [0.907]
Tenure at level=2 0.221** 0.0634
[0.0627] [0.0675]
Tenure at level=3 0.152* -0.0976
[0.0713] [0.0818]
Tenure at level=4 0.165* -0.284**
[0.0810] [0.0964]
Tenure at level5 -0.0427 -0.607**
[0.0686] [0.112]
N(worker-yrs) 27,466 26,103 27,466 13,329 13,026 13,329
N(workers) 6,018 5,260 6,018 1,918 1,853 1,918
Log-likelihood -7315 -6914 -7302 -4085 -3916 -4061
Pseudo-R2 0.353 0.362 0.354 0.18 0.195 0.184
2-test H0: 
j = 0 429.3 391.3 432 139.3 153.2 78.26
for all j
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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xed-eects logits which are reported in columns (4) to (6) yield similar ndings
except for tenure at current level. Specically, the results indicate that workers with
tenure more than 4 years are less likely to earn a bonus than workers who are in
their rst years at the current level (see column (6)).
1.5.2 Eect of Job Levels and Age on Bonuses
This section analyzes the empirical predictions of the current model regarding the
eect of job levels and the worker's age on bonus payments. Recall that the two
predictions to be tested are whether the size of bonus payments increases with job
level after controlling for the worker's age (captured in Corollary 1), and whether
the size of bonus payments increases with the worker's age after controlling for job
level (captured in Corollary 2).
Before testing the predictions formally, I look at the basic data on bonuses cat-
egorized by job level. As seen in Table 1.1, the average bonus payment increases
with job level. Indeed, it has a convex structure since the increase is larger at higher
job levels. Similarly, the variation in bonus payments also increases with job level.
Therefore, a rst glance at the data reveals that bonus payments increase with job
level. It is the task of the econometric analysis to examine to what extent this
relationship persists after conditioning on related control variables.
To empirically test the predictions, I specify a model describing determinants of
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bonus payments as follows.33
logit = Zi'+Xit + ait +
5X
j=2
Ljit
j + ti + i + it; (1.18)
where logit is the logarithm of bonus payment made to worker i at year t; Zi is
a vector of time-invariant attributes of worker i which includes indicator variables
for education and race; Xit is a vector of time-varying attributes of worker i which
includes tenure at the current job level and performance ratings at year t to capture
heterogeneity in worker productivity; ait is a vector that includes the age of worker
i at year t and its squared term (divided by 100 for convenience); Ljit is a level-
specic binary indicator (j = 2; 3; 4; 5) which is specied as Ljit = 1 if Lit = j and
0 otherwise, where Lit refers to the job level of worker i at year t;
34 ti is a vector
of year dummies which is used to control for the eect of the business cycles on
bonus payments; i is a worker-specic unobserved factor, which may be correlated
with other explanatory variables in the model;35 it is an idiosyncratic shock term,
independently and identically distributed with a mean of zero.36
The crucial point in testing the eect of job levels on bonuses is workers' as-
signment to job levels. As the theoretical model illustrates, more able workers are
assigned to higher job levels in equilibrium. Even though proxies for performance
33Smeets andWarzynski (2008) estimate a similar specication to examine how the span of control
aects the size of bonus payments. The major dierence between their specication and equation
(1.18) is that the former includes proxies for the span of control, whereas the latter includes controls
for performance ratings and tenure at current job level as well as worker xed-eects.
34Note that Level 1 is the omitted category in this specication.
35I do not employ a random-eects estimation in the empirical analysis since its restriction that
the worker-specic unobserved factor must be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables is not
realistic in the current context.
36In xed-eects estimations, I allow correlation across time, and thus report the standard errors
that account for any correlation within i.
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and ability are included in regressions, a part of the variation that aects job as-
signment is not captured by these variables. As a result, indicator variables for job
levels may be correlated with the disturbance term, and their point estimates may
consequently be biased. To this end, I begin the analysis with the ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimation on pooled data. As OLS estimation requires the most
rigid conditions to produce unbiased estimates, results from the pooled regressions
are used as a benchmark. Then, in order to mitigate the eect of unobserved worker
heterogeneity I make use of the panel dimension of the data via the xed eects (FE)
estimation, which relaxes conditions required by the OLS estimation.37
First, I examine how much of the variation in bonus payments is explained by
the variation in job levels and age terms. To this end, I estimate simple regressions
in which job level indicators and age are only independent variables. Results are
reported in Table 1.4. Consistent with some previous studies (e.g., Leonard, 1990;
Ortin-Angel and Salas-Fumas, 2002), job levels turn out to be a very important
determinant of compensation. As seen in column (1), the 50.4 percent of the cross-
sectional variation in bonuses is explained by job levels. The explanatory power
of age terms is relatively much smaller; they explain only the 5.8 percent of the
variation (see column (2)). When I include both job level dummies and age terms
(see column (3)), the variation explained by the model increases very slightly (R2
37Technically, the OLS estimation yields unbiased estimates if ability dierences that aect
workers' assignment to job levels are fully accounted by variables used in this specication, i.e.,
E[Ljit  itjZi; Xit; ait; ti] = 0 for all t and j, where it = i + it. The FE estimation, on the other
hand, relaxes this condition by assuming that the unobserved attributes of workers that aect their
job assignment are fully captured by the time-invariant individual-specic factor, i.e., it requires
that E[Ljit  itjZi; Xit; ait; ti; i] = 0 for all t and j.
53
Table 1.4: Variation in Bonus Payments Explained by Job Levels and Age
A.Pooled OLS B.Fixed-Eects
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Level=2 0.343** 0.336** 0.420** 0.292**
[0.0354] [0.0357] [0.0869] [0.0869]
Level=3 0.584** 0.576** 0.587** 0.307**
[0.0321] [0.0330] [0.0976] [0.104]
Level=4 1.318** 1.311** 0.848** 0.416**
[0.0312] [0.0330] [0.108] [0.120]
Level=5 2.821** 2.830** 1.352** 0.836**
[0.0471] [0.0490] [0.167] [0.162]
Age 0.149** 0.0272** 0.340** 0.280**
[0.0108] [0.00812] [0.0397] [0.0405]
Age2/100 -0.155** -0.0356** -0.336** -0.284**
[0.0127] [0.00953] [0.0453] [0.0448]
N(worker-yrs) 5,856 5,856 5,856 5,856 5,856 5,856
N(workers) 2,547 2,547 2,547 2,547 2,547 2,547
Log-likelihood -5442 -7325 -5431 -870.1 -805.2 -731.3
Adjusted R2 0.504 0.058 0.506 0.816 0.82 0.824
F-test H0: 
j = 0 1491 1330 21.33 7.961
for all j
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-test H0 : 1+ 307.19 2.14 84.51 34.9
age  2=50 = 0
p-value 0.000 0.1432 0.000 0.000
increases by 0.002.). Therefore, one can conclude that the cross-sectional variation
in bonus payments are largely explained by job levels, while age terms have minor
explanatory power. The FE estimation results are also provided in the same table
to investigate how much of the within variation is explained by the within variation
in job levels and age terms. Accordingly, both job levels and age terms individually
explain approximately 82 percent of the within variation in bonus payments (see
columns (4) and (5)). Similar to the pooled regressions, using both of them increases
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Table 1.5: Determinants of Bonuses
A.Pooled OLS B.Fixed-Eects
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Level=2 0.338** 0.347** 0.357** 0.299** 0.159* 0.222**
[0.0404] [0.0448] [0.0442] [0.0629] [0.0652] [0.0719]
Level=3 0.579** 0.599** 0.591** 0.322** 0.138 0.267**
[0.0394] [0.0429] [0.0421] [0.0762] [0.0757] [0.102]
Level=4 1.230** 1.180** 1.148** 0.436** 0.214* 0.431**
[0.0427] [0.0459] [0.0449] [0.0887] [0.0922] [0.146]
Level=5 2.671** 2.539** 2.589** 0.804** 0.600** 0.858**
[0.0595] [0.0695] [0.0674] [0.118] [0.193] [0.234]
Age 0.0268** 0.0189* -0.00739 0.263** 0.279** 0.194**
[0.00881] [0.00939] [0.00943] [0.0297] [0.0405] [0.0482]
Age2/100 -0.0327** -0.0232* -0.00298 -0.293** -0.242** -0.164**
[0.0103] [0.0107] [0.0107] [0.0330] [0.0435] [0.0481]
Ratings No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Tenure at level No No Yes No No Yes
N(worker-yrs) 5,856 3,948 3,948 5,856 3,948 3,948
N(workers) 2,547 2,104 2,104 2,547 2,104 2,104
Log-likelihood -5208 -3380 -3282 -625.5 567.4 584.7
Adjusted R2 0.541 0.525 0.548 0.83 0.862 0.863
F-test H0: 
j = 0 875.9 522.5 546.1 13.54 3.681 4.897
for all j
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000
F-test H0 : 1+ 0.136 0.0111 42.89 15.08 17.66 6.555
age  2=50 = 0
p-value 0.712 0.916 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011
the explanatory power of the model marginally (see column (6)).
Table 1.5 displays the results of estimating equation (1.18) for alternative speci-
cations. Panel A presents the pooled regression results, while Panel B presents the
FE regression results for the same specications. Control variables for race, educa-
tion, and year are included in all pooled regressions, while only year dummies are
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common to all FE regressions. Recall that the rst prediction states that holding
age constant, bonus payments increase with job level, that is, j+1 > j > 0 for
j = 1; 2; 3; 4.
The results provide clear support for the rst prediction: Point estimates for job
level dummies are signicantly dierent from zero at the 1 percent level in a two
tailed test, and they are increasing with job level. Results in column (1), which
serve as a benchmark, indicate that bonuses increase sharply as one moves up the
hierarchy. The point estimates suggest that, other things equal, bonuses earned by
workers at level 2 are 0.33 percentage points higher than bonuses earned by workers
at level 1. The dierential increases dramatically at higher levels; bonuses earned by
workers at level 5 are 2.67 percentage points higher than that earned by workers at
level 1. In column (2), I control for the worker's performance in the current period
by including dummies for performance ratings. The point estimates for job levels
slightly increase for levels 2 and 3, whereas they slightly decrease at levels 4 and 5.38
I further include dummies for tenure at current job level in column (3). The results
are very close to those in columns (1) and (2). For example, the bonus dierential
between level 1 and level 2 is 0.35 percentage points, while it is 2.58 percentage
points between level 1 and level 5.
Results from the FE regressions indicate that unobserved worker heterogeneity
38As mentioned earlier, performance ratings are not available for all employee-years of data.
Therefore, the number of observations decreases from 5,856 to 3,948 in specications that include
performance ratings. As a robustness check, I estimated the baseline specications, reported in
column (1) and column (4) using the subsample of observations in which performance ratings are
available. Results were very similar to those reported in the paper.
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plays an important role in workers' assignments to job levels. This follows since the
point estimates fall sharply, especially at higher job levels, when we include worker-
xed eects. Therefore, using the FE regressions to test the rst two predictions is
more appropriate since the pooled regressions yield biased point estimates for job
levels.
The FE regressions results also provide supporting evidence for the rst predic-
tion. The baseline specication in column (4) indicates that a worker at level 1 earns
0.29 percentage points higher bonuses when she is promoted to Level 2, and that
the premium increases to 0.80 percentage points at level 5. Once I control for the
worker's performance, the dierential in bonus payments decreases in all levels. As
seen in column (5), a worker earns 0.15 percentage points higher bonuses if she is
promoted from level 1 to level 2, while the dierential between the entry level and
the top level is 0.60 percentage points. Interestingly, when I include tenure at the
current job level, point estimates for job level dummies increase (see column (6)).
For example, the dierential between the top level and the entry level turns out to
be 0.85 percentage points, which is higher than the dierential reported in columns
(4) and (5).
I now turn to the second prediction which implies that bonus payments increase
with age after controlling for job level. Since both age and its squared term enter the
estimating equation in which the dependent variable is the log of bonus payments, the
eect of age on bonus payments is measured by the semi-elasticity of bonus payment
with respect to age. This elasticity term is given by 1 + ~age(1=50)2, where ~age is
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the age level at which the elasticity is evaluated.39 The bottom panel of Table 1.5
displays the F-statistic and the associated p-value for the null hypothesis that the
semi-elasticity of bonus payments with respect to age is zero for the average worker.
In addition, Figure 1.1 plots the the age semi-elasticity of bonus payment for point
estimates from pooled and FE regressions.
The pooled regressions yield results that are inconsistent with the prediction.
As seen in Table 1.5, point estimates from columns (1) and (2) indicate that null
hypothesis that the age semi-elasticity of bonus payment evaluated at the average
worker is zero cannot be rejected. In column (3), the F-test indicates that the semi-
elasticity is statistically dierent from zero (p-value is practically zero). However,
as seen in Figure 2 the semi-elasticity calculated using point estimates from this
specication is negative for all age levels, and very close to zero. Hence, even though
the F-test indicates a statistically signicant negative eect, it is economically not
signicant.
Results from the FE regressions provide clear support for the second prediction.
As seen in columns (4) to (6) in Table 1.5, the point estimates for age terms have the
expected signs, and the semi-elasticity evaluated at the average worker is positive and
statistically signicant at the 1 percent level in all specications. Moreover, the eect
of age on bonus payments is economically signicant. For example, the results from
column (4) indicate that an additional year for a 40-year-old worker leads to a 2.9
39Using equation (1.18), one can show that the semi-elasticity of bonus payments with respect
to age is given by
@E[logitjLjit;ait;Zi;Xit;ti]=@ait
E[logitjLjit;ait;Zi;Xit;ti]
= 1 + age(1=50)2, where age is the level of age at
which the elasticity is evaluated.
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Figure 1.1: Age Semi-Elasticity of Bonus Payments
percent increase in bonus payments. The increase goes up to 8.5 percent in column
5 in which workers' performance are controlled for via performance ratings. When
I further control for tenure at the current job level in column 6, the elasticity term
decreases slightly; an additional year for a 40-year-old worker brings a 6.3 percent
increase in bonus payments.
As shown in Figure 1.1, the semi-elasticity decreases with age and converges to
zero when the worker's age is about 59 (it approaches to zero at the age of 45 in
the baseline specication reported in column 4). In order to determine at what age
the eect becomes statistically insignicant, I calculate the semi-elasticity for ages
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between 20 and 60 and corresponding standard errors for point estimates from the
FE regressions. Results are reported in Table 1.6. One observes that the eect is
signicant for a range of age values. For example, the eect is statistically signicant
and positive until the age of 51 according to the specication in column (5), while it
becomes insignicant at the age of 48 according to point estimates from column (6).
The declining pattern of age elasticities is interesting, and seems inconsistent
with the theory developed in this paper. However, I believe it is possible to reconcile
the theory with this empirical nding. One potential reason for why we observe a
declining eect of age on bonus payments beyond a certain age is that compensation
packages may include pecuniary benets, other than salaries and bonuses, such as
stock options. Stock options are mostly common in higher job levels and among older
workers. Hence, a generalization of the theory developed in the paper can explain
why the eect of age on bonus payments decreases with age. If older workers own
more stock options than younger workers, it means that a smaller part of the total
incentives required to elicit the ecient level of eort needs to be provided by bonuses.
In other words, the optimal contract balances the worker's incentives by reducing
bonuses when incentives either from career-concerns or stock options increase. As
a result, we observe a declining eect of age on bonus payments. Unfortunately,
the dataset used in the empirical analysis does not include information about stock
options. Therefore, testing this extension of the theory is not feasible with this
dataset.
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Table 1.6: Semi-Elasticity of Bonus Payments with respect to Age
Age Semi-Elasticities from (4) Semi-Elasticities from (5) Semi-Elasticities from (6)
26 0.111 [0.014] 0.153 [0.024] 0.109 [0.029]
27 0.105 [0.013] 0.148 [0.023] 0.106 [0.029]
28 0.099 [0.012] 0.143 [0.023] 0.103 [0.028]
29 0.093 [0.012] 0.139 [0.022] 0.099 [0.028]
30 0.087 [0.011] 0.134 [0.022] 0.096 [0.027]
31 0.081 [0.011] 0.129 [0.022] 0.093 [0.027]
32 0.076 [0.010] 0.124 [0.021] 0.09 [0.027]
33 0.07 [0.010] 0.119 [0.021] 0.086 [0.026]
34 0.064 [0.009] 0.114 [0.021] 0.083 [0.026]
35 0.058 [0.009] 0.11 [0.020] 0.08 [0.026]
36 0.052 [0.008] 0.105 [0.020] 0.077 [0.025]
37 0.046 [0.008] 0.1 [0.020] 0.073 [0.025]
38 0.04 [0.008] 0.095 [0.020] 0.07 [0.025]
39 0.035 [0.007] 0.09 [0.020] 0.067 [0.025]
40 0.029 [0.007] 0.085 [0.020] 0.063 [0.024]
41 0.023 [0.007] 0.081 [0.020] 0.06 [0.024]
42 0.017 [0.007] 0.076 [0.020] 0.057 [0.024]
43 0.011 [0.006] 0.071 [0.020] 0.054 [0.024]
44 0.005 [0.006] 0.066 [0.020] 0.05 [0.024]
45 -0.001 [0.006] 0.061 [0.020] 0.047 [0.024]
46 -0.007 [0.007] 0.056 [0.021] 0.044 [0.024]
47 -0.012 [0.007] 0.052 [0.021] 0.041 [0.024]
48 -0.018 [0.007] 0.047 [0.021] 0.037 [0.025]
49 -0.024 [0.007] 0.042 [0.021] 0.034 [0.025]
50 -0.03 [0.008] 0.037 [0.022] 0.031 [0.025]
51 -0.036 [0.008] 0.032 [0.022] 0.027 [0.025]
52 -0.042 [0.008] 0.027 [0.022] 0.024 [0.026]
53 -0.048 [0.009] 0.023 [0.023] 0.021 [0.026]
54 -0.054 [0.009] 0.018 [0.023] 0.018 [0.026]
55 -0.059 [0.010] 0.013 [0.024] 0.014 [0.027]
56 -0.065 [0.010] 0.008 [0.024] 0.011 [0.027]
57 -0.071 [0.011] 0.003 [0.025] 0.008 [0.028]
58 -0.077 [0.011] -0.002 [0.025] 0.005 [0.028]
59 -0.083 [0.012] -0.006 [0.026] 0.001 [0.028]
60 -0.089 [0.012] -0.011 [0.026] -0.002 [0.029]
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1.5.3 Trade-o Between Bonus Payments and Career-
Concern Incentives
The third prediction indicates that there is a trade-o between explicit incentives
provided through bonus payments and implicit incentives provided through promo-
tions (captured in Corollary 3). Recall that since workers experience a large increase
in their expected utilities upon being promoted, the probability of winning a pro-
motion provides them with incentives to exert eort. The prize for a promotion,
which is given by U3(y1; yH)   U3(y1; yL) in the theoretical model, is the dierence
between the worker's expected utility in the next period if she is promoted and her
expected utility in the next period if she is not promoted. Borrowing the terminology
of Lazear and Rosen (1981), let me call the prize for a promotion the spread in the
rest of the section. In order to test the prediction that the size of bonus payments is
negatively related to the spread, I rst need to determine the empirical counterpart
of the spread.
The obvious candidate to measure the worker's expected utility is her expected
total compensation, which is the sum of salaries and bonus payments. As I discussed
earlier, however, workers do not earn bonuses in every period in which they are
eligible for bonuses. Hence, predicting the total compensation has some drawbacks
since bonus payments are erratic. To address this issue, I will use salaries as a second
proxy for the worker's expected utility. In the rest of the discussion, I use the term
compensation to refer to the worker's expected total compensation.40
40For brevity, the discussion of the econometric technique focuses only on the worker's compen-
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Note that for workers who are not promoted in a given year we cannot observe
what their compensation would be if they were promoted. Similarly, for workers who
are promoted in a given year we cannot observe what their compensation would be
in the absence of a promotion. Therefore, the second issue in testing the prediction
is to derive the worker's counterfactual compensation.
Following the method DeVaro and Waldman (2012) suggest, I propose a three-
step procedure to test the third prediction41. In the rst step, I estimate the following
equation for the subsample of observations in which promotion occurred:
logCpit+1 = logitW + Y
p
itY +  it; (1.19)
where logCpit+1 is the logarithm of next year's total compensation of worker i who
is promoted at year t, it is the salary paid to worker i at year t, and Y
p
it is the
vector of control variables for job levels, age, year, education, race, tenure at the
rm, tenure at the current level and performance ratings. For each observation in
which the worker was not promoted, I use the parameter estimates from equation
(1.19) to derive her predicted compensation upon being promoted.
In the second step, I estimate the following equation for the subsample of obser-
vations in which promotion did not occur:
logCnpit+1 = logitW + Y
np
it Y + it; (1.20)
sation. However, it equally applies to the promotion prizes measured by salaries.
41In order to test the hypothesis that the wage increase due to promotion decreases with edu-
cation, DeVaro and Waldman (2012) propose to construct the counterfactual wage increases for
workers who were promoted. They argue that one way to do this is rst to predict wage increases
in the absence of promotions using observations in which promotions did not occur, and then use
the parameter estimates from this regression to predict promoted workers' counterfactual wages in
the absence of promotions.
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where logCnpit+1 is the logarithm of next year's total compensation of worker i who
is not promoted at year t. In equation (1.20), Y npit includes individual-specic xed
eects, which are omitted in Y pit , and all the control variables in Y
p
it except time-
invariant variables (education and race).42 I use the parameter estimates from equa-
tion (1.20) to derive a predicted no-promotion compensation for each observation in
which the worker was promoted. Using the predicted values from the rst two steps,
I generate the predicted spread for each observation:
^it =
8>><>>:
logCpit+1   ^logC
np
it+1; if promit=1
^logC
p
it+1   logCnpit+1; if promit=0
In the third step, I estimate the augmented version of equation (1.18) to test whether
bonus payments are negatively related to the estimated spread:
logbit = ^it+ Zi'+Xit + ait +
5X
j=2
Ljit
j + it; (1.21)
Note that the third testable prediction implies that ^ < 0.
Since equation (1.21) includes a predicted variable, ^it, as an independent vari-
able, I have to adjust standard errors to take into account the sampling variability
of this term. Otherwise, conventional methods produce underestimated standard
errors (Murphy and Topel, 1985). To obtain consistent standard errors, I implement
a non-parametric bootstrap method which allows me to use the variation in the
bootstrapped estimates of  to adjust the standard error estimated from the original
42It was not feasible to include worker-xed eects in (1.19) because our sample includes very
few workers who have been promoted more than once inside the time period of the sample.
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sample.43
One caveat of using the aforementioned three-stage procedure to test the predic-
tion is the endogeneity of promotions. Similar to the union membership problem, if
earning a promotion is endogenous to the model, the predicted compensation values
will be biased (Robinson, 1989). However, the major dierence between earning a
promotion and being a union member (or being in the treatment group) is that the
selection criteria is known, at least to some extent, in the former case, whereas how
workers decide about union membership is less clear.44 Specically, the employer
makes promotion decisions based on the worker's performance and availability of
slots, whereas the criteria of being a union member is less clear. Therefore, using
detailed control variables for the worker's performance and dummies for job titles
should address the endogeneity problem to some extent. To further address the
problem, I will also estimate the same regressions for the subsample of workers who
have been promoted at least once in their careers. This approach will let me control
the selection bias to the extent that the unobservable eect on earning a promotion
operates through a time-invariant worker eect.45
43The method I implement is very similar to the approach that is used to compute standard
errors with multiple imputed data (Rubin, 1987), and it can be summarized as follows. Drawing
independent random samples from the subsamples of promoted and non-promoted workers, respec-
tively, I rst generate 50 datasets in addition to the original one. Then, I estimate (1.21) for each
bootstrap sample and save the results. The corrected standard error for ^ is given by the formulaq
s2 + 
2
, where s
2
 is the sample variance of ^ estimated from the original sample, and 
2
 is the
variance of the point estimates across the bootstrap samples (i.e., it is computed as var(^1; :::; ^50)).
44Another dierence is that the promotion decision is more centralized than the decision on union
membership in the sense that the employer is the only decision maker in promotions while each
worker is an individual decision maker in the union membership case.
45The two approaches that allow the estimation of endogenous treatment eects are instrumental
variables and control function procedures (see references in Robinson (1989)). To apply these
techniques to our context, however, we need a variable that is correlated with the probability of
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Table 1.7: The Trade-O Between Bonus Payments and Promotion Prizes Measured
by Total Compensation
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimated promotion prize -0.585** -0.550** -0.451** -0.516** -0.290*
[0.138] [0.137] [0.137] [0.137] [0.134]
Corrected standard error [0.195] [0.195] [0.194] [0.198] [0.194]
p-value with corrected std error 0.002 0.004 0.02 0.009 0.135
Performance ratings No Yes No No Yes
Tenure at level No No Yes No Yes
Av salary increase No No No Yes Yes
at current level
N(worker-yrs) 2,941 2,941 2,941 2,941 2,941
Adjusted R2 0.486 0.491 0.506 0.49 0.52
Log-likelihood -2527 -2513 -2468 -2516 -2423
Table 1.8: The Trade-O Between Bonus Payments and Promotion Prizes Measured
by Salary
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimated promotion prize -1.596** -1.548** -1.210** -1.452** -0.838**
[0.219] [0.217] [0.221] [0.220] [0.218]
Corrected standard error [0.307] [0.304] [0.318] [0.313] [0.327]
p-value with corrected std error 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.01
Performance ratings No Yes No No Yes
Tenure at level No No Yes No Yes
Av salary increase No No No Yes Yes
at current level
N(worker-yrs) 2,941 2,941 2,941 2,941 2,941
Adjusted R2 0.495 0.5 0.51 0.497 0.522
Log-likelihood -2502 -2488 -2456 -2496 -2417
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Tables 1.7-1.8 and Tables 1.9-1.10 display the results of estimating equation (1.21)
for the whole sample and the subsample of workers who have been promoted at least
once, respectively. For each table, Part A reports the results in which the estimated
promotion prize is in terms of the worker's total compensation, while Part B reports
the same results in which the estimated promotion prize is in terms of the worker's
salaries. To assess how correcting the standard errors aects the results, I report
both the original and the corrected standard errors. Also, note that all specications
reported in these tables include controls for job level, age terms, year, education and
race.
Conrming the point made by Murphy and Topel (1985), the original standard
errors are considerably lower than the corrected standard errors. However, this aects
the signicance of point estimates only marginally except in column (3). Accordingly,
point estimates for the spread are statistically signicant at worst at the 2.1 percent
level.
The results displayed in Table 1.7 support the hypothesis that bonus payments
are negatively related to the promotion prizes. The baseline specication reported in
column (1) indicates that a 10 percent increase in the estimated spread leads to a 5.8
percent decrease in bonus payments. When I control for the worker's performance
using performance ratings in column (2), the point estimate for the estimated spread
earning a promotion, but uncorrelated with the compensation increase. Since both the probability
of earning a promotion and the compensation increase are determined by the worker's performance,
nding such an exclusion restriction is a hard task. One variable that would provide an exclusion
restriction is the separation decision of a worker, which is correlated with the promotion probabilities
of workers who may be promoted to this worker's slot, and uncorrelated with their compensation
increase. Unfortunately, this information is not available in our dataset.
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decreases slightly, but remains statistically signicant (a 10 percent increase in the
spread is associated with a 5.5 percent decrease in bonus payments.) In column (3) in
which I use dummy variables for the worker's tenure at the current job level, the point
estimate for the spread decreases even further. Specically, a 10 percent increase in
the spread leads to a 4.5 percent decrease in bonus payments. Column (4) includes
the average salary increase at the current job level to control for the worker's ability.
Point estimates are very close to those from column (2) and statistically signicant
at conventional levels, thus they provide clear support for the prediction. Finally,
column (5) reports the results when all of the three control variables used in columns
(2)-(4) are included in the regression at the same time. The two-sided p-value indi-
cates that the estimated prize is statistically not signicant. However, a one-sided
hypothesis test indicates that the eect is negative and statistically signicant at the
7 percent level.
As seen in Table 1.8, the negative relationship between bonus payments and the
promotion prize is more evident when the latter is expressed in terms of salaries
instead of total compensation. We see that the point estimate for the promotion
prize is statistically signicant and negative in all specications, and the magnitudes
are relatively higher (in absolute terms) than those in Table 1.7. For example,
the baseline specication in column (1) indicates that a 10 percent increase in the
estimated promotion prizes leads to a 15.9 percent decrease in bonus payments. Also,
the eect remains statistically signicant (at the 1 percent level) when we include all
control variables in column (5); a 10 percent increase in the promotion prize leads
to a 8.4 percent decrease in bonus payments.
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Table 1.9: The Trade-O Between Bonus Payments and Promotion Prizes Measured
by Total Compensation
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimated promotion prize -0.529** -0.491** -0.407** -0.445** -0.235
[0.158] [0.157] [0.157] [0.156] [0.152]
Corrected standard error [0.214] [0.213] [0.210] [0.212] [0.208]
p-value with corrected std error 0.013 0.021 0.052 0.036 0.259
Performance ratings No Yes No No Yes
Tenure at level No No Yes No Yes
Av salary increase No No No Yes Yes
at current level
N(worker-yrs) 2,602 2,602 2,602 2,602 2,602
Adjusted R2 0.479 0.487 0.501 0.487 0.523
Log-likelihood -2153 -2133 -2094 -2133 -2033
Table 1.10: The Trade-O Between Bonus Payments and Promotion Prizes Measured
by Salary
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimated promotion prize -1.451** -1.377** -1.044** -1.263** -0.612**
[0.238] [0.235] [0.237] [0.235] [0.229]
Corrected standard error [0.296] [0.292] [0.297] [0.303] [0.309]
p-value with corrected std error 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.047
Performance ratings No Yes No No Yes
Tenure at level No No Yes No Yes
Av salary increase No No No Yes Yes
at current level
N(worker-yrs) 2,602 2,602 2,602 2,602 2,602
Adjusted R2 0.487 0.494 0.505 0.493 0.525
Log-likelihood -2133 -2113 -2086 -2117 -2030
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As discussed above, Tables 1.9 and 1.10 report the results from estimating the
same specications using the subsample of workers who have been promoted at least
once in their careers. Results are qualitatively the same as those reported in Tables
1.7 and 1.8. However, the magnitude of the negative eect is smaller when the sample
is restricted. Overall, the prediction is supported by the data. We observe that the
promotion prize, measured in terms of either total compensation or salaries, has a
negative eect of bonus payments the worker earns in the current period. Also, the
negative eect is more evident when the promotion prize is expressed in terms of
salaries.
1.6 Conclusion
Bonus contracts are a widely used method to provide workers with incentives to
exert high eort. Therefore, understanding how bonus contracts can be eectively
used in a corporate hierarchy is important, and it is the main goal of this paper.
In analyzing bonus contracts, the main perspective underscored here is that bonus
contracts should be examined jointly with other forms of incentives provided to the
worker. In doing that, the paper presents a theoretical model that focuses on the
interaction between incentives provided through the bonus payments and career-
concern incentives that arise from the market's gradual learning about the worker's
ability level and the hierarchical structure of the rm.
The mechanics of the model provides a rationale for why bonuses increase with
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job levels. Accordingly, the employer uses bonus contracts to implement the ecient
level of eort and takes the worker's career-concern incentives into account when
setting the size of the bonus payment. Hence, two counteracting mechanisms are
identied that determine the size of bonus payments; ecient levels of eort and
career-concern incentives. Specically, the model indicates that the size of bonus
payments increases with the ecient level of eort the employer aims to implement,
and decreases with the size of career-concern incentives of the worker. The com-
parison of bonus payments across workers at dierent job levels and of dierent age
groups provides two testable predictions of the model. In addition, the model yields
a third testable prediction that directly focuses on the trade-o between the implicit
and explicit incentives provided to the worker. Specically, the model predicts that
the size of bonus payments is negatively related to promotion prizes.
The empirical analysis of these predictions produces supporting evidence for the
model. Note that the three testable predictions distinguish the theoretical model
developed in the present study from the two competing theories that can also explain
why bonuses are larger at higher job levels. Therefore, the supporting evidence
for the current model implies that it better matches the data than the competing
explanations in the literature.
Future work might involve testing the predictions using cross-rm data. This
analysis will allow one to examine whether rms operating in dierent industries use
similar policies on bonuses. Particularly, an analysis on non-prot rms might give
interesting results since these organizations are subject to a `nondistribution con-
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straint' that prohibits distributing prots to its employees and owners (e.g., Glaeser
and Shleifer, 2001). Moreover, the current model focuses on the equilibrium in which
there is no turnover. However, it is plausible to think that the possibility of quits and
layos aects the worker's incentives. Hence, a fruitful way to extend the theoretical
model to capture the incentive eects of quits and layos.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EFFECTS OF PAY ON TURNOVER
2.1 Introduction
Worker turnover has been one of the fundamental themes in labor economics since it
is prevalent, especially among young workers, and has long-lasting eects on workers'
lifetime earnings. In their inuential study on the mobility of young men in the U.S.,
Topel and Ward (1992) nd that two-thirds of workers either change jobs or become
unemployed in their rst year of employment. They also show that wage increases due
to job changes constitute about one third of total wage growth in the rst ten years
of these workers' careers. Consistent with these ndings, there is also a substantial
amount of empirical evidence indicating wage eects of worker mobility (e.g., Bartel
and Borjas, 1981; McLaughlin, 1991; Keith and McWilliams, 1995). Overall, the
empirical evidence points out the importance of understanding the determinants of
turnover. Consequently, a large empirical literature has investigated the correlates
of turnover, which include, but are not limited to, job performance (Bishop, 1990),
relative wages (Galizzi and Lang, 1998), on-the-job training (Krueger and Rouse,
1998), and job prospects (Munasinghe, 2005).
The present study aims to contribute to this literature by focusing on the com-
ponents of the worker's compensation separately. Specically, the goal of the study
is to examine the eects of pay on turnover with a particular emphasis on bonus
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payments. Wages, which are the center of attention in this literature, are measured
by salaries, whereas bonus payments have received little attention. This paper at-
tempts to ll this this gap by documenting the eects of bonus payments on turnover,
and comparing them with that of salaries. To motivate the testable predictions con-
cerning the eect of pay variables on turnover, I employ the wealth maximization
hypothesis within the job search framework. The essence of this hypothesis is that
the worker makes a separation decision in each period so that he maximizes the ex-
pected present value of his lifetime earnings. Consequently, the hypothesis yields a
general prediction that the probability of turnover decreases with the worker's ex-
pected future earnings at the same rm. To translate this general prediction into
testable predictions regarding salaries and bonus payments, I rst investigate how
these pay variables relate to the worker's future compensation.
To the extent that pay variables are serially correlated over time (in terms of either
levels or growth rates), the current values of pay variables can be associated with their
future values. Note that the serial correlation in pay variables implies association
with the worker's future compensation in two ways. First, the worker's salary and
bonus payments change over time in the absence of promotions. Second, pay variables
can be associated with future compensation through signaling future promotions.
There is empirical evidence that supports the hypothesis that salaries can be used to
predict promotions. For example, Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994b) nd that
workers with higher wage growth in a given job level are more likely to be promoted.
The empirical relationship between bonus payments and promotions, on the other
hand, has not been studied. Therefore, I will rst empirically examine to what extent
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bonus payments are associated with future promotions before turning to the eects
of bonuses on turnover, which is the main focus of the present study.
To investigate the two mechanisms that relate the current values of pay variables
to the worker's future compensation, I rst examine serial correlation in pay. Note
that the serial correlation in salaries takes salary increases due to promotion into
account. Therefore, a part of the correlation may be driven by salary increases
upon promotions. However, this connection is weaker for bonus payments since the
promoted worker becomes eligible to earn higher bonuses, yet he is not guaranteed
to earn the bonuses. As will be shown, serial correlation in pay remains signicant
after controlling for the worker's observable characteristics including his job level
and current performance. Next, I examine to what extent pay variables are related
to the worker's probability of earning a promotion. Consistent with the literature,
both the level and the growth rate of salary have positive eects on the probability
of promotions. Moreover, the results indicate that both having earned a bonus
in the current period and the size of the earned bonus (in the current as well as
in the previous period) have positive eects on the worker's probability of earning
a promotion. Overall, the empirical evidence suggests a link between the current
values of pay variables and the worker's future compensation.
After establishing this link, I address three main issues in the empirical analysis.
First, I investigate how the level and the growth rate of salary are related to turnover.
Second, I examine whether bonus payments provide additional information in pre-
dicting turnover after controlling for the level and the growth rate of salary. Finally,
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I examine the extent to which the estimated eect of total compensation on turnover
diers from that of salaries.
The empirical analysis of this paper is based on national survey data and data
coming from the personnel records of a medium-sized U.S. rm operating in the nan-
cial services industry. This rm-level dataset, which was rst used by Baker, Gibbs
and Holmstrom (1994a, b), includes detailed information about workers' salaries and
bonus payments, as well as providing subjective performance ratings and hierarchical
job levels. As will be discussed in detail, these features enable us to control for the
worker's current performance and his promotion prospects. Despite its advantages,
the rm-level data has a shortcoming in that one cannot distinguish worker-initiated
separations (quits) from employer-initiated separations (layos). In order to examine
if pay variables have dierent eects on quits and layos, and to address heterogene-
ity of rms concerning their personnel policies, I make use of a sample drawn from
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). This additional analysis provides com-
plementary evidence to the analysis based on the rm-level data.
Consistent with the empirical literature, the results regarding the eect of salary
levels on turnover are mixed. Specically, the results from the rm-level analysis
indicate that salary level has a positive eect on turnover, whereas the results from
the PSID sample yield the opposite outcome. On the other hand, both sets of
results indicate that the growth rate of salary has a negative eect on turnover. The
fundamental results concerning the eect of salaries do not dier for quits and layos.
In addition, the results indicate that bonus payments have signicant eects on
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turnover. In particular, the analysis based on the rm-level data indicates that having
earned a bonus, as well as the size of the bonus, have negative eects on turnover.
The analysis based on the PSID sample produces related results. It indicates that
the negative eect of bonus payments are statistically signicant for layos, whereas
the results are inconclusive for quits. Finally, the results show that salaries and total
compensation, both in terms of levels and growth rates, have similar qualitative
eects on turnover. However, the estimated negative eects of salaries are larger, in
absolute terms, than those of total compensation.
The pecuniary returns of the job are a major determinant of worker turnover.
Therefore, it is crucial to make use of all information regarding the worker's com-
pensation in analyzing turnover. For example, controlling for the worker's compen-
sation is vital to obtain unbiased estimates in an empirical study that focuses on
how non-pecuniary benets of the current job aect turnover. If the worker's total
compensation is not properly controlled for, the point estimates for non-pecuniary
attributes of the job are likely to be biased. In that sense, the results of the paper
suggest that using both the growth rate of salary and the size of bonus payments
to measure the worker's compensation is a better empirical approach in analyzing
turnover.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related
studies in the literature. Section 3 discusses the wealth maximization hypothesis
and testable predictions concerning the eects of pay variables on turnover. Section
4 describes the datasets used in the empirical analysis, and formally introduces the
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xed-eects logit model that is employed to estimate the eects of pay variables
on turnover. Section 5 discusses the results from the empirical analysis. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2.2 Related Work
In motivating the testable predictions concerning the eect of pay variables on
turnover, I make use of the wealth maximization model within the job search frame-
work.1 The central prediction in this literature regarding the relationship between
pay variables and turnover is that separations should decline as a function of the
current wage level and not as a function of wage growth (e.g., Jovanovic, 1979; Mac-
Donald, 1988).2 However, there is empirical evidence inconsistent with this hypoth-
esis. For example, Topel and Ward (1992) nd that the initial wage has a signicant
positive eect on turnover after controlling for current wage, experience, and tenure.
Clearly, if the current wage is fully informative about the value of the job, the initial
wage is expected to have no signicant eect on turnover. The job-search framework
will be further discussed in the next section where I motivate the testable predictions
concerning the eect of pay variables on turnover.
Munasinghe (2000) provides a theoretical explanation concerning why turnover
depends on rates of wage growth, and claims that his argument can also solve the
1See Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005) for an extensive survey of the literature.
2The reason behind this result is that the current wage level possesses all information about the
quality of the match between the rm and the worker.
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`puzzle' that Topel and Ward (1992) documented. The main assumption in his model
is that there is heterogeneity in within-job wage growth rates.3 In equilibrium, jobs
with high growth rates oer the same wage level as jobs with low growth rates at
the time of hiring. However, the value of jobs with high growth rates exceeds the
value of jobs with low growth rates in subsequent periods. Therefore, jobs oering
high growth rates are less likely to end since workers at both types of jobs draw wage
oers from the same distribution.
Note that the job search framework does not yield direct testable predictions
regarding bonus payments. However, as I will demonstrate in the next section, it is
possible to make use of the link between the worker's expected earnings at the same
job and turnover (via the wealth maximization hypothesis) to examine the eects
of bonus payments on turnover. In this sense, the approach adopted in the present
study is closest in spirit to that of Galizzi and Lang (1998) and Munasinghe (2005).
The essence of the empirical approach followed by Galizzi and Lang (1998) is to
use wages of workers with similar observable attributes as a proxy for the worker's
expected future wages. Consistent with the wealth maximization hypothesis, their
empirical analysis indicates that the probability of quits decreases with expected
future wages at the same rm. My approach is similar to theirs in the sense that I
will also use the link between the worker's future earnings and turnover to examine
the eect of pay on turnover. However, I will use the worker's own pay to infer his
future earnings at the same rm instead of relying on similar workers' earnings as
3Note that wage increases are tied to jobs rather than to workers in this setup. He argues
that heterogeneity in within-job growth rates may arise under the assumptions of rm-specic and
general human capital.
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a proxy for the worker's future earnings. Munasinghe (2005), on the other hand,
uses workers' own assessments regarding their expected duration at the current job,
and their promotion prospects. In that way, he is able to examine the link between
the worker's job prospects and his turnover behavior. He nds that workers who
do not expect to remain at the current job for a long period and those with limited
promotion prospects have higher turnover rates.4
The earlier literature that studies turnover from an eciency point of view fo-
cuses on turnover eects of bonus payments. The idea that bonuses can be used
as a retention device was rst proposed by Hashimoto (1979), who attempted to
explain the prevalence of bonus contracts in Japan. He argues that high protabil-
ity of investment in specic human capital, which leads to the practice of lifetime
employment, is one of the main characteristics of the Japanese labor market. As a
result, if spot-contracting is costly both the employer and workers have incentives
to commit to a bonus contract that can prevent inecient separations by setting a
rule for the division of rents to specic human capital.5 Following this reasoning, he
hypothesizes that the bonus-earnings ratio should increase with the protability of
investment in specic human capital. Using aggregated data from the Basic Wage
Census from Japan, he nds that variables associated with higher returns to human
capital such as education, rm size and tenure at the current rm have signicant
4He also nds that workers with more favorable assessments regarding their future at the current
rm have steeper downward-sloping turnover-tenure proles.
5In related work, Hashimoto and Yu (1980) focus on inecient separations that may occur
due to transaction costs associated with spot contracts and opportunistic bargaining during the
post-investment period. They show that one way to minimize the loss of resources due to inecient
separations is to use bonus contracts in which parties optimally share the returns to specic capital.
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positive eects on the bonus-earnings ratio.
The work by Blakemore, Low, and Ormiston (1987), on the other hand, diers
from Hashimoto's framework by considering a costless contracting case in which the
compensation contract entails two parts. In particular, the base salary is xed before
the worker's output realization and not re-negotiable within the period, whereas the
bonus pay is not xed, but responsive to internal and external market conditions.6
This aspect of the two-part contract makes it a vital retention device since the rm
is able to respond, for example, to outside oers made to its able employees or
uctuations in worker's marginal product by adjusting the bonus payment. Using a
sample drawn from PSID 1970-81, they nd evidence consistent with their hypothesis
that rms use bonus plans to prevent workers' voluntary turnover.7
However, their empirical ndings should be interpreted with caution for several
reasons. First, the dataset provides information about individuals' supplementary
incomes that may include bonus awards, commissions, tips, or overtime pay. How-
ever, it does not specify which form of income the individual earns. To circumvent
this problem, the authors restrict their sample to prime-age male workers in man-
agement and administrator occupations. Second, as the authors cannot observe the
employer source of income for a given year if the worker changes employers within a
year, they use workers who have stayed with the same employer at least 12 months.
6Lazear (2004) makes a similar argument for CEOs' compensation. He argues that rms use
stock options in order to gain the exibility of paying CEOs more and retaining them in good
states, but behaving in an opposite fashion in bad states.
7They also hypothesize that rms operating in industries with unpredictable demand conditions
should be more likely to use two-part contracts than rms in industries facing relatively inelastic
demand schedules. However, they do not test this hypothesis due to data limitations.
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Third, they cannot distinguish workers who were not eligible to earn bonuses from
workers who were eligible, but did not earn bonuses. Therefore, their working sam-
ple includes only bonus recipients. Finally, their statistical analysis, which provides
only cross-sectional evidence, may suer from small sample size since it uses 425
worker-years of data in estimation.
Finally, a small set of empirical papers documents the dierences between salary
and bonus payments. For example, Leonard (1990) nds that the elasticity of bonus
pay with respect to unit sales is more than four times as high as the elasticity of
salary with respect to unit sales, and that bonus payments are more variable over
time than salaries. Findings of Lin (2005) are consistent with these: bonuses are
more sensitive to economic conditions than salaries, and they are more dispersed
than salaries within a hierarchical level. Belzil and Bognanno (2008) examine how
promotions aect earnings growth in corporate hierarchies and show that promotions
have a positive eect on the growth of salaries, but not on bonuses. Finally, Gibbs and
Hendricks (2004) nd evidence consistent with the hypothesis that rms make use
of bonus payments to circumvent restrictions imposed on salaries by pay scales. The
current study aims to contribute to the literature on worker turnover by examining
the eects of salaries and bonus payments on turnover. As indicated, the eect of
bonus payments on turnover has been paid little attention. Therefore, the primary
goal of the paper is to document empirical evidence that bonus payments provide
additional information in analyzing turnover after controlling for salary. As will be
discussed in the next section, the current values of pay variables can be associated
with the worker's future compensation at the same rm. Using this link, I will employ
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the wealth maximization hypothesis to motivate empirical predictions concerning the
eect of pay variables on turnover.
2.3 Theoretical Framework
In this section, I review a basic turnover model in which the worker's optimal strat-
egy entails maximization of his expected lifetime earnings. This discussion aims to
provide a theoretical framework that motivates testable predictions concerning the
eect of pay on turnover.
The idea that workers aim to maximize the expected present value of their lifetime
earnings can be used to provide an economic rationale for turnover (Burdett, 1978).
Building upon this argument, Mortensen (1988) provides a job-search model that
focuses on the worker's job separation behavior. Mortensen assumes that the worker,
while employed, receives random job oers in each period and decides whether to
quit his current job to start a new employment (or to move into unemployment). The
worker's optimal separation decision in each period maximizes the expected present
value of future earnings. In other words, the worker compares the value of his current
job, which is given by the expected present value of future earnings at the same job,
to the value of the outside job oered by potential employers, and chooses to quit
when the latter is greater than the former.
Consistent with Jovanovic's (1979a, b) model, Mortensen assumes that the wage
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process in a given job is a martingale where conditional dispersion decreases with
tenure. This assumption has important consequences. First, it implies that the
current wage level possesses all the necessary information to predict future wages at
the same job, and that the uncertainty concerning future wages diminishes with the
worker's tenure. In addition, since the worker gradually learns about his productivity
at the current job and the distribution of alternative job oers is independent of the
worker's productivity at the current job, holding a job has an option value.8 That
is, the worker has the opportunity to terminate employment in the case of a bad
realization. Therefore, uncertainty regarding future earnings is preferred by the
worker as long as he is not too risk averse. Note that the option value of a given job
decreases with the worker's tenure since the uncertainty diminishes with tenure by
assumption.
In this setup, Mortensen shows that the worker's optimal separation decision
satises the reservation property.9 Specically, each worker has a reservation wage
oer WRi so that the worker chooses to separate if the initial wage oered for an
alternative job exceeds his reservation wage oer. In other words, the reservation
wage oer is the minimum starting wage of an alternative job that can attract the
worker. The reservation wage oer can be characterized by
WRit = w(wt; w
t+1; C); (2.1)
8It is possible, however, to relax this assumption by assuming that the worker's productivity is
correlated across jobs (MacDonald, 1988).
9He shows that the same property holds for the worker's decision to move into a non-employment
state. In motivating the testable predictions, I interpret quits as workers leaving their current
employer and moving to another job as opposed to moving into non-employment or retirement.
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where wt is the current wage level, w
t+1 is the vector of future wages at the current
job, and C is the option value associated with the current job. As noted, the
worker's productivity in his current job does not aect the distribution of alternative
job oers since each worker draws a random job from a pre-specied distribution.
Therefore, any heterogeneity concerning alternative job oers operates only through
the number of job oers received in a given period (i.e., the heterogeneity is driven
by the worker's search intensity). As a result, worker i's highest alternative wage
oer at time t can be written as
WOit = w(it; O); (2.2)
where it is the number of job oers worker i receives in period t, O is the option
value of holding the alternative job. To introduce separations, let yit be a binary
variable indicating the worker's separation decision. Then the optimal separation
rule is as follows:
yit =
8>><>>:
1; if WOit > W
R
it
0; otherwise.
(2.3)
This framework can be used to motivate the testable predictions concerning the
eect of pay variables on turnover. Before discussing the predictions, a clarication
about the terminology is noteworthy. In the literature, wages refer to pecuniary
returns to employment, and they are measured by either salaries or the sum of
salaries and bonus payments. In this paper, however, I examine each component
of the worker's compensation separately. The earnings obtained from aggregating
salaries and bonus payments are referred to as total compensation. Therefore, the
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counterpart of wages becomes salaries in the present paper.
The framework discussed above predicts that the current wage level is negatively
related to turnover. Specically, when the worker's tenure is held constant, i.e., the
option value associated with the current job is held constant, the reservation wage
oer, WRit , increases with the current wage level, wt. Hence, the turnover rate de-
creases with the current wage level. However, the heterogeneity in the distribution
of alternative job oers may confound this negative relationship (Galizzi and Lang,
1998). If, for example, alternative job oers are correlated with the worker's produc-
tivity at the current rm, then the current wage level may have a positive eect on
turnover. One way to address this issue is to use the growth rate of wages (equiva-
lently using the lagged value of salaries) since both the current and the lagged values
of wages are correlated with the unobserved worker-specic term.10
Indeed, the same prediction can apply to total compensation. The reasoning
behind this claim is that the worker may evaluate the returns to employment at
the current job using the total compensation rather than salaries. In that case,
the reservation wage oer decreases with the worker's total compensation in the
current period, and consequently the probability of turnover decreases. Hence, to
test the validity of this claim, and compare the estimated eects of salaries and total
compensation on turnover, I will also estimate the eect of the total compensation
in the current period.
10Note that if the wage in the previous period also correlated with the worker's alternative job
oers, the same problem may persist.
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Unlike the level of wages, this framework does not directly yield testable predic-
tions concerning how the growth rate of pay variables and the size of bonus payments
aect turnover. However, it can be employed to motivate the testable predictions
as follows. As equation (2.1) indicates, the worker's reservation wage oer increases
with the future earnings at the same job. This is quite intuitive in the sense that
if the worker anticipates higher earnings at his current job, he requires a \better"
job oer to leave his current employer. We can invoke this mechanism to motivate
testable predictions concerning the eects of the growth rate of pay variables and the
size of bonus payments. Specically, if the current values of pay variables provide
information about the worker's future compensation at the same rm, they are likely
to aect turnover as well.
To this end, I make two conjectures, which I will empirically test in the present
study, concerning how the current value of a pay variable relates to the worker's fu-
ture compensation. First, if pay variables are serially correlated over time then their
current values may be associated with their future values. Second, the current value
of a pay variable can be associated with higher compensation in the future to the
extent it predicts future promotions. Note that the second channel in which the cur-
rent value of a pay variable (either in terms of level or growth rate) can be associated
with the worker's future compensation through promotions may be evident in serial
correlations as well. However, serial correlations in bonus payments do not fully cap-
ture the relationship between bonus payment in the current period and the worker's
future compensation. Note that if higher bonus payments are associated with higher
promotion probabilities, this means that the worker will be eligible for bonuses of
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larger sizes when he is promoted, but it does not mean that the same worker will
earn the bonus in future periods. However, the worker's expected compensation is
likely to increase since the promoted worker earns higher salaries. Therefore, bonus
payments may be associated with higher future compensation through future pro-
motions since the promoted worker earns higher salaries and becomes eligible to earn
larger bonuses.
As noted, bonus payments signal higher compensation in the future to the extent
they are associated with promotions in future periods. The employer's rationale for
using promotions is to sort more able workers and provide workers with incentives for
eort. In either case, promotions are highly correlated with the worker's performance
(Gibbs, 1995). Since bonus payments are also related to the worker's performance, it
is plausible to conjecture that earning a bonus, as well as its size, is correlated with
promotions. Ekinci (2012) provides a theoretical model consistent with this reason-
ing. Specically, in his model, the worker who produces a high level of output in a
given period improves the employer's belief regarding his ability, and consequently
earns a bonus. Since returns to ability are higher at higher job levels, the employer
has incentives to assign more able workers to higher job levels. In equilibrium, work-
ers who earn the bonus in a given period are promoted to the next job level at the
beginning of the next period. There is a considerable amount of empirical evidence
that promotions are associated with large wage increases (e.g., Lazear, 1992; McCue,
1996). Therefore, bonus payments signal higher expected compensation in future pe-
riods to the extent they are associated with future promotions and the corresponding
wage increases.
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Similarly, the growth rate of salaries may also predict higher future compensation
through promotions. Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994b) nd that workers who
experience higher wage growth in a given job level are more likely to get promoted
to the next job level. Therefore, the growth rate of salaries can also reduce the
probability of turnover through the possibility of future promotions.
Note, however, that this framework focuses on separations initiated by the worker
(quits), rather than employer-initiated separations (layos). This might be a concern
in the empirical analysis since the rm-level data does not distinguish between quits
and layos. McLaughlin (1991) shows that if separations are ecient, distinguishing
between layos and quits is meaningless since all workers are allocated to rms
eciently in equilibrium. However, given the empirical evidence for information
asymmetries between the current employer of the worker and potential employers in
the labor market (e.g., Kahn, 2009; Pinkston, 2009; DeVaro and Waldman, 2012),
the eciency assumption is a strong one. However, the main goal of the paper is not
to present a theory that can fully explain turnover, but to document the eects of
pay variables on turnover. Therefore, this caveat does not lessen the signicance of
the empirical results presented in the paper.
Overall, I will test several predictions concerning the eects of pay variables on
turnover. These predictions are as follows. First, the level of salary (and total
compensation) has a negative eect on turnover. Second, the growth rate of salary
(and total compensation) has a negative eect on turnover. Third, both earning a
bonus and the size of the bonus are negatively related to turnover after controlling
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for salary and growth rate of salary.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Firm-Level Data
The main empirical analysis in this paper is based on data coming from the personnel
records for managerial employees of a medium-sized U.S. rm in the nancial services
industry. The same dataset was rst used by Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (hereafter
BGH) (1994a, b) in their canonical study that gave a very detailed account of the
rm's wage, promotion and other personnel policies.11 The original dataset includes
year-end-records over the twenty-year period 1969-1988. However, information on
bonus payments is available only in the last seven-year period of the data, 1981-
1988.12 Therefore, the empirical analysis that makes use of bonus payments uses
only this sub-period of the data. I further restrict the analysis to U.S. male workers
since all pay variables are denominated in U.S. dollars and other dynamics that may
aect the turnover behavior of foreign and female workers confound the relationship
between turnover and pay variables, which is the main focus of this paper. Overall,
the full sample includes 31,524 worker-years of data, while the restricted sample,
which consists of workers who are eligible to earn bonuses, includes 10,575 worker-
11Recent papers that use the same data include Gibbs (1995), Kahn and Lange (2010), Ekinci
(2012), and DeVaro and Waldman (2012).
12As a robustness check, I examine the extent to which the eects of functions of salary on
turnover are comparable across pre- and after-1981 periods.
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years of data.
To derive a turnover variable, I make use of the panel dimension of the data.
Specically, if there is no record for a worker in a given year, the previous year
becomes his last year at the rm. This way of calculating the turnover variable
has two implications. First, turnover is not possible for observations in last year of
the dataset, 1988, since we cannot know if workers leave or stay at the rm in the
following year.13 Second, it does not distinguish quits from layos. However, this is
not a major limitation since the main goal of the analysis is to document that salary
and bonus payments are important determinants of turnover.
An important aspect of the data is that they include performance ratings that
are based on subjective evaluations submitted by supervisors. Despite their sub-
jectivity, Gibbs (1995), using the same dataset, nds that performance ratings are
correlated with promotions and bonuses , which are generally regarded as workers'
being rewarded for their good performance. Therefore, I will use ratings to control
for the worker's performance level.14 Subjective performance ratings are measured
on a ve-point scale in which 1 reects the best performance. Since there are few
worker-years at which the performance rating is equal to 5, I combine rating 5 with
rating 4.15
The use of performance ratings as a control variable has several purposes. First,
13Note that this is a restriction only when the variable of interest is turnover. Therefore, obser-
vations in year 1988 are included in regressions in which the dependent variable is not turnover.
14Kahn and Lange (2010), and DeVaro and Waldman (2012) also use performance ratings as a
proxy for the worker's performance.
15Results do not change when rating 4 and rating 5 enter regressions separately.
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it is plausible to presume that the worker's separation depends on his performance.
Therefore, performance ratings, which are proxies for the worker's performance level,
are expected to be correlated with turnover. Second, performance ratings are cor-
related with promotions (Gibbs, 1995). Because promotions are associated with
large increases in wages, higher performance ratings in the current period may signal
higher future compensation. Therefore, workers with higher performance ratings are
expected to be less likely to leave the rm. Third, Medo and Abraham (1981) and
Dohmen (2004) nd that performance evaluations in the current period are corre-
lated with future wage increases. Finally, as will be discussed in detail, performance
ratings are correlated both with the probability of earning a bonus and the size of the
bonus payment. Therefore, one needs to control for workers' performance to account
for heterogeneity in bonus payments that arise from workers' dierent performance
levels. However, as the theoretical discussion suggests bonus payments may provide
information about the worker's performance as well. Therefore, I will examine the
eects of bonus payments when the performance ratings are controlled for as well
as the case when they are not included in the estimating equation. Note that if the
postulate that bonus payments possess information about the worker's performance,
we anticipate that the eect of bonus payments on turnover will decline when we
control for performance ratings.
Another important aspect of the data set is that it includes hierarchical levels.
Since the HR department of this rm did not provide any information about job
levels, BGH used movements between job titles to identify job levels. Note that if
information about pay variables was used in constructing job level, a part of the
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correlation between turnover and pay variables would be inadvertently captured by
job levels.16 BGH (1994a) identify 8 levels, where level 8 reects the CEO of the
company. Since the dynamics that determine the CEO's compensation is dierent
and there are fewer employees at higher levels due to the pyramidal structure of the
rm, I drop observations in level 8 and combine levels 6 and 7 with level 5. There
are three main reasons to include job level in the empirical analysis. First, as will be
discussed in detail in the next section, turnover rates depend on job level. Second,
the probability of promotions depends on job levels (Gibbs, 1995). Third, the size of
bonus payments increases with job level (e.g., Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom, 1994a;
Smeets and Warzynski, 2008; Ekinci, 2012).
Table 2.1 presents means and standard deviations of key variables used in the
empirical analysis.17 All pay variables are measured in real terms in 1988 dollars,
while age and tenure variables are measured in years. In order to examine if observ-
able characteristics are signicantly dierent across two subsamples, `leavers' and
`stayers', average values are computed separately for each group and t-statistics for
the dierences between the means are reported in column 6. We nd that, the group
of stayers is on average older, less educated, and has longer tenure at the rm. In
terms of performance measures, stayers have higher performance ratings as expected.
16Lazear (1992) uses average pay to identify job levels. Therefore, any correlation between
turnover and pay variables in his data would be biased downward since a part of the correlation is
captured by job levels which in turn are identied by pay variables.
17The calculations are based on the sample of male workers who were employed at the rm's U.S.
plants in 1981-1988, and were eligible for bonus payments. The statistics for performance ratings
are based on worker-years for which performance ratings are available. The last column reports
t-statistics for the mean dierences between the subsamples of stayers and leavers. Throughout the
paper, statistical signicance at the 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, and **, respectively.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics (Firm-Level Data)
Leave=0 Leave=1
Variables Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev t-statistic
Age 40.887 8.853 37.864 9.478 12.59**
High School 0.334 0.472 0.215 0.411 9.56**
College 0.327 0.469 0.410 0.492 -6.52**
Professional 0.242 0.428 0.289 0.453 -4.076**
PhD 0.095 0.293 0.086 0.280 1.17
Tenure at rm 6.397 4.107 5.282 3.859 9.77**
Tenure at level 3.872 3.177 3.433 2.858 5.16**
Level=1 0.153 0.360 0.181 0.385 -2.86**
Level=2 0.211 0.408 0.225 0.418 -1.23
Level=3 0.273 0.445 0.270 0.444 0.19
Level=4 0.321 0.467 0.301 0.459 1.59
Level=5 0.041 0.199 0.022 0.147 3.69**
Rating 1.881 0.729 2.101 0.790 -9.10**
Earned bonus 0.400 0.490 0.325 0.469 5.71**
Log(bonus) 8.728 0.863 8.690 0.959 0.95
Log(salary) 10.914 0.402 10.887 0.394 2.53*
N(worker-yrs) 13,001 1,543
Finally, we observe that stayers have higher salaries and they are more likely to earn
a bonus than leavers. Note that there is no statistical dierence between bonus
payments across the two groups. However, this comparison includes only bonus
recipients.18
As will be discussed in the empirical section, both the probability of earning a
bonus and its size are positively correlated with the worker's performance. Hence,
the sample of bonus recipients may constitute a selected sample of workers who are
more productive, thus less likely to leave the rm than workers who did not earn the
18Since log of 0 is undened, observations with zero bonuses are excluded from this comparison.
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bonus in the current period. This sample selection indicates an upward bias for the
eect of bonuses on turnover. In order to circumvent the problem of sample selection
on bonuses, I replace 0 bonuses with a very small number so that the log of it is well-
dened.19 This specication allows me to use both recipients and non-recipients in
regressions analyses of bonus payments.
2.4.2 PSID Sample
The PSID sample used in this empirical analysis comes from the biennial surveys in
2003-2009. It includes male household heads who are employed in a given survey year.
I exclude self-employed, disabled, and government workers, students, and retired
individuals from the sample. For each survey year, the respondent is asked whether
he had changed his main job in the corresponding year, and the reason for his job
mobility if applicable. Following McLaughlin (1991), I dene the layo variable so
that it includes separations due to being laid-o and the company being shut down,
and dene the quit variable so that it includes only voluntary separations.
Summary statistics for variables used in the empirical analysis are reported in
Table 2.2. To be able to assess dierences in observed characteristics statistics are
reported separately for the whole sample, `stayers', `layos' and `quits'. The last
column reports the t-statistics for the mean dierences between layos and quits.
We observe that on average laid-o workers are older, more likely to be married, and
19When I used the subsample of bonus recipients in bonus regressions, the results were qualita-
tively similar to those reported in the paper.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics (Sample from the PSID)
Whole Sample Stayers Layos Quits
Variables Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev t-stat
Log(salary) 10.46 0.87 10.51 0.82 9.92 1.01 9.53 1.22 4.68**
Log(bonus) 0.86 2.43 0.89 2.47 0.47 1.75 0.44 1.63 0.17
High school 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.51 0.50 0.41 0.49 2.53*
College 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.14 0.35 0.18 0.31 1.17
Grad 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.12 0.29
Age 40.3 11.6 40.5 11.6 37.9 11.4 34.8 12.1 3.51**
Married 0.72 0.45 0.73 0.44 0.54 0.49 0.42 0.50 3.18**
Tenure 7.38 8.47 7.66 8.57 3.56 5.26 2.74 4.69 2.05*
Proportions 1 0.937 0.038 0.0141
N(worker-yrs) 15854 14870 617 224
they earn higher salaries and have longer tenure than quitters have.
2.4.3 Estimation Framework
Since the dependent variable of interest is a dichotomous variable, I make use of the
logit estimator which also enables me to exploit the panel dimension of the data. In
particular, I adopt the following underlying latent model:
yit = W
O
it  WRit
= i + p
0
it + x
0
it + it (2.4)
where yit is a continuous but unobserved index of propensity to turnover of worker i in
period t, pit is the vector of pay variables, which are of primary interest, xit is a vector
of explanatory variables (that will be discussed below), and i is an idiosyncratic
xed eect which accounts for unobserved and time-invariant heterogeneity between
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workers' propensity to turnover. Since what we observe is an indicator variable
concerning whether worker i is still employed at the rm in period t+1 provided that
the worker has worked with his current employer for t periods, we have:
yit =
8>><>>:
1; if yit > 0
0; otherwise.
(2.5)
When it is independently logistic, we have:
Pr(yit = 1ji; p
0
it; x
0
it) =
exp(i + p
0
it + x
0
it)
1 + exp(i + p
0
it + x
0
it)
: (2.6)
Following Chamberlain (1984), I estimate this xed-eects logit model by conditional
maximum likelihood.20 However, this approach relies on observations in which there
is a change in the dependent variable from zero to one or vice versa, thus it entails
a loss of observations.21 Also, since we have rm-level data in which workers are
not followed after leaving the rm, we use observations for which the dependent
variable changes from zero to one to estimate our model. Hence, in order to check
the robustness of our results, I report results from pooled regressions as well as
xed-eects regressions.22
20Note that this estimator does not treat worker xed-eects as parameters to be estimated.
21This loss of observations does not indicate a loss of information since observations in which there
is no change in the dependent variable do not contribute to the likelihood function (Wooldridge,
2010).
22Note that we do not use the random eects specication since its assumption of independence
between the individual xed eect and the explanatory variables makes this strategy unappealing
in the current context.
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2.5 Results
The empirical analysis consists of two parts. In the rst part, I use the rm-level
data to examine the eects of pay variables on turnover. In the second part, I use
the sample drawn from the PSID to examine the extent to which the ndings from
the rm-level analysis are robust to heterogeneity in rms' personnel policies. This
part of the analysis will also let us examine if there are any behavioral dierences
between quits and layos.
2.5.1 Analysis on the Firm-Level Data
In the rm-level analysis, I make use of the detailed information about workers'
pay variables, performance, and tenure to investigate the eects of pay variables on
turnover. To this end, I will rst focus on the rm's policy on bonus payments. In
particular, I will examine the probability of earning a bonus and the size of bonus
payments. This discussion will provide a basic understanding of the rm's bonus
policy; thus, it will help interpret the eect of bonus payments on turnover. Next, I
will examine the extent to which the current values of pay variables can be associated
with future compensation, and look at the exit patterns within pay distributions. In
the last subsection, I will estimate the eects of pay variables on turnover, and discuss
the results.
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Preliminary Analysis on Bonus Payments
Before turning to the eect of bonus payments on turnover, I will rst provide a
general discussion of bonus payments. As indicated, workers do not earn bonuses in
each period they are eligible for bonuses. Therefore, the subsample of eligible workers
includes worker-years of data with positive (recipients) as well as zero bonuses (non-
recipients). To investigate how the worker's (observable) characteristics, job level
and performance ratings are related to the worker's probability of earning the bonus
and to the size of bonus payments, I conduct an analysis on bonuses and report the
results in Table 2.3.23
The rst column reports the results from a logit model with the dependent vari-
able indicating whether the worker is a bonus recipient in the current period, or
not. Two important conclusions can be drawn here: rst, job levels have signi-
cant eects on the probability of earning a bonus;24 second, performance ratings are
strongly correlated with the probability of earning a bonus. Specically, the worker's
probability of earning the bonus increases monotonically with his performance. In
addition, the probability of earning a bonus is increasing with the worker's tenure
at the rm. One explanation for this nding is that the worker accumulates human
capital over time, and he becomes more likely to earn a bonus as he becomes more
productive over time.25
23All specications include control variables for education, race, age, and year dummies. `Level=1'
and `Rating=1' are the omitted categories. Pseudo{R2 refers to McFadden's R2. Standard errors
are provided in brackets.
24The p-value of the F-test for the joint signicance of job level dummies is practically zero.
25Another explanation is that the more senior workers have superior information about the per-
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Table 2.3: Determinants of Bonuses (Firm-Level Data)
Variables Earned Bonus Bonus Log(bonus) Bonus
(Logit) (OLS) (OLS) (Tobit)
Level=2 0.332** 393.2** 0.370** 3,048**
(0.0918) (148.0) (0.0479) (772.7)
Level=3 0.930** 1,343** 0.638** 7,900**
(0.0942) (210.7) (0.0493) (977.5)
Level=4 0.891** 4,255** 1.216** 11,477**
(0.105) (371.1) (0.0552) (1,196)
Level=5 0.923** 19,218** 2.594** 30,301**
(0.192) (2,380) (0.106) (3,180)
Rating=2 -0.547** -1,552** -0.122** -4,503**
(0.0509) (211.5) (0.0208) (559.4)
Rating=3 -1.618** -2,280** -0.0933* -12,620**
(0.0847) (195.0) (0.0392) (1,148)
Rating=4 -2.228** -2,806** 0.421 -16,561**
(0.340) (568.5) (0.279) (3,243)
Tenure at rm 0.158** 68.32 -0.0206 710.1**
(0.026) (93.28) (0.012) (228.0)
Tenure at rm2 -0.0077** -5.073 0.0012 -34.31**
(0.001) (4.528) (0.001) (12.28)
N(worker-yrs) 10,567 10,575 3,508 10,575
Log-likelihood -5765 -110220 -3030 -41760
Pseudo-R2 0.141 0.149 0.485 0.0247
Next, I focus on the size of bonus payments. Accordingly, I estimate three models
to understand whether using the sample of bonus recipients aects the impact of
explanatory variables on the size of bonuses. Columns 2 and 3 report the results
from the ordinary least squares estimation in which the dependent variable is bonus
payments and the logarithm of bonus payments, respectively. Note that the results
reported in column 2 include all observations, whereas the results reported in column
3 include only bonus recipients (since the logarithm of zero is undened). We see
formance requirements for earning a bonus than younger workers.
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that even though sample sizes are substantially dierent (10,575 vs. 3,508), the point
estimates for job levels have the expected pattern in both regressions. Consistent
with the existing literature, each regression indicates that the size of bonus payments
increases with job level. The estimated eect of performance ratings, on the other
hand, diers in the two regressions. The results in column 2 indicate that the size
of bonus payments increases with the worker's performance, whereas the results in
column 3 do not indicate a monotonic relationship. One potential reason for this
nding is that the subsample of bonus recipients consists of worker-years with high
performance ratings.26 Therefore, controlling for performance ratings does not yield
a monotonic relationship since only few observations with lower ratings are included
in the subsample of bonus recipients.
Finally, I employ tobit estimation to address potential selection problems due
to the clustering of workers with zero bonuses. Indeed, the results from the tobit
regression, reported in column 4, are also in line with linear regressions in terms of
understanding the qualitative eects of observable characteristics on bonuses. They
all indicate that the size of bonus payments increases with job level and performance
ratings. Note, however, that tobit regression results are the only set of results that
produce signicant eects for the worker's tenure at the rm.
Overall, the results suggest that the subsample of bonus recipients constitute a
selected sample in the sense that it consists of worker-years with higher performance
on average. Note that this result is valid to the extent that performance ratings
26As the results in column 1 indicates, it is less likely to observe a positive bonus in a given
worker-year with lower performance ratings.
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are a good measure for the worker's performance. Since there might be a selection
problem associated with the subsample of bonus recipients, it is important to make
use of both bonus recipients and non-recipients in the empirical analysis of turnover.
The Link between the Current Values of Pay Variables and Future Com-
pensation
I begin the analysis by examining the serial correlation in pay. The goal of this
exercise is to assess the extent to which the value of pay variables at the current
period is associated with their future values. In that sense, if pay variables are
highly correlated over time, one can argue that the current values of pay variables
provide information about the worker's future compensation, and they are likely to
aect turnover.
Table 2.4 reports serial correlations of total compensation, salaries, and bonus
payments between three adjacent years. The results indicate that the level of total
compensation is highly correlated over time, both in adjacent periods and two-period
windows. The same pattern is observed for the level of salary with higher correlations.
Accordingly, the serial correlation in the level of salary at the current period is close
to 1 both for 1 period and 2 periods back. The serial correlations in bonuses, on
the other hand, are weaker, but they are also signicant and positive. This explains
why the serial correlation in total compensation is weaker than that in salaries; the
fact that bonuses are less correlated over time weakens the serial correlation in total
compensation.
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Table 2.4: Serial Correlations in Pay (Firm-Level Data)
Pay Variables Correlation between pay Correlation between residual pay
variable in the current variable in the current
period and: period and:
1 period back 2 periods back 1 period back 2 periods back
Log(compensation) 0.973* 0.843* 0.719* 0.694*
Log(compensation) -0.017 -0.022 -0.112* -0.073*
Log(salary) 0.985* 0.956* 0.693* 0.656*
Log(salary) 0.325* 0.276* 0.178* 0.138*
Log(bonus) 0.207* 0.193* 0.171* 0.148*
Looking at the serial correlations in growth rates, we observe a striking dierence
between total compensation and salary.27 Specically, the serial correlation in the
growth rate of salaries is positive (and statistically signicant), whereas the serial
correlation in the growth rate of total compensation is negative and not statistically
signicant. This disparity follows from the fact that workers do not earn bonuses in
each period. Therefore, the growth rate in total compensation has a considerably
dierent pattern over time than the growth rate in salaries. Finally, a nding common
to both levels and growth rates of pay variables is that the correlation is slightly
stronger for adjacent years than the correlation between the current period and two
periods back.
To what extent these serial correlations are driven by heterogeneity in workers or
jobs (or a combination of the two) is important. In other words, these correlations
may be driven by dierences in observable characteristics of workers. For example,
27Since there are few workers who are eligible for bonuses in subsequent periods, the empirical
analysis does not include the growth rate of bonus payments.
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workers at higher job levels or workers with longer tenure at the rm may receive
higher salary increases or bonuses, or other observable characteristics such as edu-
cation or race may have systematic eects on pay variables. To account for these
possibilities, I compute abnormal variation in pay variables (residuals) after con-
trolling for age, tenure at the rm, education, race, job level and salary (for bonus
regressions only). Columns 4 and 5 report the serial correlations in residuals in three
adjacent years. As expected, serial correlations in salaries and bonus payments are
somewhat smaller, but still signicant at the 1 percent level. Interestingly, the serial
correlation in the growth rate of total compensation becomes negative and statisti-
cally signicant at the 1 percent level after controlling for the worker's observable
characteristics. As indicated, the negative relationship is mostly due to bonus pay-
ments. Since workers do not earn bonuses in each period, the growth rate of total
compensation is not as predictable. Therefore, if we account for observable factors
that are correlated with bonuses, such as job levels, the serial correlation in total
compensation becomes less sensitive to the over-time variation in bonus payments.
Overall, the results indicate that even though observable characteristics have an
important eect, the serial correlations remain statistically signicant.
Next, I investigate the extent to which pay is associated with promotions. To in-
vestigate the eect of pay on promotions, I estimate logit models with the dependent
variable indicating whether the worker earns a promotion in a given year. The re-
sults are reported in Table 2.5. In addition to performance ratings and tenure at the
current job level, each specication includes controls for job level, education, race,
and age. Consistent with the earlier literature, both performance ratings and tenure
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Table 2.5: Promotions and Pay (Firm-Level Data)
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Rating=2 -0.407** -0.393** -0.396** -0.412** -0.389** -0.335**
[0.0784] [0.0850] [0.0786] [0.0842] [0.0787] [0.0965]
Rating=3 -1.339** -1.235** -1.266** -1.269** -1.256** -1.161**
[0.117] [0.124] [0.118] [0.124] [0.118] [0.143]
Rating=4 -2.467** -2.307** -2.504** -2.496** -2.500** -1.903**
[0.595] [0.598] [0.596] [0.597] [0.596] [0.609]
Tenure at level=2 1.046** 1.125** 1.081** 1.026** 1.078** 0.855**
[0.0961] [0.115] [0.0959] [0.115] [0.0959] [0.113]
Tenure at level=3 0.991** 1.087** 1.050** 0.997** 1.047** 0.717**
[0.115] [0.130] [0.115] [0.129] [0.115] [0.133]
Tenure at level=4 0.689** 0.837** 0.750** 0.703** 0.746** 0.463**
[0.148] [0.160] [0.148] [0.159] [0.148] [0.176]
Tenure at level5 0.999** 1.145** 1.095** 1.046** 1.094** 0.703**
[0.129] [0.141] [0.129] [0.140] [0.129] [0.158]
Log(salary) 1.135**
[0.164]
Log(salary) 3.837**
[0.593]
Earned bonus 0.442** 0.437**
[0.0731] [0.0803]
Earned bonus last period 0.129
[0.0863]
Log(bonus) 0.0370** 0.0251**
[0.0057] [0.0071]
Log(bonus last period) 0.0228**
[0.0076]
N(worker-yrs) 11,763 11,124 11,764 11,126 11,763 6,855
Log-likelihood -3059 -2783 -3065 -2786 -3062 -2015
Pseudo-R2 0.197 0.202 0.196 0.202 0.196 0.192
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at the current job level are strongly correlated with the probability of promotions
(Gibbs, 1995). The results show that both the level and the growth rate of salaries
have a statistically signicant positive eect on the probability of promotions (see
columns 1 and 2). This result is consistent with the nding that workers with higher
wage growth are more likely to earn a promotion (BGH, 1994b).
More interestingly, the ndings indicate that having earned a bonus, as well as
the size of the bonus, is correlated with promotion. The results in column 3 show
that workers who have earned a bonus in the current period are more likely to earn a
promotion.28 We see that the eect of earning a bonus in the previous year is positive,
but not signicant at conventional levels (see column 4). The estimated eects of
the size of bonus payments are in line with our expectations. Specically, the size of
bonus payments is positively related to the probability of earning a promotion (see
column 5). The same result holds for the bonus payment in the previous year as
well. In column 6, we see that the sizes of bonus payments in both the current and
the previous periods have positive eect on the probability of earning a promotion.
One pattern observed in Table 2.5 is that functions of salary have larger eects
on the probability of earning a promotion than bonus variables. For example, the
marginal eect of the salary level is 3 times larger than the marginal eect of earning
a bonus in the current period. The dierence gets even larger between the salary level
and the size of bonus payments.29 Therefore, we can argue that the predictive power
28Since the data provide a snapshot for each year, we do not know the exact timing of promotion
decisions. Therefore, this nding indicates that the worker who earns a bonus in the current period
is more likely to be assigned to the next job level in the next period.
29Also, note that the point estimate for growth rate of salary is larger than that for the level of
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of bonus payments is considerably smaller than that of salary variables. Therefore,
the link between the current value of bonus payments and future compensation is
weaker than it is between salary variables and future compensation. In that sense,
this result is consistent with the discussion concerning serial correlations. Recall that
the serial correlation in bonus payments is weaker than the serial correlation in salary
variables. The reason for this is that bonus payments are erratic in the sense that
the worker may not earn bonuses in subsequent periods. Consequently, we anticipate
that the eect of bonus payments on turnover will be weaker than the eect of salaries
since the association between bonus payments and future compensation is weaker.
Exit Rates and Pay Distributions
Here, I examine exit rates by job level and pay decile. Pay deciles are calculated
within each hierarchical level and year. Therefore, one can see how exit rates vary
across pay deciles within a job level. Table 2.6 presents exit rates by job level and
salary decile. The results indicate that there is little variation in exit behavior across
salary deciles. Across levels, on the other hand, workers at levels 3 and 4 are more
likely to leave the rm than other job levels. Tables 2.7 and 2.8 examine the pattern of
exit rates by job level and deciles of salary increase, and bonus payments, respectively.
Looking at the salary increase and exit rates, two patterns are noticeable in all job
levels but level 5: rst, exit rates are highest in the bottom decile and decrease
afterwards; second, exit rates start to increase in the highest two deciles. On the
salary. This suggests that the former has a more predictive power on promotions than the latter.
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other hand, the relationship between bonus payments and exit rates are erratic,
especially in levels 1 and 5.
Table 2.6: Separation Rates by Job Level and Salary Decile (Firm-Level Data)
Level Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th Top Total
1 0.120 0.104 0.106 0.107 0.109 0.123 0.091 0.108 0.127 0.092 0.108
2 0.097 0.088 0.105 0.103 0.106 0.088 0.098 0.111 0.094 0.089 0.098
3 0.108 0.093 0.082 0.098 0.069 0.421 0.100 0.104 0.087 0.123 0.126
4 0.089 0.064 0.077 0.096 0.095 0.722 0.076 0.098 0.085 0.093 0.150
5 0.149 0.146 0.132 0.066 0.104 0.063 0.048 0.048 0.058 0.029 0.083
Total 0.104 0.089 0.092 0.098 0.093 0.074 0.088 0.1 0.091 0.095
Table 2.7: Separation Rates by Job Level and Salary Increase Decile (Firm-Level
Data)
Level Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th Top Total
1 0.184 0.111 0.082 0.074 0.085 0.088 0.067 0.075 0.043 0.121 0.093
2 0.165 0.107 0.083 0.059 0.095 0.092 0.083 0.074 0.092 0.111 0.096
3 0.158 0.075 0.079 0.089 0.066 0.082 0.085 0.073 0.089 0.097 0.089
4 0.157 0.096 0.079 0.069 0.071 0.083 0.068 0.065 0.067 0.091 0.085
5 0.085 0.155 0.117 0.103 0.068 0.113 0.031 0.069 0.01 0.01 0.076
Total 0.157 0.098 0.082 0.075 0.075 0.087 0.073 0.07 0.072 0.095
Table 2.8: Separation Rates by Job Level and Bonus Decile (Firm-Level Data)
Level Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th Top Total
1 0.087 0.17 0.205 0.057 0.2 0.028 0.127 0.128 0.115 0.164 0.129
2 0.143 0.083 0.127 0.08 0.094 0.03 0.098 0.09 0.033 0.096 0.087
3 0.107 0.076 0.059 0.068 0.067 0.103 0.068 0.046 0.059 0.113 0.074
4 0.073 0.103 0.106 0.063 0.062 0.091 0.087 0.071 0.071 0.111 0.085
5 0.179 0.036 0.029 0.028 0.108 0.143 0.065 0.056 0.083 0.071 0.079
Total 0.103 0.096 0.096 0.065 0.08 0.086 0.085 0.067 0.067 0.111
Interestingly, workers at top deciles leave the rm more often than worker at
lower levels. One possibility is that the rm has limited slots to grant promotions to
its employees (a situation referred to as promotion bottlenecks). Hence, workers who
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are not granted a promotion leave the rm since their earnings cannot go beyond the
upper limit imposed by pay scales unless they are promoted to the upper job level.
The constraint on pay raises imposed by pay scales was referred to as the `Green
Card' eect by BGH (1994a). This eect implies that workers at lower pay deciles
in a given job category experience higher raises than workers at higher pay deciles
at the same job category. Therefore, the nding that workers at top pay deciles
are more likely to separate is consistent with the green card eect in the sense that
workers who are not satised with their pay raises may have higher propensities to
separate. Another possibility is that workers in higher deciles have higher levels of
general human capital; thus, they are more mobile or have higher demand from the
labor market.
Pay Variables and Turnover
After establishing the link between the current values of pay variables with the
worker's future compensation, I test the predictions concerning the eects of salaries
and bonus payments on turnover. To investigate the eect of pay variables on
turnover, I estimate equation (2.6) under several specications. In particular, I
rst examine how the level and the growth rate of salaries aect the probability of
turnover. This analysis is based on the full sample.30 Next, I estimate the eect of
functions of bonus after controlling for salary (both its level and growth rate). Since
bonuses are available only in the restricted sample, this analysis is based only on the
30As a robustness check, I also estimate the eect of salaries on turnover using the restricted
sample which is the subsample of workers who are eligible for bonuses.
109
restricted sample. Finally, I replace salary with total compensation (equal to the
sum of salaries and bonus payments) to assess to what extent aggregating salaries
with bonus payments changes the results.
As discussed in the previous section, both xed-eects and pooled logits are es-
timated to assess how unobserved worker heterogeneity aects workers' propensities
to turnover. All pooled logits include age, tenure at rm, education level, year dum-
mies, and race dummies as control variables, whereas these variables are dropped in
xed-eects estimations. Overall, I estimate three dierent specications for each
pay variable under consideration. The baseline specication includes the set of con-
trol variables enumerated above (only for pooled regressions) and indicator variables
for job levels. The second specication augments the baseline with indicator variables
for performance ratings, while the third specication further augments it by adding
indicator variables for tenure at the current job level. As indicated, the rationale for
using performance ratings and tenure at the current job level in turnover regressions
is to account for the worker's current performance and his future promotion possibil-
ities, respectively. Therefore, we anticipate that the negative eect of pay variables
on turnover should decline in the second and the third specications.
Table 2.9 displays the results of estimating logit models in which the pay variable
of interest is salary and the estimation is based on the full sample. Panel A displays
the results for the pooled logits, while Panel B displays the results for the FE logits.
The results from pooled logits (columns 1 to 3 on Panel A) indicate that the level of
salary does not have a signicant eect on turnover. On the contrary, the FE logits
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imply that the coecient estimates for the level of salary is positive and signicant
at the 1 percent level (see columns 1 to 3 on the second panel). This means that
workers with higher salaries are more likely to turnover even after controlling for
time-invariant worker heterogeneity. As discussed earlier, this nding is inconsistent
with the search theories predicting that the probability of turnover declines with
the current wage level. However, there is no consensus in the empirical literature
about the eect of current salary level on turnover. For example, Galizzi and Lang
(1998) also nd a positive relationship between the current wage level and turnover.
A possible explanation for this nding might be that higher salaries reect workers
for which the labor market demand is higher. For example, if the skills of workers
with higher salaries are more transferable to other rms in the market, they are more
likely to receive wage oers higher than their current compensation.31 However, the
data do not permit us to test this hypothesis.
Unlike the level of salary, the growth rate of salary has a negative and statistically
signicant (at the 1 percent level) eect on turnover. Specically, both pooled logits
(columns 4 to 6 on Panel A) and FE logits (columns 4 to 6 on Panel B) indicate that
the worker's probability of turnover declines with the growth rate of salary in the
current period. Recall that the conjecture of the paper is the growth rate of salaries
is positively related to the worker's future compensation, thus it has a negative eect
on turnover. Therefore, one expects that the eect of the growth rate of salary on
turnover should decline, in absolute terms, when we account for the worker's cur-
31Consistent with this argument, Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) show that an increase in the
transferability of the worker's skills (i.e., an increase in the ratio of general to rm-specic human
capital) leads to fewer internal promotions, more external hires, and an increase in average wages.
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rent performance and his promotion prospects. The results are generally consistent
with this postulate; the point estimate for the growth rate of salary decreases after
controlling for performance ratings and tenure at the current job level. Indeed, the
decrease is more dramatic in FE logits since the point estimate almost reduces to
the one third of its level in the baseline specication. Before turning to other pay
variables, let us look at how the control variables for the worker's performance and
promotions prospects are related to turnover. The results show that the point es-
timates for performance ratings and tenure at the current level are in line with our
expectations. The probability of turnover decreases with the worker's performance.
The relationship between the probability of turnover and dummies for tenure at cur-
rent job level, which are intended to capture the variation in promotion probabilities,
is monotonic. Workers with longer tenure at the current job level are more likely
to turnover after controlling for the worker's tenure at the rm. This suggests that
the tenure at the current level can be used to control for the worker's promotion
prospects.
As noted before, the analysis on bonus payments is based on the restricted sample
since the bonus data span the 1981-1988 period. I perform two robustness checks.
First, I re-estimate all specications reported in Table 2.9, which are based on the
full sample, using the restricted sample to see if results discussed above are robust
to time period. Results from the restricted sample are qualitatively the same and
quantitatively very similar to the results from the full sample. Therefore, one can
conclude that the growth rate of salary has a statistically signicant negative eect
on the probability of turnover in both samples. Second, in order to examine whether
113
bonus recipients and non-recipients are any dierent towards their propensities to
turnover, I reproduce Table 2.9 separately for the two sub-groups. The pooled logits
indicate that these workers in these subgroups are very similar in terms of their
turnover behavior. However, the FE logits estimated on the subsample of non-
recipients are not informative since there are very few observations to estimate these
models.
To examine the eect of bonus payments on turnover, I estimate several specica-
tions of equation (2.6). The results from pooled and FE logits are displayed in Tables
2.10 and 2.11, respectively. Before looking at how the size of bonus payments are
related to turnover, I rst test whether earning a bonus in the current period aects
turnover. The results in column 1 (in both pooled and FE logits) show that workers
who earned a bonus in the current period are less likely to turnover when the level
of salary is held constant. This is true even in our richest specication in which we
control for the worker's performance and promotion prospects. This result suggests
that bonuses can provide additional information in understanding the turnover.
To be consistent with the earlier approach, I rst test the eect of bonus payments
conditioned on the current salary level (columns 2 to 4 on Tables 2.10 and 2.11), and
then I repeat the analysis replacing the current salary level with the growth rate
of salary (columns 5 to 7 on Tables 2.10 and 2.11). The results from pooled logits
indicate that the size of the bonus payment in the current period has a negative
and statistically signicant eect on the probability of turnover after controlling for
the current salary level. Note that the negative eect of bonus payments persists
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Table 2.10: The Eects of Salary and Bonuses on Turnover (Pooled Logits)
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Log(salary) 0.151 0.14 0.35 0.162
[0.192] [0.146] [0.185] [0.192]
Log(salary) -5.545** -2.686** -2.351**
[0.584] [0.689] [0.691]
Earned bonus -0.192*
[0.081]
Log(bonus) -0.0223** -0.0153* -0.014* -0.0197** -0.0157* -0.0142*
[0.0050] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006]
Level=2 0.318** 0.149 0.19 0.318** 0.251* 0.332** 0.449**
[0.121] [0.0965] [0.117] [0.121] [0.111] [0.127] [0.132]
Level=3 0.439** 0.183 0.251 0.437** 0.427** 0.479** 0.625**
[0.143] [0.109] [0.136] [0.143] [0.116] [0.138] [0.143]
Level=4 0.664** 0.262 0.411* 0.662** 0.650** 0.801** 0.941**
[0.197] [0.148] [0.185] [0.197] [0.127] [0.154] [0.158]
Level=5 0.414 -0.121 -0.053 0.415 0.316 0.573 0.817*
[0.453] [0.296] [0.439] [0.453] [0.249] [0.385] [0.389]
Rating=2 0.483** 0.514** 0.483** 0.405** 0.390**
[0.0913] [0.0905] [0.0913] [0.0975] [0.0978]
Rating=3 1.095** 1.164** 1.096** 1.013** 0.978**
[0.115] [0.113] [0.115] [0.124] [0.124]
Rating=4 1.762** 1.872** 1.764** 1.606** 1.559**
[0.254] [0.252] [0.254] [0.263] [0.263]
Tenure at level=2 0.134 0.135 0.114
[0.106] [0.106] [0.116]
Tenure at level=3 0.259* 0.260* 0.248
[0.130] [0.130] [0.135]
Tenure at level=4 0.511** 0.512** 0.501**
[0.158] [0.158] [0.160]
Tenure at level5 0.581** 0.582** 0.591**
[0.162] [0.162] [0.162]
N(worker-yrs) 8,628 12,746 8,628 8,628 11,492 8,152 8,152
Log-likelihood -2848 -4330 -2856 -2848 -3755 -2647 -2638
Pseudo-R2 0.063 0.037 0.060 0.063 0.049 0.062 0.065
AIC 5758 8707 5766 5758 7557 5347 5338
BIC 5977 8886 5956 5977 7734 5536 5555
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Table 2.11: The Eects of Salary and Bonuses on Turnover (Fixed-Eects Logits)
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Log(salary) 39.07** 39.03** 52.24** 60.09**
[2.217] [2.215] [4.620] [7.239]
Log(salary) -5.986** -3.904** -2.724
[0.990] [1.476] [2.056]
Earned bonus -0.969**
[0.202]
Log(bonus) -0.0717** -0.045 -0.0915* -0.0696** -0.0545** -0.0559**
[0.015] [0.027] [0.040] [0.010] [0.013] [0.018]
Level=2 3.817** 3.810** 4.525 8.369** 4.503** 4.443** 14.04**
[1.304] [1.305] [3.003] [2.114] [1.017] [1.084] [1.737]
Level=3 6.021** 6.029** 6.692 13.43** 9.327** 8.946** 25.37**
[1.911] [1.921] [3.693] [2.864] [1.437] [1.498] [2.762]
Level=4 7.665** 7.673** 20.33 38.72 14.29** 26.58 52.64
[2.426] [2.428] [1,450] [8,074] [1.772] [563.3] [925.9]
Level=5 13.26 13.27 39.42 63.26 17.05** 43.46 83.21
[35.05] [34.95] [86,991] [19,268] [2.114] [3,045] [6,161]
Rating=2 0.911* 0.496 0.847** 0.456
[0.452] [0.635] [0.221] [0.323]
Rating=3 3.491** 2.770** 2.116** 1.201**
[0.545] [0.758] [0.297] [0.428]
Rating=4 5.327** 4.446** 2.204** 1.281
[0.749] [0.977] [0.500] [0.682]
Tenure at level=2 1.343* 2.816**
[0.603] [0.485]
Tenure at level=3 4.321** 5.898**
[0.876] [0.759]
Tenure at level=4 7.801** 9.296**
[1.243] [1.042]
Tenure at level5 11.60** 12.97**
[1.669] [1.321]
N(worker-yrs) 3,269 3,269 1,669 1,669 2,920 1,561 1,561
N(workers) 984 984 584 584 874 544 544
Log-likelihood -394 -394.2 -137.3 -78.24 -759.2 -381.6 -184.7
Pseudo-R2 0.643 0.643 0.764 0.865 0.227 0.299 0.66
AIC 800 800 292 182 1530 781 395
BIC 836 836 341 252 1566 829 464
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after xed eects are taken into account. Particularly, the estimated negative eect
decreases in absolute value in pooled logits, whereas the eect peaks in column 4
in which the worker's performance and promotions prospects are controlled for in
FE logits. Consistent with the earlier results, the level of salary has no signicant
eect on the probability of turnover when data are pooled over time, whereas it has
a statistically signicant and positive eect on turnover in FE logits.
When we include both the growth rate of salary and the bonus payment in our
specication, results are consistent with the hypothesis that both of these variables
have negative eects on turnover. A comparison of the point estimates for bonus pay-
ments across specications leads to the following conclusions. First, bonus payments
have a negative and signicant eect on the probability of turnover in both pooled
and FE logits. Second, similar to point estimates for the growth rate of salary, the
point estimates for bonus payments also slightly decrease when we control for per-
formance ratings and tenure at the current job level. Overall, the negative eects of
both the growth rate of salary and bonus payments are robust to model specication.
As indicated, one of the goals of the present study is to show that using bonus
payments along with salaries is a better empirical approach in analyzing turnover
than using total compensation. To this end, I compare the results from models in
which the total compensation is employed to measure the pecuniary benets of the
job to the results when salaries and bonus payments are included separately in the
model.
Replacing salary with total compensation, I estimate all specications reported in
117
Table 2.9 and report the results in Table 2.12. Overall, the results indicate that the
eect of total compensation on turnover has similar patterns with the eect of salary
on turnover. Similar to the level of salary, the eect of the level of total compensation
on turnover is either insignicant (in pooled logits), or statistically signicant and
positive (in FE logits). Both pooled and FE logits show that the growth rate of
total compensation has a statistically signicant negative eect on the probability of
turnover. In addition, the estimated eect declines when we account for the worker's
performance and his future promotion possibilities. Indeed, FE logits indicate that
the eect of the growth rate of total compensation on turnover vanishes when we
control both for performance and future promotions (see column 6).
Comparing the results of the analysis when the pay variable is total compensation
to those when both salaries and bonus payments are included in the estimation
suggests that the latter approach is preferable in analyzing turnover. First of all,
note that the two models, one with total compensation and the other with salaries
and bonuses, are non-nested in the sense that one model is not a special case of the
other. Therefore, I will make use of log-likelihood criteria with degrees of freedom
adjustment in order to compare the goodness of ts of the two models. To this end,
I will employ the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information
criterion (BIC).32 According to these criteria, the model with lower AIC (or BIC)
is preferable since it has a better t than the other model after controlling for the
number of parameters.
32AIC=-2ln L+2q and BIC=-2ln L+(ln N)q, where L denotes the log-likelihood value and q is
the number of parameters estimated. Note that the penalty for the model size is larger in the BIC.
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In comparing the models, I focus on the richest specication in which performance
ratings and tenure at the current job level, in addition to other control variables
common in all specications, are included. Comparison across pooled logits gives
mixed results. For example, according to the results reported in column 4 in Table
2.10 and column 3 in Table 2.12, the AIC favors the model in which the levels of
salaries and bonuses enter separately into the estimating equation to the model with
the level of total compensation (5758 vs. 5762), whereas the BIC gives the opposite
result (5977 vs. 5974). For the growth rates of pay variables, on the other hand,
both criteria favor the model with total compensation (see column 7 in Table 2.10
and column 6 on Panel A in Table 2.12). However, this nding is not robust to model
specication. Specically, the BIC favors the model with salaries and bonuses when
performance ratings are controlled for (see column 6 in Table 2.10 and column 5 on
Panel A in Table 2.12).
The comparison of the FE logits, on the other hand, gives more uniform results.
Accordingly, in all specications both the AIC and BIC favor the model in which
the levels of salaries and bonuses enter separately (see columns 2-4 in Table 2.11 and
columns 1-3 on Panel B in Table 2.12). For the specications in which the growth
rates of pay variables are used, a similar pattern is observed. Specically, comparing
the results in column 7 in Table 2.11 to those in column 6 on Panel B in Table 2.12
reveals that the AIC favors the model with salaries and bonuses, whereas the BIC
does not discriminate among the models.
Besides the goodness of t, if one is interested in controlling for the pecuniary re-
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turns to employment, one should be cautious in model selection. We observe that the
estimated eects of salaries are larger, in absolute terms, than total compensation,
and that bonus payments have signicant eect on turnover. These results follows
from the fact that pay variables have dierent dynamics since their associations with
future compensation are dierent. Therefore, the evidence based on the rm-level
data suggests that the empirical approach that treats salaries and bonuses as dierent
forms of pay variables is a better empirical approach in analyzing turnover.
2.5.2 Analysis Based on the PSID Sample
In this section, I examine the eects of pay variables on turnover using the sam-
ple drawn from the PSID. As discussed earlier, this analysis enables us to account
for rms' heterogeneity in personnel policies, and to examine if the aforementioned
ndings dier for layos and quits. The shortcoming of this sample is that it does
not include any performance measures such as supervisor ratings, and workers' po-
sitions within the rm's hierarchy. Therefore, I will employ workers characteristics
as control variables. Specically, each specication includes control variables for the
worker's education, age, tenure at the rm, and marital status.
Following the approach taken in the rst part of the empirical analysis, I estimate
logit models for dierent specications. Table 2.13 reports the results for specica-
tions under which salaries and bonus payments enter separately into the estimating
equation. In columns 1 and 4, the dependent variable indicates whether the worker
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separates or not, without specifying the party that initiated the separation. There-
fore, these results are comparable to the earlier analysis in the paper. In columns 2
and 4, the same specications are estimated for the subsample of stayers and quitters,
while columns 3 and 6 display the results for the subsample of stayers and laid-o
workers.
Before interpreting the results concerning the pay variables, let us examine how
some of the explanatory variables are related to turnover. The results show that
workers with either a college or a graduate degree are less likely to separate than
workers with a high school degree or workers who have not completed high school.
This empirical pattern is the same in layos and quits. The worker's tenure at the
rm has a negative eect on turnover in all specications. This nding is consistent
with job search theories implying that employments with longer tenure are more
likely to be a good rm-worker match (e.g., MacDonald, 1988). Finally, the results
indicate that married workers are less likely to turnover. One possible explanation
for this nding is that since the cost of turnover is higher for married workers, they
are less likely to turnover.
Note that the rm-level data analyzed in the previous section diers from the
PSID sample in terms of job types and worker characteristics. As indicated, the
rm-level data include information regarding workers employed in managerial po-
sitions, whereas the PSID sample includes a variety of blue- and white-collar jobs.
Another major dierence between the two datasets relates to workers' education lev-
els. Specically, about 68 percent of workers in the rm-level data have either a
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Table 2.13: The Eects of Salary and Bonus Payments on Turnover (PSID Sample)
All Quits Layos All Quits Layos
VARIABLES [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Log(salary) -0.530** -0.574** -0.479**
[0.0357] [0.0499] [0.0426]
Log(salary) -0.268** -0.246** -0.200**
[0.0531] [0.0899] [0.0695]
Log(bonus) -0.0497* -0.0475 -0.0470* -0.041 -0.0614 -0.0385
[0.0198] [0.0390] [0.0230] [0.0226] [0.0465] [0.0261]
High school or GED 0.144 -0.0967 0.356** 0.0644 -0.144 0.251*
[0.0755] [0.136] [0.0910] [0.103] [0.187] [0.122]
College -0.320** -0.796** -0.313* -0.617** -1.007** -0.596**
[0.110] [0.230] [0.134] [0.142] [0.299] [0.170]
Graduate -0.646* -1.001 -0.840* -0.995** -1.36 -1.384**
[0.257] [0.592] [0.331] [0.307] [0.726] [0.425]
Age 0.0803** 0.0173 0.102** 0.0487 -0.00151 0.0547
[0.0195] [0.0333] [0.0240] [0.0272] [0.0476] [0.0323]
Age2/100 -0.0900** -0.0272 -0.113** -0.0511 0.00311 -0.0562
[0.0235] [0.0407] [0.0288] [0.0322] [0.0567] [0.0380]
Married -0.449** -0.616** -0.438** -0.602** -0.791** -0.608**
[0.0752] [0.140] [0.0896] [0.101] [0.188] [0.119]
Tenure -0.144** -0.167** -0.128** -0.145** -0.207** -0.119**
[0.0148] [0.0299] [0.0181] [0.0194] [0.0368] [0.0238]
Tenure2/100 0.317** 0.350** 0.248** 0.292** 0.479** 0.184
[0.0536] [0.111] [0.0700] [0.0716] [0.120] [0.0954]
N(worker-yrs) 15,854 12,367 15,091 8,130 7,152 7,734
Log-likelihood -3135 -1102 -2321 -1748 -613.9 -1319
Pseudo-R2 0.15 0.144 0.142 0.0916 0.0991 0.102
AIC 6301 2233 4672 3523 1254 2663
BIC 6416 2337 4786 3614 1343 2754
college degree or a graduate degree, whereas only 26 percent of workers in the PSID
sample have those degrees.33
33An ideal approach to compare the results from the two datasets is to focus on a PSID subsample
of workers with managerial jobs in the nancial services industry. However, since this restriction
leaves few observations in our working sample, the current paper does not include an analysis on
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The results regarding the eect of salaries are the same for layos and quits.
Specically, both the level and the growth rate of salary have statistically signicant
negative eects on turnover. We observe that the negative eect of salary level is
larger (in absolute value) on quits. The same pattern is observed for the growth rate
of salary. This nding suggests that the worker's salary (in terms of both levels and
growth rates) plays a more important role in determining a worker-initiated separa-
tion than it does in determining a rm-initiated separation. Note that the negative
eect of the salary level on turnover is consistent with search theories discussed ear-
lier. However, this result is not in line with the rm-level analysis in which we found
either positive or insignicant eects of salary level on turnover.
The results regarding bonus payments are mixed. Specically, the size of bonus
payments has a statistically signicant (at the 5 percent level) negative eect on
turnover after controlling for the level of salary (see column 1). The negative eect
is smaller, but still statistically signicant (at the 10 percent level) when we control
for the growth rate of salary (see column 4). When I separately examine layos
and quits, the point estimates are still negative in all specications. However, it
is statistically signicant only for layos after controlling for the level of salary. In
other cases, even if the estimated eect is negative the standard errors are too large to
make a statistical inference. One potential explanation for the nding that bonuses
have a signicant eect on layos, but not on quits, is that bonus payments possess
information about the worker's current performance, which plays a crucial role in
the layo decision.
this subsample.
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Table 2.14: The Eect of Total Compensation on Turnover (PSID Sample)
All Quits Layos All Quits Layos
VARIABLES [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Log(compensation) -0.535** -0.576** -0.487**
[0.0350] [0.0492] [0.0418]
Log(compensation) -0.285** -0.248** -0.231**
[0.0519] [0.0888] [0.0672]
High school or GED 0.150* -0.0946 0.364** 0.0657 -0.153 0.257*
[0.0754] [0.136] [0.0909] [0.103] [0.187] [0.122]
College -0.346** -0.824** -0.334* -0.641** -1.047** -0.612**
[0.110] [0.230] [0.134] [0.142] [0.298] [0.170]
Graduate -0.662* -1.024 -0.848* -1.025** -1.413 -1.401**
[0.257] [0.592] [0.331] [0.306] [0.725] [0.425]
Age 0.0803** 0.0173 0.103** 0.0501 -0.0012 0.0573*
[0.0195] [0.0332] [0.0240] [0.0272] [0.0475] [0.0323]
Age2/100 -0.0894** -0.0265 -0.113** -0.0521 0.00332 -0.0585
[0.0235] [0.0406] [0.0288] [0.0322] [0.0565] [0.0380]
Married -0.457** -0.623** -0.446** -0.614** -0.812** -0.616**
[0.0751] [0.140] [0.0895] [0.101] [0.187] [0.119]
Tenure -0.147** -0.170** -0.129** -0.146** -0.211** -0.119**
[0.0147] [0.0297] [0.0180] [0.0193] [0.0364] [0.0238]
Tenure2/100 0.319** 0.354** 0.249** 0.291** 0.484** 0.178
[0.0532] [0.110] [0.0696] [0.0714] [0.118] [0.0955]
N(worker-yrs) 15,926 12,431 15,159 8,194 7,212 7,793
Log-likelihood -3144 -1104 -2327 -1753 -618.3 -1321
Pseudo-R2 0.149 0.144 0.142 0.0922 0.0994 0.102
AIC 6316 2235 4682 3531 1261 2665
BIC 6424 2331 4789 3615 1343 2749
In Table 2.14, I used the worker's total compensation instead of using salaries
and bonuses separately, and re-estimated all specications in Table 2.13. The eect
of total compensation is qualitatively the same as that of salaries; both the level and
the growth rate of total compensation have negative and statistically signicant (at
the 1 percent level) eect on turnover. Indeed, the point estimates for total compen-
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sation are only slightly larger (in absolute terms) than that of salaries. In terms of
dierences between layos and quits, we observe the same pattern. Accordingly, the
worker's compensation has a larger impact on the probability of quits than it has on
the probability of layos. As the discussion in the previous part indicates, one way
to compare non-nested models' goodness of t is to use information criteria. To this
end, Tables 2.13 and 2.14 report the values of AIC and BIC for each specication.
We observe that both the AIC and BIC are lower when I estimate the eects of
salaries and bonuses separately (as in Table 2.13) rather than estimating the eect
of total compensation (as in Table 2.14).
Overall, the analysis based on the PSID sample suggests that using salaries and
bonuses separately in analyzing turnover is a better empirical approach. First, bonus
payments have a signicant negative eect on turnover after controlling for salaries.
Second, comparing the models in terms of goodness of t indicates that the model
in which the eects of salaries and bonuses are estimated separately is favored over
the model that uses total compensation to measure pecuniary benets of the job.
2.6 Summary and Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the eect of pay variables on turnover. Using the wealth max-
imization model to motivate testable predictions, I argue that the current values
of pay variables can relate to turnover to the extent they are associated with the
worker's future compensation. The main theoretical argument that motivates the
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empirical prediction analyzed in the paper is that the probability of separation is
negatively related to the worker's future earnings at the rm. I nd supporting
evidence for this general hypothesis.
The empirical analysis yields several results. First, the eect of the growth rate of
salary is negative on turnover, whereas the results regarding the eect of salary level
are mixed. Second, both having earned a bonus in the current period and the size of
the bonus have negative eects on turnover. Third, total compensation and salary
have qualitatively similar eects on turnover, while the magnitudes of the eects
dier. Fourth, the negative eects of pay variables are more evident on quits than
they are on layos. This nding applies to both salaries and bonus payments. Finally,
the results suggest that using a specication that treats salaries and bonus payments
separately yields a better t than using a specication with total compensation.
Overall, the empirical evidence indicates the importance of making use of all in-
formation regarding the pecuniary benets of a job. As demonstrated, the estimated
eects of total compensation dier from salaries. Hence, the researcher, who aims to
control for the worker's compensation at the current job in order to obtain unbiased
estimates for other variables of interest, should be prudent in determining with which
variables to measure the pecuniary returns to employment at the current job.
The results of the paper also point out some directions for future research. For
example, the rm-level analysis and the analysis based on the PSID sample yield
contradictory results concerning the eect of salary levels on turnover. This result
may be driven by idiosyncrasies of the rm studied here. However, if this result
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is more general, then understanding the dynamics that generate these conicting
results is important for the generalizability of results based on rm-level data. In
addition, developing a formal theoretical model that focuses on the turnover eects of
bonus payments (or performance-pay contracts) may be a fruitful research avenue.
As discussed, earlier literature focuses on bonus contracts in analyzing eciency
of separations. However, it is plausible to think that bonus payments, similar to
salaries, provide information about the match quality between the rm and the
worker. Therefore, they are likely to aect turnover decisions.
128
CHAPTER 3
EMPLOYEE REFERRALS AS A SCREENING DEVICE
3.1 Introduction
Firms frequently hire new people through referrals from current employees. For
example, Marsden (2001) nds that more than one third of all establishments sur-
veyed in the 1991 National Organizations Survey (NOS) often used referrals when
announcing job openings.1 Existing literature has identied several ways by which
rms and job applicants nd employee referrals benecial. For example, employee
referrals reduce search costs (Calvo-Armengol and Jackson, 2004); rms enjoy lower
monitoring costs due to peer pressure imposed on workers hired through referrals
(Kugler, 2003); rms use referrals as a screening mechanism to reduce asymmetric
information inherent in the hiring process (Montgomery, 1991; Simon and Warner,
1992). The screening function of employee referrals is the subject of the present
paper.
The idea that employee referrals are used as a screening device dates back to the
early work of Rees (1966). The basic premise of this idea is that referrals provide
information about the job applicant's productivity that the rm otherwise would
not have. The formalization of this mechanism is developed within two separate ap-
proaches. Montgomery (1991) assumes that the referrer's productivity is positively
correlated with that of the job applicant due to assortative matching between in-
1See Ioannides and Loury (2004) and Topa (2011) for extensive surveys of the literature.
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dividuals in social networks, while Simon and Warner (1992) assume that referrals
reduce the uncertainty regarding the productivity of the job applicant. Note that in
Montgomery's approach, the employee's ability, which has been revealed to the cur-
rent employer over time, is informative by itself about the referral's ability. Hence,
the employee referrals inherently provide information about the applicant's ability.
On the other hand, Simon and Warner (1992) assume that the employee truthfully
transmits her private information about the job applicant's ability. Note that an
important assumption in both models is that the incentives of the current employee
are perfectly aligned with those of the rm in hiring decisions.
This paper points out two mechanisms that could potentially lead to a conict
of interest between the rm and the current employee in the referral process. First,
I examine how social connections aect employee referrals. Specically, I allow the
employee to feel altruistic toward the job applicant where the degree of altruism
depends on the strength of the social connection between himself and the appli-
cant, and discuss how this alters the employee's referral decision. Second, I examine
how the employee's referral decision is aected by his promotion prospects. Em-
pirical evidence indicates that promotions are associated with large wage increases
(e.g., McCue, 1996). Therefore, the employee will be concerned about his promotion
prospects when referring an applicant. In particular, if referring an applicant reduces
his chances of promotion then he may choose not to refer the applicant even though
it is ecient to do so. To examine under what conditions these mechanisms distort
referral recruitment, I develop a theoretical model in which the rm solicits a refer-
ral from a current employee, who draws a job applicant from his social network and
130
privately observes the applicant's ability and the strength of the social connection
between himself and the applicant. The prot maximizing rm then decides whether
to hire a referred applicant or an applicant who has not been referred by a current
employee.
I investigate the employee's referral decision under three scenarios. First, the rm
remunerates a xed payment to the employee when his referral is hired. Referrals do
not provide screening of job applicants in this case since the employee's decision is
based on his social connection to the applicant, rather than on the applicant's ability.
Therefore, employees refer applicants with whom they have a close social connection
when they are eligible to earn a xed payment. Next, I consider the situation in
which the employee is eligible to earn a bonus which is contingent on the referral's
performance. Unlike the xed-payments case, the rm is able to elicit information
about job applicants' ability since bonuses provide employees with an incentive to
refer higher ability applicants. Hence, employee referrals serve a screening function
only when the rm provides employees with proper incentives to make referrals.
Finally, I use the tournament framework to incorporate promotion incentives
into the model with referral bonuses. With some positive probability the employee
competes against his own referral, rather than against a coworker whose ability is
unknown to him, to earn the promotion prize. Since the employee's probability of
earning the promotion decreases with the referral's ability, promotion concerns create
a conict of interest between the rm and the employee concerning referral recruit-
ment. Whether this tension eliminates the screening function of referrals depends
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on the relative weights of incentives and disincentives provided by bonuses and pro-
motions, respectively. If the incentives provided by referral bonuses dominate the
disincentives induced by the employee's promotion concerns, referrals continue to
serve a screening device. Otherwise, the employee behaves in an opportunistic fash-
ion and refers less able applicants who do not damage his promotion prospects. In
that case, the rm cannot screen high ability applicants using employee referrals.
There is empirical evidence suggesting that there is a conict of interest be-
tween the rm and the current employee during the referral process. Beaman and
Magruder (2011) conducted a social experiment in which they randomized the mon-
etary rewards that the employees could earn by referring another worker in their
social network. They nd that employees refer highly skilled applicants only when
they are oered a bonus that is tied to the referral's performance. When they are of-
fered a xed payment, which is not contingent on the referral's performance, they are
more likely to refer a relative or a friend. In a related study, Fafchamps and Moradi
(2011) examined historical data from the Ghana Colonial Army in which current
recruits were eligible for xed payments when they make a referral. They nd that
new recruits hired through referrals are not associated with higher unobserved qual-
ities than new recruits hired through other channels. Note that the ndings of these
studies support the result of the current paper that employee referrals are useful
for screening purposes only when the employee is provided with incentives to refer
high-ability applicants.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related theo-
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retical literature. Section 3 presents the model; subsections consider xed payments
for referrals, bonuses and the eect of promotions in turn. Section 4 concludes the
paper.
3.2 Related Theoretical Literature
In most of the existing literature, the idea that employee referrals serve a screen-
ing function is examined under the assumption that there is no conict of interest
between the rm and employees concerning referrals. For example, Montgomery
(1991) provides a framework to study the eect of social structure on wages and
rms' prots. He argues that people's tendency to have social connections with
people who have similar characteristics with themselves provides a rationale for the
use of employee referrals. Accordingly, productive employees are more likely to refer
productive applicants, thus applicants who are well connected (i.e., who have ties
with productive employees) nd jobs with higher wages and rms hiring through
referrals earn positive prots. However, he assumes that the current employee's re-
ferral decision is nonstrategic in the sense that he does not make any cost-benet
analysis when deciding to refer an applicant. Building upon the job matching frame-
work (Jovanovic, 1979), Simon and Warner (1992) show that workers hired through
referrals earn higher starting wages, have longer tenure on the job, and experience
lower wage growth than workers hired through other channels.2 The assumption
2Dustmann, Glitz, and Schonberg (2011), and Brown, Setren, and Topa (2012) also use the job
matching framework to derive testable predictions concerning how referrals' wages and tenure at
the job dier from nonreferrals.
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that drives their results, however, is that referrals provide information about the ap-
plicant's productivity that the rm otherwise would not have, thus they reduce the
uncertainty about the quality of the match between the worker and the job. In other
words, they implicitly assume that the incentives of current employees are perfectly
aligned with those of the rm concerning referral recruitment.
In related work, Saloner (1985) considers how the competition among referees
aects informativeness of their recommendations. In that setup, each referee is con-
cerned about the quality of applicants he recommends as well as the number of them
who have found a job through his recommendation. In equilibrium, even though
each referee acts strategically, they transmit the private information about job ap-
plicants in a way that the rm would hire the same applicants if it had the same
information as referees. However, Saloner explicitly assumes that the objectives of
the referees are perfectly aligned with those of the user of referrals. Therefore, the
strategic behavior of referees refers to how they optimize between the quantity and
the quality of their referrals.
The paper is also related to the literature on favoritism in organizations. Firms
frequently assign supervisors to monitor the performance of its employees. In this
setting, the supervisor privately observes the worker's performance (or rather a signal
of performance), and transmits his private information to the rm. The rm then de-
termines the worker's compensation in accordance with the performance evaluation.
This process is prone to some inuence activities. For example, Prendergast and
Topel (1996) argue that supervisors may favor some workers purely for exogenous
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reasons, thus performance evaluations may be distorted in equilibrium.3 Fairburn
and Malcomson (2001) consider the case in which the worker's performance evalua-
tion determines whether he earns a bonus or not, and show that the worker has an
incentive to bribe the supervisor in order to improve his performance evaluations.
Even though the context considered in the current paper is not the same those dis-
cussed as the one considered in the current paper, the basic idea is similar; the
rm attempts to elicit private information of its employees in order to maximize its
prots, while the employee uses his private information for his own benet.
Carmichael (1988) considers the idea that there might be a conict of interest
between a university and its current academic sta concerning new hires. Similar to
the setting considered in the current paper, current employees have better informa-
tion about job candidates' abilities than the university administration. Therefore,
the administration asks its current employees to evaluate abilities of job candidates.
Current employees are, however, concerned about their future employment at the
university in the sense that the administration may re them in order to make room
for a candidate who has more research potential. Therefore, their incentives may not
be aligned with those of the university in selecting the best candidates. Carmichael
shows that \tenure-track" appointments can alleviate the problem as they ensure
that the current researchers will not lose their jobs when they are outperformed by
newly hired researchers. In the current paper, I focus on employees' concerns about
their future career at the rm and social connections between employees and job
3Milgrom and Roberts (1988), and Milgrom (1988) discuss how employees may indulge in inu-
ence activities to improve their performance reports
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candidates. In that sense, I consider dierent mechanisms that lead to a conict of
interest. Also, he assumes that current employees transmit a signal concerning the
ability of a job candidate, while I allow them not to reveal their opinion of the job
candidate's ability by choosing not to refer the applicant.
3.3 Model
In this section, I develop a theoretical model to examine the screening role of employee
referrals when incentives of the rm are not perfectly aligned with those of current
employees. To this end, I rst develop a model in which the current employee earns a
xed payment when his referral is hired by the rm. Next, I replace xed payments
by referral bonuses, which are contingent on the referral's performance, and discuss
the implications. Finally, I incorporate promotions into the model to examine under
what conditions and in which direction their presence aects referral recruitment.
All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
3.3.1 Referrals with Fixed Payments
I consider a single rm that has no market power in the labor market. Therefore, it
can hire a new worker at the market wage and makes zero expected prots. Alterna-
tively, the rm can ll a vacancy by hiring an applicant who is referred by a current
employee. It chooses to do so only if it earns positive prots from hiring a referred
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applicant. By assumption, the rm knows the ability levels of its employees, while
it cannot observe a job applicant's ability.
Without loss of generality, let subscript i refer to a current employee, j refer to
a job applicant who is referred by a current employee, and k refer to an anonymous
applicant (i.e., who is not referred by a current employee). Each employee i draws an
applicant j from his social network and privately observes her ability.4 The ability
of workers, l (l 2 fi; j; kg), is uniformly distributed over the interval [L; H ] andb denotes the average ability level in the labor market. In addition to ability, the
strength of the social connection between employee i and applicant j, denoted by ij,
is privately known by the employee. The term ij can be interpreted as employee
i's altruism towards applicant j.5 Accordingly, applicant j is a close acquaintance
of employee i (ij = H) with probability 1   , while he is not (ij = L) with
probability . I assume H > L  0 so that the employee has a greater bias in favor
of a close acquaintance, and that realizations of j and ij are independent. After
privately observing j and ij, the employee decides whether to refer the applicant
to his current employer at a cost of c > 0. If the employee decides to make a
referral, the rm matches the applicant with the current employee who has made the
referral, but it can observe neither the applicant's ability nor the strength of their
social connection. Otherwise, it cannot match applicants with any employees.6 The
4Drawing only one applicant is equivalent to drawing multiple applicants independently from
the same distribution.
5Beaman and Magruder (2011) note that these payments could be interpreted as a reduction in
future payments that i would otherwise have to make to applicant j due to risk sharing or other
network-based arrangements.
6In other words, the rm cannot observe the relationship between a current employee and a job
applicant when the employee decides not to refer the applicant.
137
employee receives a xed payment F > 0 from the rm if his referral is hired at the
end of the recruitment process.
Following Prendergast and Topel (1996), and Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul
(2009), I assume the employee's preferences are aected by his social connection to
the referred applicant. Therefore, employee i's utility if his referral j is hired by the
rm is given by
Ui = wi + F + ij   c; (3.1)
where wi is the wage level, F is the payment from the rm, ij measures, as discussed
above, the social connection between the employee and the applicant, and c is the
cost of referring the applicant. Note that employee i's utility is simply equal to his
wage wi when he does not refer the applicant. The xed payment F is assumed
to be a monetary reward oered by the rm if the referral is hired.7 The crucial
assumption, which will be relaxed in the next section, is that the payment of F is
not contingent on the referral's performance.
If the rm decides to make an oer to referred applicant j, he compares the wage
oer to his outside option and decides whether to accept the oer. As discussed, the
rm is able to hire an anonymous applicant at the market wage. However, there is
no certainty that the referred applicant will accept the rm's job oer. If he has a
better alternative oer, he will decline the oer. To model the applicant's decision, I
7Alternatively, F could be the employee's non-monetary benets from referring an applicant.
Research in social psychology has shown that employees who make referrals will have increased
organizational normative commitment and job satisfaction regardless of whether they have intrinsic
or extrinsic motivation to make referrals (Shinnar, Young, and Meana, 2004). Hence, it is plausible
to assume that the employee will enjoy some \benets" when the referred applicant is hired by his
current employer.
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assume he privately draws a random utility shock j, which is uniformly distributed
over the interval [ ; ].8 Applicant j's utility is then given by
Uj = max

WR;WM + j
	
; (3.2)
where WR and WM denote the referral wage and the market wage, respectively.
Therefore, the applicant will accept the rm's job oer if WR > WM +j. Note that
the applicant may accept a wage oer which is lower than the market wage when the
realized value of j is negative.
For simplicity, I assume that output is only a function of the worker's ability. The
output of a worker is then given by yl = l + l, where a mean-zero error term, l, is
independently and identically distributed across workers with unimodal, symmetric
and dierentiable density f(). Note that this production technology disregards any
spillover eects between socially connected workers. Therefore, the rm's expected
prots from hiring a worker is given by
 = max

E [jjreferred by i] WR   F; 0
	
(3.3)
Note that the rm's expected prots from hiring a referral is equal to the referral's
expected ability minus the referral's wage and the xed payment paid to the referrer,
whereas the rm makes zero expected prots from hiring an anonymous worker. This
implies that the rm hires a referral only if it earns positive rents.
The timing of the game is as follows. The rm solicits a referral from its current
8For simplicity, the realization of j is assumed to be independent of the applicant's ability j .
A more plausible assumption, which would not alter the main results, is that more able workers
have better alternative oer, i.e., j and j are positively correlated.
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employees. Each employee draws an applicant from his social network, and decides
whether to refer the applicant to the rm after privately observing the applicant's
ability as well as the strength of their social connection. If an applicant is referred by
a current employee, the rm updates its beliefs regarding the ability of the applicant,
otherwise all applicants look ex-ante identical to the rm. The rm makes a wage
oer to the referred applicant if it decides to hire the referral, otherwise it hires an
anonymous applicant from the labor market. The referred applicant privately draws
a utility shock, and then decides whether to accept the rm's oer.
Note that in this setup the employee is not allowed to choose an applicant from
his social network when making a referral decision. Rather, he decides whether to
refer a randomly drawn applicant. Therefore, the optimal strategy of the current
employee is to refer the applicant as long as the cost of referring does not exceed the
benets. The rm, on the other hand, updates its belief regarding the applicant's
ability if she is referred by a current employee. If the referred applicant's ability is
suciently high to oset the cost of the xed payment F , the rm makes a wage
oer to hire the referred applicant. Otherwise, it is optimal to hire an anonymous
worker at the market wage.
To formalize the employee's decision, let us write the returns from referring ap-
plicant j as follows
(F; ij; c) = F + ij   c: (3.4)
Since the employee's current wage level wi is independent of the referral process, it
does not enter function (:). It is optimal for the employee to refer the applicant
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as long as (:)  0.9 The employee's decision depends on the strength of his social
connection with the applicant, but it is independent of the applicant's ability. For
example, if H > c F > L, the net benets of referring an applicant is nonnegative
only if the employee has a close social connection with the applicant. As a result,
the employee will refer only close acquaintances from his social network. In this
case, employee referrals are not informative about the applicant's ability since the
employee's decision is based on the strength of his social connection to the appli-
cant rather than on the applicant's ability. Note that applicants self-select in terms
of their social connections to current employees since only close acquaintances of
current employees are referred. However, this has no value to the rm since we dis-
regard situations in which employing socially connected workers increases the rm's
prots.10
Consequently, the expected ability of a referral is equal to that of an anonymous
applicant in equilibrium regardless of what type of social connections induces refer-
rals. In other words, employee referrals do not serve a screening function in this
setup. The rm nds it optimal to hire an anonymous applicant rather than the
referred applicant since it has to reimburse a xed payment of F to the referrer if it
hires through a referral. Anticipating that his referral will not be hired by the rm,
9If returns from referring an applicant is zero, the employee is indierent between referring and
not referring the applicant. I assume throughout that the employee refers the applicant in this case.
10Employing socially connected workers may be benecial to the rm in a number of ways. For
example, the referrers could help the rm monitor newly hired workers on which they can exert peer
pressure (Kugler, 2003); or complementarity in production between socially connected workers may
increase the overall performance of the rm (Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul, 2009). Examining
data from a single rm, Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2009) nd that social connections increase
the performance of connected workers, but they reduce the rm's overall performance.
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the employee does not refer any applicants in equilibrium since he cannot make up
for the cost of referring, c.
Proposition 3 In equilibrium, the employee does not refer any applicants, and the
rm hires an anonymous worker at the market wage.
There is empirical evidence consistent with the result that xed payments do not
incentivize current employees to refer applicants whose unobserved qualities are bet-
ter than those of an unreferred applicant. Fafchamps and Moradi (2011) examined
data from the Ghanaian colonial army over the 1908-1923 period. In their setting,
the army oered a nancial reward to the current ocers who bring a new recruit.
Whether they used referrals for screening purposes or to reduce recruitment costs is
not clear. However, the longitudinal nature of the data allows them to test whether
referrals serve a screening function. They nd that even though referred recruits
had better observed characteristics at the time of hiring, it is revealed in the long
run that their unobserved characteristics were of lower quality. Specically, referred
recruits are shown to be more likely to desert or to be dismissed as inecient. These
ndings, the authors suggest, might explain why the colonial army stopped oering
nancial incentives for referrals after World War I.
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3.3.2 Referral Bonuses
In this section, I introduce referral bonuses that the employee earns if his referral
meets a certain output-based criteria determined by the rm. Specically, the rm
sets an output level eq so that employee i earns a bonus of B if his referral j produces
more than the output level eq.11 Therefore, the probability employee i earns the
bonus is given by prob(yj > eq) = prob(j > eq   j) = 1  F (eq   j). We can rewrite
employee i's expected returns from referring applicant j as follows
(ij; c; j; eq; B) = ij   c+ [1  F (eq   j)]B: (3.5)
It is easy to see that the expected returns from referring are increasing with the size
of the bonus B and decreasing with the threshold output level eq. Since the payment
of bonuses are contingent on the referral's performance, the expected returns increase
with the referral's ability (i.e., @(:)
@j
> 0). Therefore, unlike xed payments, referral
bonuses provide an incentive for the employee to refer higher ability applicants.
The employee's optimal strategy is the same as before; he refers the applicant
as long as the expected returns are non-negative. Since the expected returns are
increasing with the applicant's ability, there exists a cuto ability level such that
the employee refers the applicant as long as she is of higher ability than the cuto.
Let ~Bj (ij; eq) denote the lowest-ability applicant that employee i refers when his
social connection is ij, and the output threshold to earn the bonus is eq. The ability
11The employee's referral decision is aected by the size of the expected bonus payment. There-
fore, the value of bonus B could also be determined endogenously. However, I do not consider this
possibility since it does not provide additional insight.
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cuto depends on the social connection between the employee and the applicant
since other things equal the employee enjoys higher benets from referring a close
acquaintance.12 It is possible to characterize the cuto using the following condition
(ij; c; ~
B
j (ij; eq); eq; B) = 0; for ij 2 fL; Hg : (3.6)
Note that the cuto increases with the value of eq. The reason is that as the rm
requires a higher level of output to reimburse the bonus, the employee needs to refer
applicants of higher ability in order to make up for the decrease in the expected
returns from referring. Unlike the xed payments, the rm is able to aect the
expected ability of a referral using bonuses. However, this does not come without
costs; as the rm sets a higher value of eq, the employee becomes less likely to refer
an applicant since it is less likely to draw an applicant whose ability is higher than
the cuto. Thus, the rm faces a trade-o between the quality and the quantity of
employee referrals, and chooses an optimal value that balances the two.
In addition to eq, the rm also needs to set a referral wage WR to hire a referred
applicant. As discussed earlier, the referred applicant draws a random utility . As
the rm oers a higher wage to a referred applicant, it increases the probability that
she accepts the job oer. However, it also decreases the expected prots from hiring
12The cuto ability level also depends on other parameters of the benet function (:). For
brevity, I do not write them explicitly if there is no possibility of confusion.
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a referral. The rm's problem, thus, is the following:
max
WR;eq R =

Pr(j  ~Bj (L; eq))E hj   [1  F (eq   j)]Bjj  ~Bj (L; eq)i
+(1  )Pr(j  ~Bj (H ; eq))E hj   [1  F (eq   j)]Bjj  ~Bj (H ; eq)i
 WR

Pr(WR > WM + )
subject to (3.6). As discussed above, (3.6) indicates that the employee adjusts his
referral strategy depending on the rm's choice of eq.
Proposition 4 Assume c  [1  F (q   L)]B > H > L. Then equilibrium behav-
ior is as follows:
1. Employee i makes a referral for any applicant j with j  ~Bj (ij; q), where
~Bj (ij; q
) is such that (ij; c; ~Bj (ij; q
); q; B) = 0 for ij 2 fL; Hg.
2. The rm oers the equilibrium referral wage W R to hire a referred applicant
and sets q that satises the condition F (q   H) = 1  1B .
3. Referred applicant j accepts the oer if W R > WM + j.
As summarized in the above proposition, the employee's equilibrium strategy consists
of setting a cuto ability level, which depends on the strength of the social connection
among other things, and referring any applicants whose abilities are above the cuto.
The rm, on the other hand, nds it optimal to hire a referred applicant rather than
an anonymous applicant, it thus oers an equilibrium referral wage to a referred
applicant. The referred applicant accepts the oer only if the referral wage oer is
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better than her outside option, which is determined by a random utility shock as
well as the market wage.
Note that the expected ability of employee i's referral is higher than the expected
ability of an anonymous applicant in equilibrium. The reason is that when the
employee is oered nancial incentives in the form of bonuses indexed to the referral's
performance, the employee's referral decision is based on the applicant's ability as
well as the strength of the social connection. In other words, bonuses help the rm
align its incentives with those of the employee in referral recruitment. This result
is in stark contrast to the result derived in the previous section in which the rm
uses a xed payment in an attempt to incentivize informative referrals. Therefore, a
main result of the model is that the employee referrals provide a screening function
only when the employee is oered nancial incentives that align his incentives with
those of the rm.
The empirical evidence documented by Beaman and Magruder (2011) supports
this result. These authors conducted a social experiment in Kolkata, India, to un-
derstand how social networks aect job referrals. In their setting, workers are hired
for a temporary job, and they are asked to refer an individual for the same job in
order to earn a nancial reward. The nature of nancial rewards are randomized
between xed payments and a bonus contingent on the referral's performance. They
nd that workers refer highly skilled network members only when their reward is tied
to the referral's performance. Otherwise, they are more likely to refer a relative or a
close friend. Further, they nd that referred applicants have higher cognitive skills
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in the case of bonus treatments. Hence, their ndings suggest that referrals serve a
screening role only when the tension between the incentives of the employee and the
rm is non-existent, or mitigated by the use of correct nancial tools.
Before turning to promotions, I am going to discuss, in turn, how the expected
ability of a referral is related to the social connection between the employee and the
applicant, and how the rm can use the bonus scheme to alter the expected ability
of a referral.
Corollary 4 The expected ability of a referral who possesses a weak social con-
nection with the current employee is higher. That is, E
h
jjj  ~Bj (L; q)
i
>
E
h
jjj  ~Bj (H ; q)
i
.
The expected ability of a referral depends on the strength of the social connection
between the employee and the applicant. Specically, the employee refers an appli-
cant of higher ability on average when he has a weak connection with the applicant
than the case in which he has a strong connection. However, the crucial result is
that the expected ability of a referral is higher than that of an anonymous applicant
regardless of the strength of the social connection between the employee and the ap-
plicant. Therefore, referrals provide screening of higher-ability applicants. Yet, the
higher expected ability may not translate into higher wages. The reason is that the
rm incurs additional costs when it hires through referrals since it pays bonuses to
employees who have made \successful" referrals. Therefore, the rm's wage oer to
referrals is reduced to take costs from paying bonuses into account. The referral wage
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is higher than the market wage only if additional prots from hiring the referred ap-
plicant, who is expected to be of higher ability than an anonymous applicant, make
up for the expected cost of referral bonuses.
Existing theoretical work suggests that referrals are oered higher starting salaries
than anonymous applicants since the former are expected to be more productive. For
example, Montgomery (1991) shows that applicants who have more ties with high-
ability employees will earn higher wages. Similarly, Simon and Warner (1992) show
that referred applicants' reservations wages are higher than those of nonreferrals since
there is less uncertainty concerning the referrals' productivity at the rm. Therefore,
the rm has to oer higher wages in order to hire through referrals. Empirical
evidence concerning starting wages of new hires is consistent with this result. For
example, examining data from a mid-to-large U.S. corporation, Brown, Setren, and
Topa (2012) nd that referrals are associated with a 2.1 percent premium on starting
wages. However, empirical studies have not addressed the eect of bonuses or any
other recruitment costs on the starting wages of referrals. As the current model
illustrates, in addition to the referral's expected productivity, the size of referral
wages is also related to the rm's recruitment costs that it would incur only if it
hires through referrals. Therefore, a more appropriate test of the current model
would take recruitment costs such as referral bonuses into account.
Corollary 5 The expected ability of a referral decreases with the size of bonus B,
and increases with the output threshold q.
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The rm can aect employee referrals by changing its bonus scheme. Specically,
when the rm oers a lower bonus or requires a higher output threshold to earn
the bonus, employees refer applicants of higher ability on average. The intuition
is that as the expected bonus payment increases (either due to an increase in the
size of the bonus or a lower threshold), it becomes easier to outweigh the cost of
referring low-ability applicants. Therefore, the employee nds it optimal to refer
some applicants that he did not refer before. This lowers the expected ability of a
referral. Beaman and Magruder (2011) nd that when the rm oers a higher referral
bonus, the referral's performance on the job decreases, which may be interpreted as
lower ability, but the eect is not statistically signicant in their empirical analysis.
Finally, it is instructive to discuss how adopting a social structure similar to
that assumed by Montgomery (1991) alters the results of the model. Recall that
Montgomery assumes that a worker is more likely to know workers of his own type.
Therefore, the rm nds it optimal to solicit referrals from workers of high-ability
since they are more likely to refer high-ability applicants. Note that our result that
xed payments do not provide employees with an incentive to refer higher ability
applicants is valid regardless of the employees' ability levels. If we assume that
employees are more likely to draw an applicant of their own type, the employee's
referral decision will still be independent of the applicant's ability. However, the
assumed social structure implies that referrals from high-ability employees will be
more able, on average, than an anonymous applicant. Therefore, the rm will nd
it optimal to hire a referral if his expected productivity is high enough to make up
for the cost of the xed payment remunerated to the referrer. Hence, even when
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the rm uses xed payments it will hire referrals from high-ability employees, while
low-ability employees will not refer any applicants in equilibrium.
A similar logic applies to referral bonuses. We showed that bonuses provide
current employees of any ability level an incentive to refer higher-ability applicants.
The assumption that employees are more likely to draw applicants of their own type
slightly changes the results. The optimal strategy of the current employee will still be
characterized by a cuto ability level above which he refers any applicants. However,
the rm will update its beliefs concerning the ability level of a referral according to
the referrer's ability since each employee is more likely to refer an applicant of his
own type. Therefore, unlike the current situation, the referral wage oer will also
be a function of the referrer's ability. However, employee referrals will still serve a
screening function.
3.3.3 Promotion Incentives
In this section, I incorporate promotions to the model in order to examine how their
presence aects job referrals from current employees. The rationale behind promo-
tions aecting current employees' referral decisions is that referring an applicant
may alter the current employee's promotion prospects. For example, a particular
employee may increase his promotion prospects by referring a lower ability applicant
if he is likely to compete against his referral for a promotion. However, the eect
of promotions on employee referrals is not clear-cut for two reasons. First, it is not
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certain whether making a referral for a particular applicant will make the employee
better o. It is obvious that the employee's probability of earning a promotion in-
creases as the contestant's ability goes down. Less obvious is whether the employee
will be better o when he refers an applicant against whom he might compete for a
promotion rather than competing against a randomly drawn co-worker at the rm.
Second, when considering whether to refer lower ability applicants, the employee
faces a trade-o between increasing his promotion prospects and decreasing his prob-
ability of earning a bonus. As discussed in the previous section, when bonuses are
tied to the performance of referrals, they provide current employees with an incentive
to refer higher ability applicants. However, the employee has also an incentive to
refer a lower ability applicant in order to increase his promotion prospects. Which
eect dominates depend on the relative magnitudes of incentives provided by bonuses
and promotions. To elaborate on these dynamics, I rst discuss how to incorporate
promotions into the framework in which employees are eligible for referral bonuses.
Then, I consider two cases distinguished by whether incentives for referrals pro-
vided through bonuses dominate disincentives caused by the employee's promotion
prospects. As will be discussed, the case in which disincentives caused by promo-
tion incentives dominate incentives provided through bonuses entails the situation in
which employees are eligible for xed payments rather than bonuses as a special case.
Therefore, I consider the implications of having xed payments when employees are
concerned about their promotion prospects as a special case.
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The rm runs promotion tournaments in the spirit of Lazear and Rosen (1981).13
Employees compete in pairs and the one who produced the higher level of output
earns a promotion. As Lazear and Rosen show, the rm sets the promotion prize
in order to elicit ecient levels of eort from its employees.14 However, I abstract
away from eort choice since the goal of this paper is to examine the screening role
of referrals when promotions are present rather than examining the incentive eects
of promotions.
Let the wage increase associated with earning a promotion, denoted by W ,
be exogenously determined. In other words, the rm does not take how the size
of promotion prizes aects employee referrals into account when setting the size of
promotion prizes. This assumption is plausible in the present context since the goal of
the rm in using promotions is to assign workers to jobs to which their skills are most
tted and to provide eort incentives. The promotion prize, however, may aect the
employee's referral decision if the employee faces a possibility of competition with the
newly hired worker. The intuition behind this rationale is simple. The employee will
be competing against a co-worker to earn the promotion prize, and his probability
of earning the prize decreases with the opponent's ability. Therefore, the presence of
promotions gives the employee an incentive to refer a less able applicant when there
is a possibility of competition for promotions. Hence, both the rm and the employee
should take the eect of promotions into account during the referral process.
13For extensive surveys of the tournament literature, see Gibbons and Waldman (1999), Pren-
dergast (1999), Waldman (2010) and Lazear and Oyer (2010).
14Promotion prizes also provide incentives for employees to invest in rm-specic human capital
(Prendergast, 1993; Zabojnik and Bernhardt, 2001).
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To model the possibility that the employee will face his own referral as a contes-
tant, the promotion tournament is assumed to have the following structure. With
probability  employee i competes against employee j, who has been hired through
i's referral. Otherwise, he is paired with employee k whose ability is unknown to
i. The probability of i earning the promotion when the contestant is j is given by
prob(yi > yj) = prob(i   j > ) = G(i   j), where   j   i and G(.) is the
cdf of . When i's contestant is employee k, his probability of earning the promotion
is given by Ek [prob(yi > yk)] =
R H
L
G(i   k) 1H Ldk. Note that in the latter
case the employee takes the expectation over his contestant's ability since it is un-
observable to him. 15 As a result, i's probability of earning the promotion prize is
a function of his own ability, as well as the referral's ability and the probability of
facing the referral as a contestant:
Pi(i; j; ) = G(i   j) + (1  )
Z H
L
G(i   k) 1
H   Ldk: (3.7)
Consistent with the above discussion, the employee aects his probability of earning
the prize through his referral decision only if  is non-zero. Otherwise, his referral
decision is independent of the promotion tournament. Therefore, I assume that  > 0
in the rest of the discussion. The employee's utility is then given by
Ui = wi + ij   c+ [1  F (eq   j)]B +WPi(i; j; ): (3.8)
Since the employee's current wage level wi is independent of the referral process, we
15One may argue that the employee could observe his co-worker's ability if it is observable to
the rm. However, the assumed tournament structure is robust to this argument as long as the
employee does not know which co-worker he will be paired with for the tournament, and the ability
distribution of the rm's workforce is the same as that of job applicants.
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can dene the expected returns from referring applicant j as follows
(ij; c; j; eq; B; i; ) = ij   c+ [1  F (eq   j)]B +W[G(i   j)
 
Z H
L
G(i   k) 1
H   Ldk]
= ij   c+ [1  F (eq   j)]B +W (i; j); (3.9)
where  (i; j) measures the change in the probability that employee i will earn the
promotion prize when he refers applicant j. Note that the employee will draw a
contestant from the whole distribution of ability if he does not make a referral. Oth-
erwise, he will be competing against his referral j with probability . In which of
these cases the employee would be better o is not certain, therefore the sign of  (:)
is indeterminate for a given (i; j) pair. That is, taking the ability of the poten-
tial referral xed, some employees increase their chances of earning the promotion
prize by making a referral, whereas some others indeed reduce their probability of
promotion.
Note that the probability of employee i earning the promotion decreases with
the ability of the referral, thus  (:) decreases with j. This weakens the employee's
incentives to refer high-ability applicants. However, even though the presence of
promotions generates a conict of interest between the rm and the employee con-
cerning referral recruitment, referral decisions may not be distorted in equilibrium.
The reason is that if the incentive eects of referral bonuses are suciently large,
they oset the disincentives induced by promotions. In other words, the expected
returns from referring an applicant becomes an increasing function of the referral's
ability if referral bonuses generate suciently strong incentives to refer high-ability
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applicants. In the remainder of this section, I examine these two cases in turn.
Case 1 The expected returns from referring an applicant increase with the appli-
cant's ability. That is, (:) is an increasing function of j.
I rst examine the case in which expected returns from referring an applicant increase
with the applicant's ability. Note that holding abilities of the employee and the
applicant constant, marginal returns from referring a higher-ability applicant increase
with the size of referral bonus B and decrease with the size of promotion prize W
and the probability of facing the referral as a contestant .16 The rst case then
follows when the referral bonus B is suciently large relative to W   so that the
employee has an incentive to refer high-ability applicants.
The employee's optimal strategy is that he will refer the applicant as long as
the expected returns are non-negative. Since the expected returns increase with the
applicant's ability by assumption, there exists a cuto ability level above which the
employee refers any applicant. Let ~Pj (ij; eq; i) denote the lowest-ability applicant
that employee i refers when he is eligible to earn bonuses and is concerned about
his promotion prospects. Unlike the no-promotions case, the cuto depends on the
employee's own ability as well as the social connection between the employee and
the applicant, and the output threshold to earn the bonus. The reason is that the
employee's promotion prospects are a function of his own ability.
To examine equilibrium behavior, let us focus on an employee whose optimal
16This follows since we have @(:)@j = f(eq   j)B  Wg(i   j).
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strategy is the same for both types of social connections he might have with the
applicant. That is, employee i's optimal strategy is to select a cuto and refer any
applicants whose ability is above it. The rm's optimization problem is the same as
before, except (3.6) is replaced by
(ij; c; ~
P
j (ij; eq; i); eq; B; i; ) = 0; for ij 2 fL; Hg (3.10)
Proposition 5 Assume c   [1  F (q   L)]B   W (i; L) > H > L for a
given employee i. Then equilibrium behavior is as follows:
1. Employee i makes a referral for any applicant j with j  ~Pj (ij; q; i),
where ~Pj (ij; q
; i) is such that (ij; c; ~Pj (ij; q
; i); q; B; i; ) = 0 for
ij 2 fL; Hg.
2. The rm oers the equilibrium referral wage W R(i) to hire a referred appli-
cant and sets q that satises the condition F (q   H) = 1  1B .
3. Referred applicant j accepts the oer if W R(i) > WM + j.
The structure of the equilibrium is the same as that in no-promotions case. However,
the major dierence occurs on the optimal strategy of employees who adjust their
behavior to exploit the referral process in order to increase their promotion prospects.
Since the cuto above which the employee refers any applicant depends on the em-
ployee's own ability as well, the expected ability of a referral is also a function of
the employee's ability. The rm determines referral wages consistent with its beliefs
concerning the expected ability of a referral. Therefore, unlike in the no-promotions
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case, the referral wage is a function of the referrer's ability. Note, however, that the
optimal output threshold to earn the bonus q is the same as before. The reason
is that the employee's promotion prospects are not aected by the bonus scheme.
Specically, the marginal increase in the referral's expected ability due to a small
increase in eq is not aected by the employee's promotion prospects, thus it is the
same as before.
As in the no-promotions case, the expected ability of a referral is higher if the
social connection between the employee and the applicant is weak. However, since the
rm is not able to observe the strength of the social connection between the employee
and the job applicant, it forms beliefs concerning the social connection and oers a
referral wage consistent with those beliefs. This implies that the expected ability
of a referral is a function of the proportion of low-biased and high-biased employee-
applicant pairs. Since low-biased employees refer applicants of higher ability on
average, the expected ability of a referral increases with the probability that the
social connection between a given employee-applicant pair is weak.
To simplify the discussion, let the applicant whose ability is just equal to the
cuto be referred to as the marginal referral. Note that the marginal referral is
the lowest-ability applicant that the employee nds it optimal to refer. Therefore,
the expected ability of a referral is monotonically increasing with the ability of the
marginal referral. The following result shows how the expected ability of a referral
changes when promotions are incorporated.
Corollary 6 The expected ability of a referral is higher when promotions are present
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if and only if the employee reduces his probability of promotion by referring the
marginal referral. That is, for a given employee i and a given value of ij,
~Bj (ij; q
) < ~Pj (ij; q
; i) if and only if  (i; ~Pj (ij; q
; i)) < 0.
To understand the mechanics behind this result, consider an applicant j0 such that
~Bj (ij; q
) < j0 < ~Pj (ij; q
; i). When promotions are absent, the employee refers
this applicant since the expected benets exceed the cost of referring. When pro-
motions are introduced, the employee will choose not to refer the same applicant
if and only if referring the applicant reduces his probability of promotion, i.e., if
 (i; j0) < 0. Otherwise, he will still nd it optimal to refer this applicant. This
result also implies that incorporating promotions reduces the expected ability of a re-
ferral if referring the marginal referral increases the employee's promotion prospects.
Therefore, it shows that employees' promotion incentives may still distort their re-
ferral decisions even when referrals continue to serve a screening function.
Corollary 7 If referring a particular applicant reduces the employee's probability
of promotion, the expected ability of that referral is an increasing function of the
employee's probability of competing against his own referral. That is, for a given
(i; j) pair, ~
P
j (ij; q
; i) increases with  if and only if  (i; j) < 0.
Recall that the parameter  is the probability that the employee will compete against
his own referral. Therefore, it measures the eect of referral decisions on promotion
prospects; higher values of  imply a greater eect of referral decisions on the em-
ployee's promotion prospects. How the value of  aects the critical value depends
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on whether the employee benets from referring the applicant in terms of increasing
his probability of promotion. If referring a given applicant reduces the employee's
probability of earning a promotion (i.e., if  (i; j) < 0 for a given (i; j) pair), the
critical value increases with the value of . The reason is that higher values of 
imply a greater decrease in the employee's promotion prospects when  (i; j) < 0.
Since the expected benets increase with the applicant's ability by assumption, the
employee sets a higher cuto in order to oset the decrease in the probability of pro-
motion. Conversely, if referring a given applicant increases the employee's probability
of promotion, he sets a lower cuto as the value of  increases.
Finally, the relationship between the referrer's ability level and the expected
ability of the referral is of interest. If higher ability employees set a higher cuto
ability level to refer applicants, it means that there is a positive correlation between
the referrer's ability and the expected ability of a referral. However, this result follows
only if the employee's promotion prospects decrease with his ability level. Here is
the formalization of the result.
Corollary 8 The expected ability of a referral increases with the referrer's ability
level if and only if the referrer's promotion prospects decrease with his own ability
level. That is, ~Pj (ij; q
; i) is an increasing function of i if and only if
@ (i;j)
@i
< 0.
Consider two employees i and i0 such that i > i0 . When the promotion prospects
decrease with the referrer's ability, we have  (i; j) <  (i0 ; j) for a given applicant
j. In other words, employee i0 experiences a higher reduction in his expected utility
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since his promotion prospects diminish more than those of employee i. In order to
oset this reduction in his expected utility, employee i0 sets a higher cuto to refer
applicants. Note that the last step of this reasoning follows since, by assumption, the
expected returns from referring an applicant increase with the applicant's ability.
As discussed earlier, Montgomery (1991) shows that assortative matching in social
networks results in a positive correlation between the expected ability of a referral and
the referrer's ability. In that sense, our result shows the link between the current
model and that of Montgomery. That is, without assuming assortative matching,
the positive correlation is possible only if the employee's promotion prospects do not
increase with his own ability. Otherwise, a negative correlation will be observed as
promotions generate greater distortions at the high end of the ability distribution.
Case 2 The expected returns from referring an applicant decrease with the appli-
cant's ability. That is, (:) is a decreasing function of j.
Next, I consider the case in which the expected returns from referring an applicant
decrease with the applicant's ability. As the opposite of the rst case, promotion
incentives are stronger than those provided through bonuses so that the employee
does not have an incentive to refer higher-ability applicants. In other words, either
the promotion prize W or the probability that the employee will compete against
his own referral  is suciently large. Note that the presence of promotions leads
to a situation in which the employee indeed has an incentive to refer low-ability
applicants in order to increase his promotion prospects. Hence, this is the worst-case
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scenario from the rm's point of view as the incentives of the employee are fully
misaligned with those of the rm concerning referral recruitment. Note that this
case also arises when the rm does not oer bonuses, i.e. when B = 0. Therefore,
the results discussed for this case applies to the situation in which the rm uses
xed payments to solicit referrals from employees who are concerned about their
promotion prospects.
The employee continues to refer any applicants that will bring him non-zero
expected returns. However, there is a major change in his optimal strategy. Since
the expected returns decrease, rather than increasing, with the applicant's ability,
there exists a critical value above which the employee does not refer any applicants.
Let 
P
j (ij; eq; i) denote the cuto for given values of ij and eq. Since (:) decreases
with j, for any j0 > 
P
j (ij; eq; i) we have
(ij; c; 
P
j (ij; eq; i); eq; B) > 0 > (ij; c; j0 ; eq; B): for ij 2 fL; Hg
This means that the expected ability of a referral is lower, regardless of the strength
of the social connection, than that of an anonymous applicant. Therefore, employee
referrals do not serve a screening function in this case.
Proposition 6 In equilibrium, the employee does not refer any applicants, and the
rm hires an anonymous worker at the market wage.
Note that a necessary condition to have referral hiring in equilibrium is that the
expected ability of a referral is higher than the expected ability of an anonymous
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applicant. If this condition is not satised, the rm cannot make up for the costs
of referral bonuses, thus it does not hire any referred applicants. Anticipating that
the rm will not hire any referred applicants, the employee then does not refer
any applicants in equilibrium since it is costly to refer an applicant. Incorporating
promotions into the model shows that the employee may have conicting interest with
the rm when making a referral decision. In that case, the rm does not nd any
referrals from the employee credible enough to hire the referred applicant. However,
as the discussion of the two cases illustrates, the rm can mitigate the tension of
interests using referral bonuses.
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate two potential mechanisms that generate a conict of
interest between the rm and current employees concerning referral recruitment.
First, I show that the current employee's referral decision is aected by the strength
of his social connection to the applicant. Specically, the employee has an incentive
to refer applicants of lower ability, on average, if he has a strong social connection
to the applicant. Second, I examine how the employee's promotion incentives aect
his referral decision. The intuition of incorporating promotions is that the employee
will have an incentive to refer applicants of lower ability if he faces a possibility of
competition for promotions against his own referral.
The model points out the importance of providing the \correct" incentives with
162
the current employee to elicit successful referrals. Specically, when the employee is
eligible to earn a xed payment for referring an applicant, his decision is independent
of the applicant's ability. Thus, he has an incentive to refer applicants with whom he
has strong social connections. Therefore, employee referrals do not serve a screening
function. However, the rm can incentivize the employee to refer high-ability appli-
cants by oering bonuses which are contingent on the referral's performance on the
job. In that case, the rm hires referred applicants since employee referrals screen
more able workers. The presence of promotions complicates the employee's referral
decision. If the employee is not provided with suciently strong incentives through
bonuses, he will have an incentive to refer applicants of lower ability. Therefore, the
rm does not hire through referrals in this case. If, however, bonuses generate suf-
ciently strong incentives so that the employee nds it optimal to refer high-ability
applicants, then referrals still serve a screening function.
As discussed before, the empirical evidence documented in the literature supports
the model's predictions concerning the eect of xed payments and bonuses on em-
ployee referrals. However, the relationship between the current employee's promotion
prospects and his referrals decisions have not been investigated. In that sense, the
results of the paper point out directions for further research.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 1
Parametric Restrictions:
Let +t (j; j+1) denote the threshold ability level in period t at which the current
employer is indierent between assigning worker i to job level j and j + 1. The
parametric restrictions regarding the current employer's promotion decisions are as
follows.
(i) E[] < +1 (1; 2). That is, on average young workers are more productive in
job level 1.
(ii) e2(yH) > 
+
2 (1; 2) > 
e
2(yL). This condition states that middle-aged workers
who produced the high (low) level of output when they were young are expected to
be more productive at job level 2 (job level 1).
(iii) e3(yL; yH) > 
+
3 (1; 2). This condition ensures that old workers with the
output history (yL; yH) are expected to be more productive at job level 2.
(iv), e3(yH ; yL) > 
+
3 (1; 2). That is, old workers with the output history (yH ; yL)
are expected to be more productive at job level 2.
(v), e3(yH ; yH) > 
+
3 (2; 3). This condition tells us that old workers with the
output history (yH ; yH) are expected to be more productive at job level 3.
Proof of Proposition 1.
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Let us rst solve for the optimal contract in the second period. Following Roger-
son (1985), one can replace the the incentive constraint (1.7) by the rst-order condi-
tion of the worker's problem given by (1.11).1 Let 1  0 and 2  0 be the Lagrange
multipliers associated with participation constraint (1.8) and the constraint from the
worker's problem (1.11), respectively. Then, the rst-order necessary conditions are
given by
 1 + 1 = 0 (A.1)
 pej(y1) + 1pej(y1) + 2[e2(y1)] = 0 (A.2)
e2(y1)[s2[Y
j
H   Y jL ] + e3(y1; yH)  e3(y1; yL)]+
+1[
e
2(y1)[j2 + [U3(y1; yH)  U3(y1; yL)]]  g0(ej)] + 2[ g00(ej)] = 0 (A.3)
(A.1) indicates that 1 = 1, thus the participation constraint is binding. By comple-
mentary slackness, (A.2) indicates that 2 = 0 since 
e
2(y1) > 0. Imposing 1 = 1,
2 = 0 and the replaced incentive constraint into (A.3) gives (1.9). (B.2) follows from
the binding participation constraint. Since the participation constraint (1.8) is bind-
ing and there is an innitesimal moving cost borne by the worker, all middle-aged
workers remain with their period-1 employers.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let us derive the optimal contract for the last period.
Similar to the second-period problem, one can replace the incentive constraint (1.2)
by the rst-order condition of the worker's problem given by (1.6). Let 1  0 and
1It can be showed that Pr(Yijt = Y
j
H) = [eijti] satises the two sucient conditions, the
monotone likelihood-ratio condition (MLRC) and the convexity of the distribution function condi-
tion (CDFC), to use the rst-order approach. Also note that the convexity of g(.) provides the
suciency condition for the worker's maximization problem.
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2  0 be the Lagrange multipliers associated with participation constraint (1.3) and
the constraint from the worker's problem (1.6), respectively. Then, the rst-order
necessary conditions are given by
 1 + 1 = 0 (A.4)
 pej(y1; y2) + 1pej(y1; y2) + 2[e3(y1; y2)] = 0 (A.5)
s3
e
3(y1; y2)[Y
j
H   Y jL ]  e3(y1; y2)j3 + 1[e3(y1; y2)j3   g0(ej)] +
2( g00(ej)) = 0 (A.6)
(A.4) indicates that 1 = 1, thus the participation constraint (1.3) is binding. By
complementary slackness, (A.5) indicates that 2 = 0 since 
e
3(y1; y2) > 0. Imposing
1 = 1, 2 = 0 and the replaced incentive constraint into (A.6) gives (1.4). (B.3)
follows from the binding participation constraint. Similar to the second period, since
the participation constraint (1.8) is binding and there is an innitesimal moving cost
borne by the worker, all old workers remain with their period-1 employers.
Before presenting the proofs omitted in the text, let us introduce the expected
net surplus function and show that it is strictly increasing and convex with respect
to s and E.
Lemma 1 Let E  Et[ijIit] be a shorthand for the worker i's expected ability
conditional on information available at period Iit, which includes her output and job
assignment history until period t. Let us write the expected net surplus as a function
of the expected ability of the worker, E, and the term reecting the rm-specic
human capital, s, i.e., Xj(E; s) = sY jL + s[Y
j
H   Y jL ]ej(E; s)E   g(ej(E; s)):
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Then, Xj(E; s) is strictly increasing in E and s, and is strictly convex.
Proof of Lemma. First note that the worker's utility maximization problem
implies that g0(ej) = Es[Y
j
H   Y jL ]. Hence, using the implicit function theorem one
can write ej as a function of E and s, i.e., g
0(ej(E; s)) = Es[Y
j
H   Y jL ]. This
implies that
@ej(E;s)
@E
=
s[Y jH Y jL ]
g00(ej(E;s))
> 0 and
@ej(E;s)
@s
=
E[Y jH Y jL ]
g00(ej(E;s))
> 0 since g(.) is a
convex function.
Using this result, one can prove the lemma:
@Xj(E;s)
@E
= s[Y jH   Y jL ][@ej(E;s)@E E + ej(E; s)]  g0(ej(E; s))@ej(E;s)@E
= s[Y jH   Y jL ]ej(E; s) + s[Y
j
H Y jL ]
g00(ej(E;s))
[s[Y jH   Y jL ]E   s[Y jH   Y jL ]E]
= s[Y jH   Y jL ]ej(E; s) > 0 for all ej(E; s) > 0,
@Xj(E;s)
@s
= Y jL + [Y
j
H   Y jL ]ej(E; s)E > 0.
This proves that Xj(E; s) is strictly increasing in E and s. We also need to
compute the second-order partial derivatives of the expected surplus function in order
to show that it is strictly convex.
@2Xj(E;s)
@E2
= s[Y jH   Y jL ]@ej(E;s)@E =
(s[Y jH Y jL ])2
g00(ej(E;s))
> 0,
@2Xj(E;s)
@s2
= E[Y jH   Y jL ]@ej(E;s)@s =
(E[Y jH Y jL ])2
g00(ekl(E;s))
> 0.
This implies that the Jacobian of Xj is positive denite, which is sucient to
show that is strictly convex.
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Note that one can also write down the expected net surplus at a competing rm
by replacing the term s by h. This is equivalent to imposing the restriction s = h.
Therefore, the expected net surplus function is strictly convex with respect to h.
Proof of Corollary 1 s3[Y
3
H   Y 3L ] > s3[Y 2H   Y 2L ] > s3[Y 1H   Y 1L ] since [Y 3H   Y 3L ] >
[Y 2H   Y 2L ] > [Y 1H   Y 1L ] and s3 > 1. Therefore, we have 33 > 23 > 13.
To show that 22 > 12 let us rst rewrite the bonus payments for middle-aged
workers using the expected net surplus function as follows:
22 = s2[Y
2
H   Y 2L ] + [e3(yH ; yH)  e3(yH ; yL)]
= s2[Y
2
H   Y 2L ] + (s3E[Y 3jyH ; yH ]   E[Y o3jyH ; yH ])   (s3E[Y 2jyH ; yL]  
E[Y o2jyH ; yL]) + [g(eo33)  g(e33)]  [g(eo23)  g(e23)]
= s2 [Y
2
H   Y 2L ]+X3(E[jH;H]; s3) X3(E[jH;H]; h) X2(E[jH;L]; s3)+
X2(E[jH;L]; h)
12 = s2[Y
1
H   Y 1L ] + [e3(yL; yH)  e3(yL; yL)]
= s2[Y
1
H   Y 1L ] + (s3E[Y 2jyL; yH ]   E[Y o2jyL; yH ])   (s3E[Y 1jyL; yL]  
E[Y o1jyL; yL]) + [g(feo23)  g(fe23)]  [g(eo13)  g(e13)]
= s2[Y
1
H   Y 1L ] +X2(E[jL;H]; s3) X2(E[jL;H]; h) X1(E[jL;L]; s3) +
X1(E[jL;L]; h):
First, assume that s3 = h. Then, the above condition simplies to s2[Y
2
H   Y 2L ] >
s2[Y
1
H   Y 1L ], which is true since [Y 2H   Y 2L ] > [Y 1H   Y 1L ] and s2 > 0.
168
Next, assume that s3 > h. We need to show that terms that include expected net
surplus in the last period is increasing in the human capital parameter, s. In other
words, ignoring the rst terms, s2 [Y
2
H   Y 2L ] and s2 [Y 1H   Y 1L ], we need to show that
the following strict inequality holds:
X3(E[jH;H]; s3)   X3(E[jH;H]; h)   X2(E[jH;L]; s3) + X2(E[jH;L]; h) >
X2(E[jL;H]; s3) X2(E[jL;H]; h) X1(E[jL;L]; s3) +X1(E[jL;L]; h).
One can rearrange this as the following:
X3(E[jH;H]; s3) X2(E[jH;L]; s3) X2(E[jL;H]; s3) +X1(E[jL;L]; s3) >
X3(E[jH;H]; h) X2(E[jH;L]; h) X2(E[jL;H]; h) +X1(E[jL;L]; h).
Since E[jH;H] E[jH;L]  E[jL;H] E[jL;L] and X(.) is strictly convex,
terms at both sides are positive. Moreover, that X(.) is strictly convex and s3 > h
implies that the term on the left hand side is greater than the term on the right hand
side. Hence the result.
Proof of Corollary 2 Let us rewrite the bonus payment for the middle-aged worker
using the expected net surplus: j2 = s2[Y
j
H   Y jL ] + Xj+1(E[jy1; H]; s3)  
Xj+1(E[jy1; H]; h) Xj(E[jy1; L]; s3) +Xj(E[jy1; L]; h). Note that when s3 = h,
the result follows since the terms related to the last period cancel out and s3[Y
j
H Y jL ] >
s2[Y
j
H Y jL ]. To show the inequality for h < s3 let us re-arrange the terms as follows:
j3 > j2,
s3[Y
j
H   Y jL ] > s2[Y jH   Y jL ] + Xj+1(E[jy1; H]; s3)   Xj+1(E[jy1; H]; h)  
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Xj(E[jy1; L]; s3) +Xj(E[jy1; L]; h),
s3[Y
j
H   Y jL ] + Xj+1(E[jy1; H]; h)   Xj(E[jy1; L]; h) > s2[Y jH   Y jL ] +
Xj+1(E[jy1; H]; s3) Xj(E[jy1; L]; s3).
Note that the second term on the left hand side, that is, Xj+1(E[jy1; H]; h)  
Xj(E[jy1; L]; h) is increasing in h. As we know that the inequality holds for h = s3
and the term on the left hand side is increasing in h, one can conclude that there are
values of h such that h < s3 and that the inequality holds.
Proof of Corollary 3 Note that the term Xj+1(E[jy1; H]; h) Xj(E[jy1; L]; h) is
equivalent to U3(y1; yH) U3(y1; yL). As it is increasing in h, the prize for promotion
increases with h. On the contrary, j2 decreases with h since the term, U3(y1; yH) 
U3(y1; yL), is deducted from the bonus payment. (1.11) indicates that the ecient
eort level remains constant since the prize for promotion and the part for the career-
concern incentive in the bonus payment cancel out. That is, the ecient level of eort
does not depend on h.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 3
Proof of Proposition 1. When employee i earns a xed payment of F by referring
an applicant, he refers applicants of any ability as long as the cost of referring does not
exceed the benets. However, this decision is independent of the applicant's ability.
Therefore, the expected ability of a referral is at most equal to the expected ability
of an anonymous applicant. In that case, the rm makes zero expected prots from
hiring the referred applicant since in addition to wages paid to the newly hired worker,
it also has to pay F to the referrer. Hence, in equilibrium the rm hires an anonymous
applicant at the market wage and makes zero expected prots. Anticipating this,
the employee does not refer any applicants not to incur the referring cost c in vain.
Proof of Proposition 2. Before solving the rm's optimization problem, let us
see how the choice of eq aects the employee's referral decision. As discussed in the
text, given the values of (ij; c; eq; B), the employee chooses a cuto ~Bj (ij; eq) above
which he refers any applicants. Therefore, the cuto is implicitly dened by
(ij; c; ~
B
j (ij; eq); eq; B) = 0; for ij 2 fL; Hg (B.1)
Using the implicit function theorem, one can show that
@~Bj (ij; eq)
@eq =  @(ij; c; j; eq; B)@eq =@(ij; c; j; eq; B)@j =   f(eq   j)Bf(eq   j)B = 1;
for ij 2 fL; Hg. Using this result, the rm chooses values of WR and eq that
maximize its expected prots from hiring a referred applicant. Let us rewrite the
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expected prots from hiring a referral R more explicitly as
max
WR;eq R =
WR  WM + 
2


H   L
Z H
~Bj (L;eq) [j   [1  F (eq   j)]B] @j
+
1  
H   L
Z H
~Bj (H ;eq) [j   [1  F (eq   j)]B] @j  WR

subject to (B.1). First order conditions with respect to WR and eq, respectively, as
follows
W R
2


H   L
Z H
~Bj (L;q
)
[j   [1  F (q   j)]B] @j + 1  
H   LZ H
~Bj (H ;q
)
[j   [1  F (q   j)]B] @j  W R

 

W R  WM + 
2

= 0 (B.2)

H   L
@~Bj (L; eq)
@eq

  1 + B  BF (q   ~Bj (L; q))

+
B
H   L
Z H
~Bj (L;q
)
f(q   j)@j
+
1  
H   L
@~Bj (H ; eq)
@eq

  1 +B  BF (q   ~Bj (H ; q))

+
(1  )B
H   H
Z H
~Bj (H ;q
)
f(q   j)@j = 0 (B.3)
For brevity, let us dene
A  
H   L
Z H
~Bj (L;q
)
[j   [1  F (q   j)]B] @j + 1  
H   LZ H
~Bj (H ;q
)
[j   [1  F (q   j)]B] @j:
Then, (B.2) implies that
W R =
1
2

WM + A  

:
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Imposing
@~Bj (ij ;eq)
@eq = 1 into (B.3) and rearranging it gives F (q   H) = 1  1B .
Proof of Corollary 1. It suces to show that ~Bj (L; q
) > ~Bj (H ; q
). Evalu-
ating (B.1) at L and H gives:
L   c+
h
1  F (q   ~Bj (L; q))
i
B = H   c+
h
1  F (q   ~Bj (H ; q))
i
B
Rearranging the term gives F (q   ~Bj (H ; q)) > F (q   ~Bj (L; q)). The result
follows.
Proof of Corollary 2. The expected ability of referred applicant j in equilibrium
is given by
E [j] = E
h
jjj  ~Bj (L; q)
i
+ (1  )E
h
jjj  ~Bj (H ; q)
i
: (B.4)
Since (B.4) monotonically increases with ~Bj (L; q
), it suces to show that ~Bj (L; q
)
increases with q and decreases with B. We already showed that
@~Bj (ij ;eq)
@eq = 1. To
show that
@~Bj (ij ;eq)
@B
> 0, let us implicitly dierentiate (B.1) with respect to B:
@(ij; c; j; eq; B)
@j
"
@~Bj (ij; eq)
@eq dqdB + @~Bj (ij; eq)@B
#
+
@(ij; c; j; eq; B)
@B
= 0
Evaluating the whole expression at q gives
@~Bj (ij; eq)
@B
=  1  F (q
   j)
f(q   j)B  
1
B2
1
f(q   j) < 0:
Proof of Proposition 3. Since
@~Pj (ij ;eq;i)
@eq = 1, the solution illustrated for
Proposition 2 still applies. However, the referral wage W R changes to take the
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change in the expected ability of the referral into account. For brevity, let us dene
B  
H   L
Z H
~Bj (L;q
;i)
[j   [1  F (q   j)]B] @j + 1  
H   LZ H
~Bj (H ;q
;i)
[j   [1  F (q   j)]B] @j:
Then, we have
W R =
1
2

WM +B   

:
Proof of Corollary 3. Evaluating (3.6) and (3.10) at q gives
h
F (q   ~Pj (ij; q; i))  F (q   ~Bj (ij; q))
i
B = W (i; ~
P
j (ij; q
; i))
Thus, ~Bj (ij) >
~Pj (ij; q
; i) if and only if  (i; ~Pj (ij; q
; i)) > 0.
Proof of Corollary 4. Implicitly dierentiating (3.10) gives
@~Pj (ij; eq; i)
@
=  @(ij; c; j; eq; B; i; )
@
=
@(ij; c; j; eq; B; i; ))
@j
; for ij 2 fL; Hg
Since the term in the denominator is positive by assumption, and
@(ij ;c;j ;eq;B;i;)
@
=
 (i; j),
@~Pj (ij ;eq;i)
@
is positive if and only if  (i; j) is negative.
Proof of Corollary 5. Implicitly dierentiating (3.10) with respect to i gives
@~Pj (ij; eq; i)
@i
=  @(ij; c; j; eq; B; i; )
@i
=
@(ij; c; j; eq; B; i; ))
@j
; for ij 2 fL; Hg
Since the term in the denominator is positive by assumption, and
@(ij ;c;j ;eq;B;i;)
@i
=
@ (i;j)
@i
,
@~Pj (ij ;eq;i)
@i
is positive if and only if
@ (i;j)
@i
is negative.
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Proof of Proposition 4. As the discussion in the text illustrates, the employee
sets a cuto 
P
j (ij; eq; i) above which he does not refer any applicants. In that case,
the expected ability of a referral is given by E [jjreferred by i] = L+
P
j (ij ;eq;i)
2
which
is lower than b since Pj (ij; eq; i) < H . The remainder of the logic is the same as
the one discussed in the Proof of Proposition 1.
175
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Andersson, F. 2002. \Career concerns, contracts, and eort distortions." Journal of
Labor Economics 20 (1):42{58.
Baker, G., M. Gibbs, and B. Holmstrom. 1994a. \The Internal Economics of the Firm
- Evidence From Personnel Data." Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (4):881{
919.
|||. 1994b. \The Wage Policy of A Firm." Quarterly Journal of Economics
109 (4):921{955.
Bandiera, O., I. Barankay, and I. Rasul. 2009. \Social Connections and Incentives in
the Workplace: Evidence from Personnel Data." Econometrica 77 (4):1047{1094.
Bartel, A.P. and G.J. Borjas. 1981. Studies in Labor Markets, chap. Wage Growth
and Job Turnover: An Empirical Analysis. University of Chicago Press, 65{84.
Beaman, L. and J. Magruder. 2011. \Who gets the job referral? Evidence from a
social networks experiment." Working Paper.
Belzil, C. and M. Bognanno. 2008. \Promotions, demotions, halo eects, and
the earnings dynamics of American executives." Journal of Labor Economics
26 (2):287{310.
Bishop, J. H. 1990. \Job Performance, Turnover, and Wage Growth." Journal of
Labor Economics 8 (3):pp. 363{386.
176
Blakemore, A. E., S.A. Low, and M.B. Ormiston. 1987. \Employment Bonuses and
Labor Turnover." Journal of Labor Economics 5 (4):pp. S124{S135.
Boschmans, K. 2008. Selected Essays on Personnel Economics: Turnover, Promo-
tions and Incentives. Ph.D. thesis, Universiteit Antwerpen.
Brown, M., E. Setren, and G. Topa. 2012. \Do Informal Referrals Lead to Better
Matches? Evidence from a Firm's Employee Referral System." Working Paper.
Burdett, K. 1978. \Employee Search and Quits." American Economic Review
68:212{220.
Calvo-Armengol, A. and M. Jackson. 2004. \The Eects of Social Networks on
Employment and Inequality." American Economic Review 3 (3):426{454.
Carmichael, H.L. 1988. \Incentives in academics: why is there tenure?" Journal of
Political Economy 96 (3):453{472.
Chamberlain, G. 1984. \Panel data." Griliches and M. Intrilligator, eds., Handbook
of Econometrics 2:1247{1318.
DeVaro, J. and M. Waldman. 2012. \The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further
Theory and Empirical Evidence." Journal of Labor Economics 30 (1):pp. 91{147.
Dohmen, T. J. 2004. \Performance, seniority, and wages: formal salary systems and
individual earnings proles." Labour Economics 11 (6):741{763.
Dustmann, C., A. Glitz, and U. Schonberg. 2011. \Referral-based job search net-
works." IZA Discussion Paper No. 5777 .
177
Ekinci, E. 2012. \Bonus Payments in a Corporate Hierarchy: Theory and Evidence."
Cornell University, Working Paper.
Fafchamps, M. and A. Moradi. 2011. \Referral and Job Performance: Evidence from
the Ghana Colonial Army." Working Paper.
Fairburn, J. A. and J. M. Malcomson. 2001. \Performance, promotion, and the Peter
Principle." Review of Economic Studies 68 (1):45{66.
Fama, E.F. 1980. \Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm." Journal of
Political Economy 88 (2):288{307.
Galizzi, M. and K. Lang. 1998. \Relative wages, wage growth, and quit behavior."
Journal of Labor Economics 16 (2):367{391.
Ghosh, Suman and Michael Waldman. 2010. \Standard promotion practices versus
up-or-out contracts." Rand Journal of Economics 41 (2):301{325.
Gibbons, R. and L. Katz. 1992. \Does Unmeasured Ability Explain Interindustry
Wage Dierentials." Review of Economic Studies 59 (3):515{535.
Gibbons, R. and K. J. Murphy. 1992. \Optimal Incentive Contracts In the Pres-
ence of Career Concerns - Theory and Evidence." Journal of Political Economy
100 (3):468{505.
Gibbons, R. and M. Waldman. 1999. Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3, chap.
Careers in organizations: Theory and evidence. Elsevier, 2373{2437.
178
Gibbs, M. 1995. \Incentive Compensation In A Corporate Hierarchy." Journal of
Accounting and Economics 19 (2):247{277.
Gibbs, M. and W. Hendricks. 2004. \Do formal salary systems really matter?"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 58 (1):71{93.
Glaeser, E.L. and A. Shleifer. 2001. \Not-for-prot entrepreneurs." Journal of Public
Economics 81 (1):99{115.
Hashimoto, M. 1979. \Bonus Payments, on-the-Job Training, and Lifetime Employ-
ment in Japan." Journal of Political Economy 87 (5):1086{1104.
Hashimoto, M. and B.T. Yu. 1980. \Specic Capital, Employment Contracts, and
Wage Rigidity." Bell Journal of Economics 11 (2):pp. 536{549.
Holmstrom, B. 1999. \Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective."
Review of Economic Studies 66 (1):169{182.
Hu, L. and C. Taber. 2011. \Displacement, Asymmetric Information, and Heteroge-
neous Human Capital." Journal of Labor Economics 29 (1):pp. 113{152.
Ioannides, Y. M. and L.D. Loury. 2004. \Job Information Networks, Neighborhood
Eects, and Inequality." Journal of Economic Literature 42 (4):1056{1093.
Jovanovic, B. 1979. \Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover." Journal of Political
Economy 87 (5):pp. 972{990.
Kahn, L.B. 2009. \Asymmetric information between employers." Mimeo, Yale Uni-
versity.
179
Kahn, L.B. and F. Lange. 2010. \Employer Learning, Productivity and the Earnings
Distribution: Evidence from Performance Measures." IZA Discussion Paper No.
5054.
Keith, K. and A. McWilliams. 1995. \The Wage Eects of Cumulative Job Mobility."
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 49 (1):pp. 121{137.
Koch, A. K. and E. Peyrache. 2009. \Aligning Ambition and Incentives." Journal
of Law, Economics, and Organization .
Krueger, A. and C. Rouse. 1998. \The Eect of Workplace Education on Earnings,
Turnover, and Job Performance." Journal of Labor Economics 16 (1):pp. 61{94.
Kugler, A.D. 2003. \Employee referrals and eciency wages." Labour Economics
10 (5):531{556.
Lambert, R.A., D.F. Larcker, and K. Weigelt. 1993. \The structure of organizational
incentives." Administrative Science Quarterly 38 (3):438{461.
Lazear, E.P. 1986. \Salaries and Piece Rates." Journal of Business 59 (3):405{431.
|||. 1992. Performance Measurement, Evaluation, and Incentives, chap. The job
as a concept. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 183{215.
|||. 2004. \Output-Based Pay: Incentives, Retention or Sorting?" Research in
Labor Economics 23:1{25.
Lazear, E.P. and P. Oyer. 2010. \Personnel Economics." in R. Gibbons and J.
Roberts, eds., Handbook of Organizational Economics .
180
Lazear, E.P. and S. Rosen. 1981. \Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor
Contracts." Journal of Political Economy 89 (5):841{864.
|||. 1990. \Male-Female Wage Dierentials in Job Ladders." Journal of Labor
Economics 8 (1):S106{S123.
Lemieux, T., W. B. MacLeod, and D. Parent. 2009. \Performance Pay and Wage
Inequality." Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (1):1{49.
Leonard, J.S. 1990. \Executive Pay and Firm Performance." Industrial and Labor
Relations Review 43 (3):13S{29S.
Lin, M. J. 2005. \Opening the black box: The internal labor markets of company
X." Industrial Relations 44 (4):659{706.
MacDonald, G.M. 1988. \Job Mobility in Market Equilibrium." The Review of
Economic Studies 55 (1):pp. 153{168.
Marsden, P.V. 2001. Social Capital: Theory and Research, chap. Interpersonal Ties,
Social Capital, and Employer Stang Practices. Transaction Publishers, New
Brunswick, NJ.
McCue, K. 1996. \Promotions and wage growth." Journal of Labor Economics
14 (2):175{209.
McLaughlin, K. J. 1991. \A Theory of Quits and Layos with Ecient Turnover."
Journal of Political Economy 99 (1):pp. 1{29.
181
Medo, J.L. and K.G. Abraham. 1981. \Are Those Paid More Really More Produc-
tive? The Case of Experience." Journal of Human Resources 16 (2):pp. 186{216.
Milgrom, P. 1988. \Employment Contracts, Inuence Activities, and Ecient Orga-
nization Design." Journal of Political Economy 96 (1):42{60.
Milgrom, P. and S. Oster. 1987. \Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invis-
ibility Hypothesis." Quarterly Journal of Economics 102 (3):453{476.
Milgrom, P. and J Roberts. 1988. \An Economic-Approach to Inuence Activities
In Organizations." American Journal of Sociology 94 (Suppl. S):S154{S179.
Montgomery, J. D. 1991. \Social Networks and Labor-market Outcomes - Toward
An Economic-analysis." American Economic Review 81 (5):1408{1418.
Mortensen, D.T. 1988. \Wages, Separations, and Job Tenure: On-the-Job Specic
Training or Matching?" Journal of Labor Economics 6 (4):pp. 445{471.
Mukherjee, A. 2008. \Career concerns, matching, and optimal disclosure policy."
International Economic Review 49 (4):1211{1250.
Munasinghe, L. 2000. \Wage growth and the theory of turnover." Journal of Labor
Economics 18 (2):204{220.
|||. 2005. \Expectations matter: Job prospects and turnover dynamics." Labour
Economics 13 (5):1{21.
Murphy, K.J. and J. Zabojnik. 2004. \CEO Pay and appointments: A market-based
explanation for recent trends." American Economic Review 94 (2):192{196.
182
Murphy, K.M. and R.H. Topel. 1985. \Estimation and Inference in Two-Step Econo-
metric Models." Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 3 (4):370{379.
Ortin-Angel, P. and V. Salas-Fumas. 2002. \Compensation and span of control in
hierarchical organizations." Journal of Labor Economics 20 (4):848{876.
Pinkston, J. C. 2009. \A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning with Testable
Implications." Review of Economic Studies 76 (1):367{394.
Prendergast, C. 1993. \The Role of Promotion In Inducing Specic Human-capital
Acquisition." Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (2):523{534.
|||. 1999. \The provision of incentives in rms." Journal of Economic Literature
37 (1):7{63.
Prendergast, C. and R. H. Topel. 1996. \Favoritism in organizations." Journal of
Political Economy 104 (5):958{978.
Rees, A. 1966. \Information Networks in Labor Markets." American Economic
Review 56 (1/2):559{566.
Robinson, C. 1989. \The joint determination of union status and union wage eects:
some tests of alternative models." Journal of Political Economy 97 (3):639{667.
Rogerson, R., R. Shimer, and R. Wright. 2005. \Search-Theoretic Models of the
Labor Market: A Survey." Journal of Economic Literature 43 (4):pp. 959{988.
Rogerson, W.P. 1985. \The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems."
Econometrica 53 (6):pp. 1357{1367.
183
Rosen, S. 1982. \Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings." The Bell
Journal of Economics 13 (2):311{323.
|||. 1986. \Prizes and Incentives In Elimination Tournaments." American Eco-
nomic Review 76 (4):701{715.
Rubin, D.B. 1987. Multiple imputation for nonresponse in surveys, vol. 17. New
York: John Wiley & Sons Inc.
Saloner, G. 1985. \Old boy networks as screening mechanism." Journal of Labor
Economics 3 (3):255{267.
Shinnar, R. S., C.A. Young, and M. Meana. 2004. \The motivations for and outcomes
of employee referrals." Journal of Business and Psychology 19 (2):271{283.
Simon, C.J. and J.T. Warner. 1992. \Matchmaker, matchmaker: The eect of old boy
networks on job match quality, earnings, and tenure." Journal of Labor Economics
10 (3):306{330.
Smeets, V. and F. Warzynski. 2008. \Too many theories, too few facts? What
the data tell us about the link between span of control, compensation and career
dynamics." Labour Economics 15 (4):688{704.
Topa, G. 2011. Hanbook of Social Economics, vol. 1B, chap. Labor Markets and
Referrals. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1193{1221.
Topel, R. H. and M. P. Ward. 1992. \Job Mobility and the Careers of Young Men."
Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (2):pp. 439{479.
184
Waldman, M. 1984. \Job Assignments, Signaling, and Eciency." Rand Journal of
Economics 15 (2):255{267.
|||. 2010. Handbook of Organizational Economics, chap. Theory and evidence in
internal labor markets. University Library of Munich, Germany.
|||. 2011. \Classic Promotion Tournamens Versus Market-Based Tournaments."
Mimeo, Cornell University.
Wooldridge, J.M. 2010. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. MIT
Press.
Zabojnik, J. and D. Bernhardt. 2001. \Corporate tournaments, human capital acqui-
sition, and the rm size-wage relation." Review of Economic Studies 68 (3):693{
716.
185
